Objection 4: God Isn't Worthy if He Kills Innocent Children

This chapter offers Strobel's talk with Norman Geisler, and I will confess from the start that I am not happy with who Strobel chose to speak to on this subject. I would have rather seen him talk to Glenn Miller of the Christian ThinkTank, who has written numerous articles on this subject offering a wealth of detail about the social world of the OT and conditions that apply to this question: for example here, here, and here. We also have some points of our own here and here, and Miller also deals with the issue of slavery here. Geisler offers nothing of this level of detail, so I can hardly blame Jacobsen for responding to Geisler's pat comment of there being "no cruel or tortuous executions" ordered by God by quoting passages from the OT offering what he believes are just that. Miller's articles go into the depth on these particulars that Geisler plainly lacks, and answer all of Jacobsen's questions (such as, "How did they know which girls were virgins?" -- the general answer, "By dress." -- and "Just how bad were those Canaanites?" -- answer, worse than Jacobsen thinks.) If Jacobsen thinks any of what Miller offers are "lame excuses" he will need to put himself in the shoes of inhabitants of the ANE and explain why. It is clear from his request for "better solutions" such as finding homes for the children of these people that he has not considered in detail the type of world and the conditions these people lived in.

So what does that leave us? Jacobsen asks for one:

And another thing to note in the Deuteronomy account, the reason God gives for His order of the killings is that He is afraid that the Israelites will learn the evil ways of their enemies. Whatever happened to free will? I thought God's people were expected--demanded--to resist the influence of evil. Here, God doesn't trust His people to resist evil and finds that a good reason to exterminate people!

What happened to free will? Well, here's the rub: The principle of free will does NOT claim that God will NEVER step in like this, but that His stepping in will only be to the minimal amount required in order to achieve His purposes. To put it in sum, God can logically save no one unless he tells someone how to be saved. This logically requires Him to reveal Himself and technically violate someone's free will. Of course to ensure that everyone has that fair shot at being saved may require more than this; here, the paradigm would state that God needed to establish a people on earth to host the Messiah, and His message, and had He not destroyed the Canaanites, this would not have been possible. The free will issue involves a balance which must be struck: one may of course argue that the balance is uneven, but here again, as noted in Chapter 1, one must essentially assume omniscience of all historical alternatives.

It is next written: "[Geisler] argues that the Canaanites were simply beyond salvation. This seems to contradict what I understand to be a fundamental tenant of Christianity--that everyone is loved by God, even if He hates their sin; and that everyone has the potential to see their sins, repent, and be saved." I am not sure where Jacobsen gets the idea that this is a "fundamental tenet of Christianity" -- the second part, at least. That everyone is loved by God is held (per John 3:16) but "everyone has the potential to see their sins, repent, and be saved" is not, unless Jacobsen speaks here theoretically. If so, it needs to be added that this also includes the idea that despite that potential, there are those who will NOT ever see their sin, repent, and be saved. Further development on this point we have done here.

Jacobsen continues, "And is it not likely some of God's precious Israelites were killed in battle?" It is more than likely; it is acknowledged to have happened, but here again Jacobsen falls for the same "temptation" as in Chapter 1: "Seems like God could come up with a better way to get rid of the Canaanites without risking lives of Israelites, and without all the warring and bloodshed. How about a one-way force-field that would keep anybody God doesn't like out of the Holy Land, but not impede God's precious favored people?" Well, certainly, why not? Why not also the same at Waterloo, Gettsyburg, and Dunkirk? And why not also force fields that would keep us from sin? Why not have God hovering over us every moment? Once Jacobsen starts that ball rolling, he's asking for interference in every area of his life and no free will to speak of. Requests like these are the product of emotional reaction, not reason. The principle again is minimal interference -- moreover, could Jacobsen predict what sort of people the Israelites would be if they were thus invincible in battle? Can he contemplate what that might do to the national character of the Israelites? This needs to be addressed, for otherwise merely throwing out suggestions like these is thoughtless reactionarianism.

Jacobsen expresses surprise at Geisler's answer that children were killed as an act of mercy, for they would be eternally saved. This is not an argument I would use myself in this context (while agreeing that such children would indeed be so saved), but I will nevertheless offer answers to Jacobsen's questions:

• "First of all, when exactly does one reach the age of accountability? I've never heard a very satisfactory answer to this. The only answers I've heard are along the lines of, 'it differs for every individual and God knows when you are old enough to decide your fate.'" This is true; why is it "unsatisfactory"? Here again as in Ch. 1 Jacobsen is objecting not to the answer itself, but to his lack of knowledge and inability to (quite honestly!) know the minds and hearts of every individual! Why should it matter to (and really, why should it be the concern of) Jacobsen whether anyone but himself has the ability to be accountable at any particular time and place?

