Recently it was brought to my attention that Vincent Sapone of "acfaith.com" ("You can't prove the impossible to prove, so there!") had some time ago written a critique of our article on the doctrine of the atonement. It apparently didn't have much effect, since it took months to hear of it, but we'll go ahead and address it now.

Sapone opines that our view is "plagued by many formidable difficulties," and he offers a decalogue of comments. While our own article is not directly addressed, it is known from other circumstances (a Theologyweb discussion) that Sapone had our article in mind. As we will see, Sapone and his sources use deeply flawed arguments that, among other things, rely on emotion, not rational thought, as a basis for objection, and also show a clear lack of knowledge of relevant social data (in particular, on what the ancients regarded as forgiveness, which fits in perfectly with the penal model).

1. The first objection is an attempt to claim that penal substitution (PS) is irreconcilable with certain Biblical passages. However, Sapone only delivers on one specific verse (while vaguely claiming problems in "numerous passages"):

   ...in Mark 2:5 Jesus pronounces a person's sins forgiven. Unless that person and numerous others were forgiven in light of some future event (which seems dubious itself), the formulation of PS above does not work.

   Sapone is right that it would be argued that the person and others "were forgiven in light of" the future event of the crucifixion, but why this "seems dubious" is (characteristic of those with no actual reason to say so) is not explained. If we regard God as beyond time, as residing in an eternal timelessness, then there is no matter of "dubiousness" here to discuss. The persons in the temporal realm prior to the crucifixion looked forward to God's ability to provide salvation. The persons Jesus healed were all Jews who anticipated God's soteriological action. What is "dubious" here other than Sapone's lack of "fourth-dimensional" thinking?

   In his second objection, Sapone shows that he knows this answer, but rather than rebut it or answer it, says that this "introduce(s) new and un-testable material that is questionable itself," though as usual, we are not told why or how it is "questionable" and why it being "un-testable" is any sort of problem when "un-testable" theories of modern physics, biology, astronomy, et al seem to sprout regardless of this "limitation". As elsewhere Sapone seems to play the role of the playground child who exclaims, "I bet you can't jump over that building!" and then smugly says, "I knew you couldn't!"

2. The next "objection" is not an objection at all but a note that we "need to distinguish between the doctrine of atonement and theories of the atonement." That's news to no one. Without Sapone's help, we would never know that we had to make a distinction between "what" and "how" in daily life. Sapone then rattles off the claim that the PS model "does not bring us any closer into understanding how or why Jesus' death reconciles people to God." Sapone and his source Collins can speak for themselves on "not understanding" and not being able to "make sense" of the doctrine. Others are not confused nor puzzled and see no "divine ineffable mystery" whatsoever.
3. Next it is said, the PS model "claims that God cannot simply forgive our sin even if we are truly repentant. His justice demands payment or satisfaction." This is said to be "an instance of introducing a questionable claim that was talked about above." Glenn Miller has already taken this objection apart here and has shown the ignorance of Collins' claim that this sort of idea is "not found anywhere in Scripture". (It is also here where Collins is not informed of the social concept of forgiveness in the ancient world: Malina and Rohrbaugh's Social Science commentary notes that in the ancient world, sin was "a breach of interpersonal relations" that invoked a debt upon the sinner to the "sinnee". Thus also in the PS model of the doctrine of the atonement: Sin incurs a debt upon us to God that Jesus' blood forgives. What Sapone and Collins did not and could not reckon is that the PS model is the ONLY model that fits the ancient definition of forgiveness.)

   Sapone also uses Collins' bewonderment: "Human persons often forgive without demanding satisfaction or punishment, especially when the wrongdoer is apologetic and repentant, and this does not appear to be morally egregious." It is peculiar indeed that Collins and Sapone see no essential difference between "human persons" and a divine being in these terms, and God as one who by nature of His holiness cannot and will not righteously relinquish a demand for satisfaction. We are able to forgive without satisfaction because we have debts of our own and no right to demand it. Try Matthew 18:23-35 for a picture of this, which Collins misses in his misuse of it. (Collins also makes non-specific use of Ezek. 18; on that matter and Collins' likely abuse in mind, see here.)

