As noted in Part 1, Kyle and I have since come to know each other better, and some of the harsh judgments I made there and below, I have now tempered. We have now started a serires here together. The content below remains unchanged, with the admonition that the text would be less critical if written today.

It's a pleasure when a skeptic responds, and a dual pleasure when they know HTML and save me some trouble. To thank Mr. Gerkin for his competence (in this matter at least! ) I'm going to post the following as he sent it to me, and by agreement, insert my replies in this nasty color. We'll also continue in a dialogue format since that is most convenient. Everything here is as presented, other than that I have removed some of my original editorial commentary that Gerkin did not (and of course would not have to) comment upon. The "first person" speaking to start is Gerkin himself.

For the purposes of this document:

Holding's review is in plain text.

Excerpts from my orginal essay are in italics.

My responses are in bold.

And my responses are in this nasty bluish tone.

Still Failing the Bar Exam

Or, Another Legal Loopity-Loop
James Patrick Holding

"Ladies and gentleman, may I direct your attention to the center ring, for the premier performance of 'The Amazing Gerkin'! See him pick up and hurl elephants with ease! Watch as he flounders like a fish through Ancient Near Eastern social data! Observe as he scrupuolously ignores scholarship and blithely dimisses those with twenty times his learning! Yes, folks, you couldn't pay enough for this type of performance -- not since the Osmonds!"

Holding starts out with ad hominem attacks, lampooning me as an author in an effort to denigrate my credibility. These are cheap rhetorical tricks, that have no bearing on the truth or falsehood of the propositions laid out in my article. This is certainly not the tone of an objective analysis.

He's right. This is the tone of someone who can't help but not take his opponents seriously. It's also two other things: 1) levity to bring humor to a dry topic; 2) a method of exposing those who take themselves far too seriously. ;-)

The Secular Web has a few intelligent people, but overall has long been a haven for every skeptical know-it-all to pronounce judgments upon matters outside of their expertise. The trend continues with the work of one Kyle Gerkin, who, with striking resemblances to a certain project called The Jury Is In, deigns to critique the popular Case for Faith by Lee Strobel.

Again, I am practically declared an ignorant lout before we've even discussed one aspect of my essay.

That would indeed be inappropos, as long as I didn't go on to prove the point -- which I did, in spades. Indeed, Gerkin admits (to his credit) to several mistakes in what follows, and while "ignorant lout" is probably too serious a categorization, "skeptical know-it-all pronouncing judgments upon matters outside his expertise" seems to have fit very well.

Ages ago I noted that to attack such works as McDowell's and Strobel's, in the manner that the Secular Web does, is to do so under a pretense of having covered all bases and as if what they record is the last word in Christian scholarship. To do so is to seriously misapprehend the purpose of such works. McDowell's material is only the tip of the iceberg, as we have amply shown over the past several years in his defense; Strobel's material takes matters a significant step further, but necessarily cannot cover all possible bases or objections from every quarter, ranging from the serious to the ludicrously uninformed.

In no way do I think people such as Strobel or McDowell are the last word in Christian scholarship. Rather the reverse, I know they are just scratching the surface. However, their works are quite popular and so they deserve a response. Also, while Strobel's book may not claim to be the alpha and omega of scholarship, it is clearly intended to sufficiently answer the objections it poses and even be convincing enough to convert unbelievers. In these respects, it is grossly deficient, and that is the point of my critique.

However, as I have noted, Strobel earns my praise and respect where McDowell does not, because his material provides direct pointers to those who provide answers on "the next level" for those who need them. And it is for this reason that I have gladly defended his work, and do so now yet again.
Gerkin also deserves some small credit in this regard. At least in his response, he provides indications that there is more material elsewhere, as throughout his critique there are links to further information within the Secular Web. That does deserve some small credit, but not much. Tactically this amounts to "hurling the elephant" because unless links are given with specific application -- rather than only listing links to large sets of material and yelling, "Here, this will cover it!" -- it's little more than a confidence job. I readily provide links when answers are provided elsewhere, but only where there are specific applications. Linking to the Secular Web's entire collection of essays on "the argument from evil" is little more than rhetorical excess and tactical laziness.

