Previously we had our say on Hector Avalos' demand to end Biblical studies; now we will have a look at Fighting Words. Boiled down, the argument goes like this:

1. Religion has been a cause for war in history (because it offers scarce resources).
2. Religions are all false (so that the resources actually don't exist).
3. Therefore, wars caused by religion are very very very bad (because they are a waste of time for "non-existent gain" [29]).
4. Therefore, the solution: Get rid of religion.

Of course, the fact that the vast majority of wars in history have had no discernible religious cause doesn't seem to bother Avalos at all. Taken together, the fact that most wars do NOT have a religious cause doesn't sit well with the claim that religion is prone to violence and that it is a truly serious problem. As with his other work (in which he wanted to end Biblical studies, but didn't care about baseball, Paris Hilton, or anything else), it is just as clear that Avalos' purpose is driven by his personal hatred, not by an objective study of the facts.

His indication that he is not saying religion causes all violence, and that not all violence is religious [22], is a vast understatement indeed. Moreover, one would suggest that to make his argument in the first place, Avalos needs to prove that ALL religions in question offer "non-existent gain," in other words, prove that their claims upon which violence may be predicated are actually untrue. Naturally, do not expect him to do this. Avalos pledges to naturalism simply and without discussion or argument [103-4].

There is also very little to say when Avalos begs this enormous question and then proceeds to argue as though he has already proven it true. This, regrettably, constitutes the bulk of argumentation in the book. There is also very little in the way of defense of the proposition that violence is wrong in specific situations, but that may be to be expected since Avalos believes he has already accomplished this argument by dismissing religion as false. We are never told why, for example, it was wrong for Elijah to order the deaths of Baal's prophets [144]; presumably we would be told that "it was for religion, a waste of time" was reason enough, making it unnecessary to defend any proposition under which Elijah truly represents YHWH and Baal's prophets thereby undermine the social order.

All of that said, our examination of this book will be limited. Much is outside or scope (eg, chapters on Islam) and other chapters, such as the ones surveying prior views, may or may not be valid.

I will also not repeat points also found in his other book, End of Biblical Studies.

54 -- It is, to say the least, interesting to see Avalos criticizing fellow atheist/agnostic Michael Shermer for his views not being radical enough (eg, taking for granted that Abraham was a historical figure, which Avalos denies). I'd ask what Avalos' criteria and arguments are for this, but since he believes that the Christ-myth is plausible, and is likely unwilling to debate that issue, there'd be little point.

78 -- It is also interesting to witness Avalos challenging credentialed sociologists outside his field, like Rodney Stark, with a mere page of text and charges of textual cherry-picking.

118 -- Here is an example of how Avalos' fundamentalism remains entrenched within him. He flaws the Deueteronomic "prophet test" thusly:

Of course, this criterion was of only limited value and could result in contradictory conclusions. For example, let us suppose that a prophet of Baal predicted that it would rain in the next few days, and that a prophet of Yahweh also predicted the same thing. If rain comes, then the criterion of fulfillment would not be sufficient to distinguish a false prophecy from a true prophecy.

Hardly so. A clash of prophets would have resulted in a serious honor-challenge, meaning that either the second prophet would take the opposing view (taking confidence in his deity to take care of fulfillment) or would have upped the ante with a greater challenge of some sort (like a more specific prophecy). Does he really think that each prophet would make the same prediction, and leave it at that to be made an inevitable draw?

150 -- One cannot help but find it odd that Avalos considers circumcision to be a type of violence. We wonder when he plans to launch his campaign against violence associated with body piercings and tattoo parlors.

160ff -- Ch. 7 is about academic defenses of violence in the OT. Only one of these theories interests us at all: The one Avalos called the "greater good" theory as advocated by Kaminsky. Here Avalos purposely diverts attention away from one of Kaminsky's points. Kaminsky noted that comparisons of the war against the Canaanites to Nazi tactics is illicit because Israel made no attempt to make war on Canaanites that fled the Promised Land. Avalos clearly does not see the point here, for he responds:

This argument is somewhat puzzling because it presumes that slaughter within the borders of Canaan somehow is a mitigating factor. Would Kaminsky argue that the slaughter that took place within German borders is somehow more justified?

No, what Kaminsky is saying is that analogies to Nazi tactics are false -- nothing more. Avalos is putting words in Kaminsky's mouth. Nazis pursued genocide, the extermination of a group of people, regardless of their location -- as they went past their own borders to find them. Israel did not. Israel would have done nothing to the Canaanites had they all packed up and left the Promised Land. Israel was not out to commit genocide, period.