   Sapone also draws in Porter's "three reasons for rejecting the notion that punishment is necessary for forgiveness:", none of which turn out to be "reasons" at all:

   1. "...there is a strong leaning in church history towards the view that God could have affected atonement for sins in any way that he pleased, but that the way he did was fitting for this or that reason." That's very nice, but this and ten cents will buy a cup of coffee in a cheap burger joint. This is not an argument or an answer to anything in terms of whether or not the PS model is valid, as though citing disagreements or discussion proves anything.
   2. "... that God is free to forgive without punishment squares with widespread moral intuition and moral experience that forgiveness without punishment is not only possible, but virtuous." This is essentially the same inability shown above to differentiate between humans and deity by nature. It is also vague ("widespread moral intuition", etc). Thus, another argument from feeling and subjectivity rather than data and logic.
   3. "...a traditional Christian belief is that God is sovereign over all things, and while there are some logically impossible things that even a sovereign God cannot do, it seems odd that one of these impossibilities is forgiveness without punishment when humans do this regularly." This is just the same argument reworded and recast. It is also again pure subjectivity ("seems odd" to who? not to me). Porter also adds that he does "not find the theological arguments in support of the necessity of punishment compelling" which is excellent news about his state of mind, but doesn't constitute any sort of actual argument.
4. It is then claimed that the PS model "does not actually teach that God forgives us." Sapone quotes Stump as objecting, "To forgive a debtor is to fail to exact all that is in justice due. But, according to (the PS model), God does exact every bit of the debt owed him by human beings; he allows none of it to go unpaid." Here again Sapone's sources betray him, as they are patently unaware that the PS model DOES fit forgiveness as it was understood by ancient writers. As Malina and Rohrbaugh put it, "forgiveness by God meant being divinely restored to one's position and therefore being freed from fear of loss at the hands of God." HOW this was done is not part of the definition, which means "exacting all that is in justice due" is not excluded as a method, whether the person itself somehow pays it, or someone else does (as Jesus does in the PS model).
5. We are then told that the PS model "is self-defeating" but the objection is partly rendered moot by Miller's comments here. Otherwise it is asked, "But then what of all the instances where God punished people in the Old and New Testament? Surely they are being punished more than is deserved because Jesus satisfied the needed punishment?" Here Sapone has regarded these reactions of God as "punishments" which is falsely generalizing under that category. God's reactions in the OT are not simply retributive justice. They serve rather the purpose of either rehabilitation (i.e., enforcing a penalty so that the person does not do the act again) or protection of the innocent or of the greater good. Sapone is aware of this option, but as usual scuttles behind his all-purpose non-answer that it "seems dubious and empirically false to suggest this," not that we are told specifically why this is so or given any case studies to the contrary.
6. We are then told that under the PS model "the doctrine of hell would be unethical," for Christ has paid the penalty. In this again Sapone's sources display remarkable ignorance of the social models of the OT and NT era. God offers us a client-patron relationship in which Jesus acts as broker. In this situation the client's acceptance of the patron's offer of grace is a given in order for the client to receive the benefits of the relationship. The ancients saw nothing "unethical" in this arrangement, and in fact nothing is unethical about it, so what reason other than emotion can be given for saying that it is?
7. Next up, once again the academic limitations of one of Sapone's sources is offered as a reason as we are told it is "very unclear how it could be just to punish an innocent person in place of some other guilty individual, even if the innocent person undergoes the punishment willingly, since moral guilt does not seem the kind of thing that can be transferred to another." The ancients had no problem whatsoever viewing moral guilt as a transferable commodity, and seeing that one could nobly take the place of another. An error is also offered by Sapone's source, Evans:

   Suppose that a mother with two sons, one innocent and one disobedient, inflicted all her disobedient son's justly deserved punishment on her innocent son, on the grounds that the disobedient one was too little to bear his punishment and her justice required her to punish someone. We would not praise her justice, but rather condemn her as barbaric, even if the innocent son had assented to this procedure.

   That last "even if" is scuttled in under the rug, as it were; but only the shortsighted would condemn this as barbaric, especially since, under the PS model, the innocent son is the only one who has a way to "repair" the damage to himself. If the innocent son could resurrect himself after a death penalty and the guilty son could not, is Evans still going to say that the mother's actions are "barbaric"?