Much as Strobel's book could be considered introductory apologetics, my review should be considered an introductory secular work. The "argument from evil" is far too complex to be completely dealt with in my response, or really in any one article - which is the reason for my link. As far as specificity is concerned, I linked to a collection of essays dealing with the specific issue of the "argument from evil" so they are all relevant, they are all of reasonably high caliber, and best of all, they deal with different aspects of the issue. My intent was not to overwhelm the reader with rhetorical excess, but rather to provide a jumping off point for further education if so desired.

Once again, this merely exposes the absurdity of projects "exposing" works like those of McDowell and Strobel within the context indicated. Moreover, this does not prove, beyind Gerkin's own opinion, that the material linked to is indeed worth the effort. Why not educate us with direct material from the essays?

Section 1: Evil and Suffering

The idea here is that God must allow some short term suffering in order to achieve a greater good. The analogy employed by professor Kreeft involves a hunter who is trying to free a bear from a trap, but cannot because the bear is liable to react violently, incorrectly perceiving the hunter as a threat. The hunter must therefore use tranquilizer darts and the like, which also would seem to the bear as harmful, in order to achieve what is ultimately best for the bear, i.e. freedom from the trap. The analogy is, of course, Hunter = God, Bear = Human (pp. 31-2).
Problems:
For starters, if God is omnipotent, couldn't he still achieve the long term good without the short term suffering? If he cannot, he is not omnipotent. To suggest that there are things God absolutely cannot do, is to suggest that there are laws which operate over and above God, that even He can't transcend. I have no problem with this, but most Christians, including Kreeft, do. Thus the analogy is a false one, because no matter how sophisticated a human being might appear to a bear, the human is not omnipotent and therefore cannot conjure up a completely painless solution to the bear's plight, whereas God, if he is indeed omnipotent, could achieve good without the suffering.  This is but one of many reasons such attempts at answering this objection fail.  For more, see the Secular Web's library on the Argument from Evil.

Here Gerkin displays a fundamental ignorance of what it means to be "omnipotent." Omnipotence does not cover the ability to do that which is logically impossible -- such acts are outside the range of "power" and are not relevant to a doctrine of omnipotence. To use an example I like, God cannot make 2 + 2 = 5, and this does not compromise omnipotence because it doesn't matter how much power one has; such things cannot be changed. One could, after the manner of Orwell's 1984 tyrants, use torture to "convince" people that 2 + 2 = 5, but this is not the same thing -- 2 + 2 objectively remains 4. One could also play a semantic game and use the symbol "4" to equate with a group of objects that we would now numerically associate with the symbol "5". But again, this is not the same thing as actually making 2 + 2 = 5 as we understand the equation.
What is especially surprising here is that Gerkin thinks that "most Christians, including Kreeft" would have a problem with this. Most Christians I know do not have a problem with this at all -- actually none I know have a problem with it, although some, when hearing this for the first time, do realize that it is something they have not considered before. Kreeft himself has expressed this view in his other works and would be as surprised to be told that his name is Peter. This is not a matter, though, of a law that God cannot "transcend" but a law that is part of His nature. God of course could not transcend His own nature, here, as a ontologically consistent being. He cannot know something and not know it. He cannot do something and also not do it.  That Gerkin believes this to be a problem shows just how little he knows about modern apologetic arguments and monotheistic theology. (A little later he expresses surprise when Kreeft "deviates" from the "hard line Christian stance" [!] and makes this very point! Because of this, I also seriously doubt if Gerkin knows of or understands the intricacies of the arguments he is both criticizing and promoting.)

I have encountered many Christians who claimed God was capable of the logically impossible. Perhaps I mischaracterized such a position as the "hard line Christian stance" but the belief is certainly extant. In my experience, most Christians want to attribute God with primacy over all things, but if logic is part of God's nature, then it is at least equivalent to God in terms of necessary existence.

That said, it is indeed logically and theoretically possible that certain good could not be achieved without suffering. And this has been ably argued in detail by Glenn Miller here -- I daresay with greater alacrity from its perspective than the entirety of the Secular Web's collection corresponding "Argument from Evil" material. One elephant deserves another!

