Previously we had our say on Hector Avalos' demand to end Biblical studies; now we will have a look at another of his temper tantrums, which is yet another magnificat from Prometheus Press (not, naturally, a credible scholarly press). This one is called Fighting Words, and it's generally a tantrum with the theme, "Religion sucks." How, precisely, does it do this? Boiled down, the argument goes like this:

1. Religion has been a cause for war in history (because it offers scarce resources).
2. Religions are all false (so that the resources actually don't exist).
3. Therefore, wars caused by religion are very very very bad (because they are a waste of time for "non-existent gain" [29]).
4. Therefore, the solution: Get rid of religion!

Of course, the fact that the vast majority of wars in history have had no discernible religious cause doesn't seem to bother Avalos at all; but that is most likely because his issue is the ants he has in his pants over religion. Taken together, the fact that most wars do NOT have a religious cause doesn't sit well with the claim that religion is prone to violence and that it is a truly serious problem. As with his other work (in which he wanted to end Biblical studies, but didn't care about baseball, Paris Hilton, or anything else), it is just as clear that Avalos' purpose is driven by his personal hatred, not by an objective study of the facts. His indication that he is not saying religion causes all violence, and that not all violence is religious [22], is a vast understatement indeed. Moreover, one would suggest that to make his argument in the first place, Avalos needs to prove that ALL religions in question offer "non-existent gain," in other words, prove that their claims upon which violence may be predicated are actually untrue. Naturally, do not expect him to do this. Avalos pledges to naturalism simply and without discussion or argument [103-4]. There is also very little to say when Avalos begs this enormous question and then proceeds to argue as though he has already proven it true. This, regrettably, constitutes the bulk of argumentation in the book. There is also very little in the way of defense of the proposition that violence is wrong in specific situations, but that may be to be expected since Avalos believes he has already accomplished this argument by dismissing religion as false. We are never told why, for example, it was wrong for Elijah to order the deaths of Baal's prophets [144]; presumably we would be told that "it was for religion, a waste of time" was reason enough, making it unnecessary to defend any proposition under which Elijah truly represents YHWH and Baal's prophets thereby undermine the social order.

All of that said, our examination of this book will be limited. Much is outside or scope (eg, chapters on Islam) and other chapters, such as the ones surveying prior views, may or may not be valid for all we care (given Avalos' utter incompetence in fields outside his scope, and his tendency to bend the truth as it suits him, I would not count on any of this book deserving benefit of the doubt). In this first part we range as far as Chapter 6 with a few comments.

54 -- It is, to say the least, interesting to see Avalos tanning fellow atheist/agnostic Michael Shermer for his views not being radical enough (eg, taking for granted that Abraham was a historical figure, which Avalos denies). I'd ask what Avalos' criteria and arguments are for this, but since he is so irrational as to believe that the Christ-myth is plausible, and is likely too afraid to debate that issue, there'd be little point.

78 -- It is also amusing to witness Avalos having the nerve to challenge credentialed sociologists outside his field, like Rodney Stark, with a mere page of text and charges of textual cherry-picking.

118 -- Here is an example of how Avalos' fundamentalist mindset remains entrenched within him. He flaws the Deueteronomic "prophet test" thusly:

Of course, this criterion was of only limited value and could result in contradictory conclusions. For example, let us suppose that a prophet of Baal predicted that it would rain in the next few days, and that a prophet of Yahweh also predicted the same thing. If rain comes, then the criterion of fulfillment would not be sufficient to distinguish a false prophecy from a true prophecy.

It is amazing that Avalos is so simple-minded as to believe that this analysis is meaningful or represents any actuality. A clash of prophets would have resulted in a serious honor-challenge, meaning that either the second prophet would take the opposing view (taking confidence in his deity to take care of fulfillment) or would have upped the ante with a greater challenge of some sort (like a more specific prophecy). Is Avalos so lacking in sense that he thinks that each prophet would make the same prediction, and leave it at that to be made an inevitable draw?

150 -- One cannot help but find it paranoid that Avalos considers circumcision to be a type of violence. We wonder when he plans to launch his campaign against violence associated with body piercings and tattoo parlors.

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