  Jacobsen supposes we might pick 18 as an "average" age of accountability, but I reply that the calendar has little if anything to do with it. Moreover, one may pass such a point of accountability in some areas of life before passing it with others. With respect to the Gospel, some may be accountable by 12 or 13 (I would have been!); others by 18, others by 21 or 25. I find it very unlikely that anyone would need more time than that, barring unusual circumstances (such as a mental disorder). Trying to cloud the issue by saying that "maturation [is] a gradual, lifelong process" does not address the matter. There is clearly always a point at which one is obliged to make a rational and informed decision on any matter.

• It is said, "And, if killing a child can in any circumstance be better than to let the child live, what does that say about the value of life on Earth? Christians frequently claim that atheism degrades the value of human life. But isn't this theology doing exactly that? Isn't it saying that the children were better off having no life on Earth because they will have a better life in heaven?" This is one reason why I do not use the argument as Geisler has formulated it. Rather the matter would be framed in terms of what accomplishes the greater good. Here, as Miller's articles show, letting such children live would if anything amount to a greater cruelty, as well as a long-term danger to others -- and note well his points that ancient persons agreed with this view. If Jacobsen seeks an analogy, he may consider modern arguments for voluntary euthanasia. The ANE's values had within the structure certain conditions under which it was considered better to be dead than alive.
• Jacobsen also presents Geisler's reply to Strobel asking why it is not logical to therefore support abortion. Geisler notes that only God has the right to decide such things, and that our culture is not as corrupt as those destroyed. To this I would add that the social options available have changed significantly. But as to Geisler's response, Jacobsen says he does not find it "satisfactory" and does not actually answer, nor does he do so when he brings forth the example of Andrea Yates. Merely expressing personal dissatisfaction is not an answer. Nor is posting emotional rants from other writers who extract hyperbole from their quiver.
• It is then asked, "...what possible value is living beyond the age of accountability? Of what use is life on Earth if all it means is just a possible chance to throw away salvation?" Such persons -- we might use Madalyn O'Hair as an example -- may nevertheless continue to serve a purpose for the greater good; if they will never be saved themselves, their poor example may save others, as indeed O'Hair has done, unwittingly, through her converted son. (On these points we recommend Miller's series here, notably part 4.

Next up, Jacobsen briefly discusses the question, "does God do things because they are good, or are things good because God does them?" He does not delve into the matter in depth, and neither shall we, but his objections again are not against the matters themselves as his own (and our) lack of knowledge. "For example, how can we know that God did not order the September 11 attack?" We can't; we can weigh evidence and make hypotheses, but what of it?

And next, original sin. My view on this matter differs significantly from Geisler's (see here) so I will not defend his arguments. However, I do not see any validity to Jacobsen's objection that any propensity we have to sin means we cannot be blamed for sinning. This is a shifting-blame approach that refuses personal responsibility.

The subject shifts now to the reliability of the Bible. Geisler pointed to external confirmations of the text, and Jacobsen somewhat petulantly replies:

I'm no expert on history or archaeology, but my instincts tell me this isn't a valid argument. It seems reasonable to me that real events beget legends. People who lived in the times, probably knew who was king at the time, what cities were where, etc. As an analogy, in a few hundred years, someone finding a video of the movie Titanic could conceivably conclude that it was a documentary piece. Lots of events in the movie could conceivably be confirmed via other records of the Titanic. So, using the same reasoning, someone could erroneously conclude that the events in the movie were all historic.

There's a certain irony here, since the movie Titanic was thoroughly researched and every effort was made to surround the truly fictional characters with what was known to be true history! But as for Jacobsen's "instincts" he may wish to share them with historians who routinely use such confirmations to decide whether or not a historian is reliable. He may also enlighten us as to what means he uses to decide whether to trust others -- if it is not their previous record, then what criteria does he use? Or does he trust no one? Moreover, no one is even claiming that a modern movie is intended as a historical account, and Titanic, for all its virtues, does not fit within the genre of a narrative documentary.

Geisler discusses further issues which Jacobsen declines comment upon, such as history and alleged Bible contradictions, admirably acknowledging a lack of expertise and referring readers to the Secular Web. We in turn refer the reader to materials on this site; if Jacobsen thinks any of these are subject to the criticism's of Tobin's article he refers to, we'd like to know how.

There is then a diversion to the matter of carnivorous animals and the Fall. This is quite beyond my scope but I refer the reader to Miller's item here. Jacobsen closes with comments on vegetarianism and I think he would be pleased with my position offered here.