Coincidentally, an Christian friend of mine actually sent me the above link a few weeks ago, and I responded in kind. My response was not a comprehensive refutation, but just a short overview of why I feel Miller's essay is flawed. In any case, since you mentioned it, I will reproduce my comments here:

Good enough. Apparently this is a dialogue between Gerkin and his Christian friend. Let's look at those comments; I'll leave my own comments aside for a while, since I agree with what his friend had to offer as a whole:

Essentially, the paper seems to center around the Fall and its
implications for God's character. The problem boils down to two
statements held by Christians:

1. God created the universe and everything in it.
2. God is omniscient - he knows everything that has happened or ever
will happen.

If you object to either of those statements, let me know.

But if you hold those statements to be true, then you are in a bit of a
pickle. Because the inescapable conclusion to be drawn from such a
situation is that: God created Adam & Eve with the precise foreknowledge that they would
Fall. Now, we can hardly blame Adam & Eve for this.  Yes, they made a
choice, but clearly the choice could not have been any different than
it was because God created the whole situation knowing that it would
unfold one way and one way only.

Here's an analogy:
Suppose I wrote a computer program called "Number Chooser". It is a
simple program that asks the user to enter two separate numbers. Then, the
program "chooses" the higher of the two and displays it on the screen.

I created the program with the precise foreknowledge of how it would
operate. Thus, while the program makes a choice, it can never select
the lower number because I created the whole program to operate one way and
one way only.

I have yet to see this argument refuted successfully.

*********************
From My Friend:

>Suppose I wrote a computer program called "Number Chooser". It is a simple
>program that asks the user to enter two separate numbers. Then, the
>program "chooses" the higher of the two and displays it on the screen.

>I created the program with the precise foreknowledge of how it would
>operate. Thus, while the program makes a choice, it can never select the
>lower number because I created the whole program to operate one way and
>one way only.

Actually, you are not giving the program free choice, because at the
beginning, you programmed it to only pick the higher number.  So while it
makes a choice, it is one that you pre-destined, not just foreknew.    God
didn't program us to operate one way and one way only.  Knowing what choices
somebody will make is entirely different from making the choice for them.

**********************
From Me Again:

>Actually, you are not giving the program free choice, because at the
>beginning, you programmed it to only pick the higher number.  So while it
>makes a choice, it is one that you pre-destined, not just foreknew.
>God didn't program us to operate one way and one way only.  Knowing what
>choices somebody will make is entirely different from making the choice for them.

How can you have foreknowledge without predestiny? The two  concepts
are inextricably linked. If Adam & Eve might've chosen to Fall, but
might've chosen not to Fall, then God couldn't know which they would choose
until it actually happened. And if God knew the choice they would make
*before they actually made it* then there obviously was no way they could have
decided otherwise.  And if God created us, in every detail, and created
the world, in every detail, and knew exactly how we would react and
interact with that world, then how is that any different from me
programming a computer?

I do not know if or how Gerkin's friend responded, but I am surprised at Gerkin's naivete here. Foreknowledge and "predestiny" [!] are indeed inextricably linked, but not in such a way that is problematic as Gerkin supposes. Knowing that someone will do something does not necessitate that they must do something, and this is no way compromises free will. The computer analogy is indeed badly flawed. In any event, this seems to be all Gerkin has to say about Miller's extensive series for the time being, and all I can say is, it deserves an F for effort.

I would also add that while the bear analogy is therefore not flawed in the way Gerkin supposes, it is unavoidably "flawed" (but not actually flawed, since its intent is limited) in other ways. For the analogy to be perfect the trap would have had to been willingly entered by the bear, set by the bear himself, or by other bears. This leads to my own take on the "problem" of evil -- I do not consider it a "problem" at all because it is clear that the overwhelming majority of suffering is either self-inflicted or else inflicted upon us by other men making free choices. Even natural catastrophes such as floods, in which homes are destroyed, owe the bulk of fault to the foolishness of building on known floodplains, on dirt hillsides, or to the obvious tradeoff of building near a riverbank. Those who ask why bad things happen to good people most often find their answer in the mirror.

Are we to believe that no good people are ever mauled by wild animals, or that every person struck down by smallpox or the bubonic plague was evil? Are babies that die of SIDS being punished for the foolishness of parents who place them on their stomachs? And what kind of God punishes people for building near riverbanks? (Until recently) what were people supposed to do, live without a water supply? Your view paints God as a cold hearted fiend.