   My replies again about the three purposes of modern criminal justice:

   1. Punishment. The criminal above would get a prison sentence, but prison sentences don't often do a lot in this regard. A number of justice experts feel that restitution would be a better way, and indeed, that is the basic principle laid down in the OT law. In this case, restitution might well equal death! Now of course any person could pay the debt if restitution were all there was to the matter! Even at the lower tier of justice, things like speeding tickets can be paid for by a benefactor; where, we ask DTW, is the "satisfaction" in that? But in fact there is satisfaction: For if someone paid restitution for you and you could not afford it, then you would be indebted to that person - which leads to the notion of Christian ethical behavior as an obligation of the believer. But to #2 -
   2. Rehab. We assert that God effects rehab through the indwelling of the Spirit (i.e., sanctification); but let's concentrate on our murder case. Because of the way our justice system is structured, we MIGHT have the murderer go through counseling, therapy, etc. - which is one reason why the substitute of the innocent person would indeed be ludicrous for US. We tie punishment in with rehab to such an extent that letting the innocent volunteer to pay the price does not make sense. However, IF the payment of the innocent person assured that rehab would occur, THEN we could argue that her substitution is acceptable. This is indeed the problem with our totally-human analogy: Our judges (even the most politically "liberal" among them with the greatest faith in human nature!) cannot guarantee that the payment of the price of guilt thereafter results in rehabilitation; but God can, and promises "ultimate" rehabilitation with the gift of the resurrection body (1 Cor. 15) for which the Holy Spirit is a deposit. In the meantime, if we truly accept God's gift of grace, we ought to act like we do!
   3. Protection. Much the same here as with #2 above.

   In addition, we would note that the arguments Sapone and his sources use is entirely based on modern, Western perceptions of justice peculiar to an individualistic society. On that point we recommend something here. It is ironic indeed that Sapone wraps up by saying that, "In this Post-Enlightenment age it seems morally dubious to suggest that the innocent suffering of one person can take away my guilt." Well, we never knew truth was told by looking at a clock, but as it happens, we are the odd ones out and it takes more than a look at the clock to decide who is wrong!

8. The eighth objection is Jesus "could not have satisfied the infinite punishment that our sin warranted." In so doing it offers the typical error that Miller corrects here. In addition it fails upon not grasping that it is Jesus' identity AS deity -- infinite in value, and nature -- that pays for that infinite punishment, not the pain (as Miller further confirms).
9. Sapone's ninth point is not at all rational and is in fact purely emotion. It asks, via Collins, "Consider starving children in Africa. What is the Gospel message of the Penal and Satisfaction theory to them? 'Even though most of your life you have been starving, and your brain barely functions, and you have been abused by others who have killed your parents, raped you, and deprived you of food, you are guilty before God and deserving of eternal punishment and torment in Hell. In fact, the torment you have endured all your life is infinitely less than you actually deserve. But I have good news for you! God has paid the penalty for your sins! He has endured the infinite punishment....' Does this sound like what the central Gospel message to those people should be?" Yes, any why not? Obviously this message needs to be accompanied by assistance to the person's basic needs for food; one may as well complain that there is no need to bring such people the "good news" of cheap nuclear power because in their condition they cannot appreciate the mechanics of reactors. This sort of "crybaby" reasoning is no reasoning at all, but a manipulative attempt to instill guilt for believing the penal model. How about this: Let's say after his deposition, instead of moving safely into exile, Idi Amin was turned out into the wilderness, where he starved so that his brain barely functions, and is abused by others who also killed his parents, raped him, and deprived him of food. Does this mean he did none of his evil acts? (As an aside, let's remember what Miller had to say about the nature of that punishment here. The nature of the punishment does not warrant that "guilt trip".)
10. Sapone's tenth and last point has to do with original sin. Since I do not adhere to the "typical" view of this doctrine (see here) I will not address Sapone's commentary on this subject.

And so ends the critique of PS. As shown, Sapone offers little more than hand-wringing and anachronistic confusion.