Kaminsky also notes that the condemnation of the Amalekites is "phrased in terms of a cosmic battle" between God and the Amalekites. Avalos finds this in contradiction to Kaminsky's comment about the Canaanites not being pursured past national boundaries, apparently missing the change in subject matter.

It is also hard to see why Avalos thinks the use of "cosmic battle" language contradicts battle within national borders. Obviously the actual war against Amalek's people was not "cosmic".

Other than that, Avalos collapses down contexts to a lowest common denominator to arrive at the conclusion that "Nazi policy can be seen as simply one of the most tragic applications of policies enunciated in the Bible." It is just as easy for Nazis to say that the war against them is such an "application" -- but it isn't an argument, except by outrage.

162 -- Kaminsky rightly points out that obedience, not ethnicity, was the mark of the covenant people, using Rahab as an example. Avalos agrees and thereby misses the point. Yes, it was Rahab's obedience in aiding Joshua that enabled her to be spared. Avalos tries to divert the issue by suggesting that Rahab was "a victim of effective terrorism" anbd comparing her to Nazi collaborators, which is nothing but a contrivance on his part.

Does Avalos ever get beyond argument by outrage? Not here, but we'll see some other place where he tries and fails, later on.

179 -- says that the Council of Nicea "enshrined the doctrine of the trinity as part of orthodoxy" (see here). The same lack of knowledge of Wisdom theology leads Avalos to say later (199) that the author of Hebrews "does not believe that Jesus is God."

186 -- Avalos states, "The fact is that we do not know how or why the books in the New Testament were selected." Really?

187 -- Acts 19:19 is noted, as a place where people burnt books, though Avalos doesn't seem to notice here that people were burning their OWN books.

203 -- Avalos somehow gets out of this:

Luke 14:23 And the lord said unto the servant, Go out into the highways and hedges, and compel them to come in, that my house may be filled.

....that "Christians must compel nonbelievers to enter the kingdom of God" because the king was trying to get his servants to "force people" to come in off the streets into his banquet. The word used can mean that force is used, but context decides that, and Avalos has simply read "force" into the text. The word used more often is used of persuasion by argument or non-violent means, such as in: "Jesus constrained his disciples to get into the ship." (Matt. 14:22)

204 -- false understanding of slavery in the NT era. See here.

216 -- chapter 9 opens with Avalos' exegesis of Luke 14:26 found in EOBS. I would not note this, except that it is very telling that rather than address qualified scholars such as Malina or Witherington for the opposite view, Avalos takes on the popular preacher J. Vernon McGee.

223 -- Yes, it is quite true that true Biblical love can mean violence when necesary for the greater good.

226 -- Pointless observation that the Golden Rule is not original. Since when is "originality" a means value for ethics?

228 -- Usual argument about Deut. 14:26, followed up by objections about the death of David's infant son using the same faulty exegesis.

230 -- Avalos thinks that Rom. 12:14 refers to "violence" of literally pouring coals on someone else's head. See here.

Chapters 10 and 11 are on Islam and will not be addressed here; nor will Ch. 12 on the Nazi Holocaust and ch. 14-17 which are Avalos' discussions of such things as foreign policy. Thus we end with Ch. 13, which is Avalos' attempt to deflect criticisms associated with violence under atheist regimes.

This is Avalos' shortest chapter, and has all the bearing of someone who is trying to get the matter out of the way as fast as he can. Avalos' rationale is that Stalin's actions "had as a much to do with politics as with atheism," and he proceeds to lay out Stalin's political motivations.

In so doing he evades the critical point: That the charge is that atheism is what morally permitted Stalin to enact politics as he did, using violence, rather than being a direct motovator of Stalin's actions. In short, whether his atheism led to a view of humanity as tools that meant that he felt no moral compunction against disposing of people as he did. Whether a case can be made against that is another matter, but Avalos has clearly avoided the critical question.

Avalos closes the chapter with a bit on alleged communism in the Bible in which he makes the same mistake noted here. He also tries to evade the problem of Ananias' death being for lying, rather than for not giving money, by stating that Acts "still endorses the idea that a promise to enjoin collectivization can be enforced through violence." [332] But it does not matter what the subject of the promise was at all. Therefore, Avalos is trying to shift reader attention from the real issue.

-JPH