Gerkin is missing the point; I have not said that such events are always (or for that matter, most of the time!) the result of people being evil. I am saying that they are mostly the result of our own irresponsibility and free choices (which may be morally evil, but may also be, and probably mainly are, just foolish), and therefore we have no right to complain that they occur. Good people mauled by wild animals are almost always venturing into areas where wild animals exist and where the danger is known and real. Smallpox and bubonic plague are spread by unsanitary conditions and by behavior. SIDS babies are not being "punished" (again, Gerkin has failed to grasp my distinction) but if SIDS researchers are correct, do die because of misinformed parental practice (though there is still more research to do in this area, last I checked). And so on with people by the riverbank (and they could certainly build far enough from the river to avoid floods and still get water from it, to say nothing of using aqueducts, etc.).

Moreover, how is it that we feel that we can spit in God's face as we please, violating one after another of His rules, and then expect Him to "run interference" when we have a problem?

God wouldn't have to "run interference" had he the foresight to create a more benevolent universe in the first place.

This is not an answer to the argument; it is merely sour grapes. In the series by Miller it is shown in detail that there is overwhelmingly more good in our existence than bad. The universe as a whole is quite benevolent -- the focus of our news media on tragedy notwithstanding.

To do so would be to compromise a logical necessity -- what Gerkin dismissively calls the "old free will defense." Every sinful action declares to God, "We want our freedom from You!"

Is it not the Christian view that we are inherently sinful creatures? If so, do we inherently want our freedom from God? If so, can we really be blamed for this?

Whether "inherently sinful" or not (I would want to know what Gerkin thinks establishes this premise; from my study, the idea is much more subtle than that), being "sinful" is not the same as "wanting our freedom" -- both must be inherent and separate for this argument to work. Theoretically we could "want our freedom" to do something beneficial (not likely, but it is enough to establish that the two are not the same). Gerkin fails to distinguish between the desire and the expression of the desire.

If that is what we want, God will not force our hand. We'll comment a bit more on this later.

It is one thing to not force our hand, it is quite another to punish those who don't please God.

We agree, but what is the application here?

The fundamental issue at stake here though is defining "good and evil." Why are certain things good and others evil? To a Christian the answer is, more or less, because God says so. But then, if we are to say God is "good," what standard are we judging him by? The only standard a Christian has is that which God has ordained. But with his Hunter/Bear argument Kreeft wants to say this standard can't be used, because it is for humans, and God plays by his own set of rules. However, Kreeft assures us that God will eventually bring about the ultimate good. Why? Because He is all-good, silly! Wait a minute, though. Then the argument is: God is good because God is good? Unfortunately, it doesn't amount to much more than that tautology. If we, as humans, can't judge God by his actions (or inactions) that cause suffering and evil, then how are we to know that he is good? We're not to know. We are to presuppose. But even presupposing that god may be good, how do we know there are justifying reasons for him to refrain from freeing people from the many traps they do fall into? Or even to lay those traps in the first place, given the inherent dangers found throughout nature? The issues here are far more complex than Strobel and Kreeft let on.  For instance, see the Secular Web's libraries on Atheistic Moral Arguments, and Moral Argument and Divine Command Theory.

This point is actually incidental to Kreeft's arguments and is not covered in C4F -- an inevitable constraint of the genre. However, this seems to me a non-issue as well. One would agruably say that moral constraints, like logical ones, are inherent to God's nature. Presupposition is involved in any event and from any view and is inevitably subjective from our limited perspectives. The argument sounds impressive, but is really pointless to pursue.

I hardly think it is pointless to pursue the issue of God's moral character. If I was going to dedicate my life to the worship of a supernatural being, I should like to know what ethical code he observes - and whether he actually observes it. If I were a Christian, I would be most unsatisfied with Kreeft's pat reassurance that God is, somehow or other, working out the best possible good, despite my current observation of evil.

Faith and Prejudice -
Here Kreeft says there is evidence both for and against God. But, he claims the Christian's evidence is prejudiced in favor of God by his personal experience (33-4).
Problems:
At first glance, I failed to see how this is an argument in favor of God. However, after a second reading, I think I see where Kreeft is coming from. The reason I didn't catch it the first time around is that Kreeft and I have different standards for 'evidence'.
Gekrin defines "evidence" in terms of that which is testable and empirically verifiable, and then writes:
Kreeft, I suspect, has a rather different standard. For him I think visions, dreams, personal feelings of joy in prayer, and a sense of direction under God all count as "evidence" for God. In light of this, I believe Kreeft's argument is that Christians are prejudiced, and rightly so, in believing in God because while there is evidence (of the scientific variety) both for and against God, there is also evidence (of the broader, personal variety) for God.

Kreeft here does indeed use the word "evidence" in a more general way, but this is made quite clear on p. 33 where he compares "absolute proof" with "clues" -- the latter of which he refers to as evidence. Such things may be broadly defined as "evidence" in the sense that they are datum which warrant an explanation. Gerkin is engaging a serious nitpick here. But he does go on to hurl the elephants of the Secular Web's library against theism, which is fair, since Kreeft also notes that in one of his books, he summarizes twnety arguments for theism. So again, I suppose one elephant deserves another; but the herd is still not finished walking by:

If you accept Kreeft's standard for personal evidence then yes, you have evidence for Christianity. But you also have evidence for Judaism, Hinduism, Buddhism, Zeus, UFOs, telekinesis, ESP, ghosts, and well, just about anything. This is an old problem of the difference between faith and evidence, and Strobel and Kreeft hardly touch on the real issues, as one can see in the Secular Web's libraries on Faith and Reason and Religious Experience.

I seriously doubt that most of these entries (Zeus, UFOs, etc.) are any more than apples to a Christian orange. Simplistically collapsing down to "just about anything" is tactically impressive only to the similarly simplistic.

Then hopefully it will convince those simplistic enough to accept Kreeft's absurd standards for evidence.

This is not an answer, obviously -- just a sound bite. Simplicity supported with simplicity! When Gerkin wants to start breaking into the specifics, he can call us.

 I'd like to see a particular defense of Zeus in this context. The literature shows that Zeus made himself pretty obvious, grabbing jollies any way he could; tell me of news reports of this happening today, and Gerkin may have a case of more than Uncritical Listing Syndrome.

Tell me of news reports of men being resurrected from the dead today, and I will accept your charge of Uncritical Listing Syndrome.

The implication carries a false dichotomy. The character of the Biblical God is not one of resurrecting people from the dead as often as Zeus went out grabbing jollies. Gerkin is sneaking in an irrelevant argument/sound bite and ignoring the thrust of the argument, which is that Zeus is a poor candidate-example for his original premise with respect to evidence.

A minor point of note: Kreeft says, "If we had absolute proof instead of clues, then you could no more deny God than deny the Sun" (33). Firstly, there are still people who deny that the Earth is round [1], so even when absolute proof is available people will sometimes reject it. Secondly, I fail to see how it would be bad (especially for Christians) if people had no reason to deny God's existence. Why is it better to play a cosmic game of hide and seek?

That people will deny even with absolute proof is of no relevance -- and Gerkin fails to see the answer for #2 in Kreeft's very words: "God gives is just enough evidence so that those who want him can have him." God is "hidden" only from those who don't want him.

This is a nice view for Christians, since it is airtight. Unfortunately, that also makes it worthless, as anyone who finds the evidence for God insufficient can simply be accused of not really wanting God, and summarily dismissed. I could make an equally valid, and equally dogmatic claim that all people who believes the evidence is sufficient are simply deceiving themselves because they do want God.

And of course, this is one reason why I have pages full of material and links for skeptics to refute. Until they do, my dog(matic claim) is bigger than your dog(matic claim). ;-) After this follows my paragraph in which I say, "The evidence is sufficient for unbiased and rational choice. Skeptics will deny this, of course, but after years of reading their various works and the excuses they construct for disbelief (even as those who compose some of the most intelligent and reasoned excuses I have seen), as far as I am concerned, the benefit of the doubt has been exhausted. Skepticism is a religion of faith that seeks any constructed explanation, no matter how out of touch with the relevant data, to keep skeptical beliefs alive. It is also a religion that finds itself satsified with the answer that suits its prejudiuces, never looking further than is needed to prove the point." Gerkin has no comment on this (and really didn't need to comment anyway) but as we will see more or less admits to not investigating certain claims properly before using them. Now, does that not at least have the appearance of one who is earning a summary dismissal rightfully?

Evil As Evidence For God --
Kreeft claims that humans have standards of good and evil and those must have their origin in God. He also claims that impersonal evolution, if it was true, would have created a perfect universe by now. He says that atheism snobbishly disregards the fact that the majority of people believe in God, and robs life of value (34-6).
Problems:
Lots to talk about here. We'll start with standards of good and evil. Kreeft says, "...if there is no God, where did we get the standard of goodness by which we judge evil as evil?" (34). If all you are saying is that "we humans have standards" then it is not a valid jump to say "therefore God had to have made up those standards." This is also annoying because Kreeft is deliberately ignoring a number of easy alternatives. How about the easiest one: We humans made the standards up. In fact, since many different human cultures have had many, wide-ranging sets of standards, I think the "human origin" fits the facts much better. Sure, there are some "nearly-universal" standards found in civilized cultures, but isn't it possible (even likely) that those are the result of what is necessary for human civilization to endure?

Lots to talk about, indeed, but no more than an elephant hurled by; not surprising, since the alternative is easy to say, but not easy to back up. Gerkin's arguments for "made them up" are not without problems of their own. This talk of "wide-ranging sets of standards" is generalizing balderdash. There are no such wide ranges; what ranges is the level of information that informs the actions. To choose one instance: Hinduism values animal life to the extent of not killing cows because they have a view of such animals as divine. If this were indeed true, their moral act would be correct. The basic moral value (honor of the divine) is recognized here as there (even skepticism does not deny this value, it merely assumes there is no "divine" to honor); what is not recognized as the same is the application. Failure to distinguish between base value and application lies at the heart of this typical skeptical argument.

I would argue that there is a far more base value at work than "honor of the divine". The base value is pleasure. To my knowledge, Hindu's believe that prior to each reincarnation, their spirit will suffer or be blessed as determined by their actions in this life. Since killing a cow is coded an evil action in Hinduism, it would severely hurt their after-life stock and lead away from pleasure. Of course, this same idea applies to Christians' heaven and hell doctrines.

This is all quite interesting, and I do not find the expansion on Hinduism disagreeable, but it doesn't address the point at hand, which is that there is no such thing as a "wide-ranging set of standards" in the way Gerkin supposes. The plug about Christian ideas is yet another irrelevant sound bite, and once again misconstrues a popular perception as actuality. (We deal more on hell below; as for heaven, I want some specifics. I would also ask, what matter is it, since the correct choice to make under any moral system -- religious or not -- is that which turns out to be most beneficial, and thus pleasurable, in the long run? Is there any way to respectfully follow a belief system without being accused by Gerkin of self-interest?)

In terms of "what is necessary for human civilazation to endure" -- it is true that standards would indeed be necessary for this, but that does not explain at all why a person should care whether human civilization endures. Why shouldn't a very selfish amd powerful person kill or enslave them all and take everything for themselves? Obviously this would be hard to do, especially now, but this means that only selfish self-preservation, not standards, would prevent such an act.

I would argue that self-preservation is a standard, and is, in fact, the driving force behind some of our most basic values: life, property, loyalty, etc. We can recognize that living in societies where such values are held is beneficial to our survival. Another standard is pleasure. We can try to determine what sort of society we would prefer to live in. The majority of those whose preferences coincide set the general standards.

This is all well and good, but again the issue remains: If a person could get away with mass enslavement and destruction, preserve himself eternally by whatever means, give himself all the pleasure desired, then why should they care about the rest of us? I go on to say:

 Given enough power, the skeptic cannot explain why said person should preserve human civilization.

"Should" implies a goal orientation. I could certainly explain why said person should preserve human civilization for a number of reasons, but if said person's primary goal (above all others) was the destruction of human civilization, I would be unconvincing - as would anyone. That is why we, who value civilization, should withhold power from those who do not.

This is also very interesting, but not specific to the extent needed. What a "goal orientation" has to do with anything in this context, or how it affects my argument, is not clear. Nor does Gerkin answer the "why" -- he only says that we should fight such people or prevent them from getting power, which is obviously not our point of disagreement. The question remains unanswered.

More could and has been said on this, but within our genre constraint, we will go no further, other than to make the point that Gerkin's argument by itself is far too simplistic.

I hold that my answer was no more simplistic than was warranted by Kreeft's unsupported assumption that moral standards must find their origin in God.

I hold that it remains simplistic regardless of what was offered by Kreeft. In other words, "they did it too" is not an answer to the matter.

But even if you decide that it is impossible that humans made the standards up (although I don't see how such a position could be conclusively reached) is the Christian God the only alternative? Could the Jewish or Islamic Gods have been the originators? And why a single God? Why not a Council or Pantheon of Gods? A Cosmic Congress, if you will. I don't see how these alternatives can be discounted.  Also, sound atheistic alternatives cannot be simply ignored, as one can see from the Secular Web's library on Morality and Atheism, and theistic attempts to make a god necessary actually fail, as is shown in the Secular Web's library on Moral Argument and Divine Command Theory.

Here we have what I have elsewhere termed Uncritical Listing Syndrome, a disease borne often by pagan copycat theorists, but often found elsewhere as well; in skeptics, usually with reference to arguments about the Scriptural canon, i.e., "Why weren't any of these 423 books in the canon?" In this case, we have merely an uncritical list of alternatives with no evaluation, coupled with the elephants of the Secular Web's library spun out as though their mere existence makes them reasonable and sound. Of course with reference to the Jewish and Islamic alternatives, it would not matter -- in this respect the origin of standards is agreed upon; what is differed upon is application. A Council is possible theoretically but is hardly an alternative worthy of consideration when it is merely thrown in the air -- candidates should at least have tendered some revelation by now; or else, if we speak of the Norse, or Greco-Roman pantheons, don't seem worth consideration on account of their apparent extended absence (when it was previously supposed that it was in their character to show off and not be ignored -- Loki at least would hardly be able to resist showing off and taking credit).

Firstly, I would suggest that the Graeco-Roman Gods have been no more absent than our good friend Yahveh. Secondly, what bearing does a God's absence or presence have on his ability to imbue humans with an inherent morality?

That Gerkin suggests such a thing is nice, but again, there is a false dichotomy being posited, since the Greco-Roman and Norse gods were not exactly advocates of free choice by humanity. The level of proof for "absence" is entirely different, and beyond that we get into positive evidence which Gerkin apparently assumes is not sufficient. (Presumably we will be referred to the SecWeb's library on theistic arguments, the resurrection, miracles, etc.) I am not addressing the issue of an inherent morality in this specific point -- why is this being brought up? I am only addressing Gerkin's suggestion that other source-alternatives are possible.

Commentary about evolution is beyond our scope, so we next move here:

Kreeft says, "How is it possible that over ninety percent of all human beings who have ever lived...could believe in God?" (35). This is the classic argument from popular assent (a.k.a. the fallacy of argumentum ad numerum), which is about the weakest kind one can muster. One doesn't take a poll to determine truth. Almost every human on the planet at one time thought that the earth was flat and the center of the universe around which the sun revolved. So they can be wrong.

I suspect Kreeft is doing more than appealing to the numbers here -- he is pointing to the fact that this number includes peoples of vast intelligence who we would be hard-pressed (and quite arrogant) to declare wrong. The comparison to the earth being flat, etc. is not an appropriate analogy: the philosophical arguments for God's existence are intellectually accessible to everyone and at all times; data about the earth and the universe has not been.

I question how accessible philosophy was to the average person for the vast majority of history. Certainly not more accessible than the ability to watch a sailing ship disappear beyond the horizon with its mast as the portion last seen - which is all the data one needs to determine the earth's curvature. Indeed, the Greeks figured this out circa 500 BC.

"Philosophy" is composed of logical chains of thought, and logic has certainly been accessible to all people (besides the mentally impaired, which is another issue) -- much more accessible, actually, than the sailing ship, which is interpretable in other ways from a limited perspective. (For example, the earth may indeed be curved; but it may also be like the cracked top of an eggshell in its ultimate shape. The sailing ship would only prove that the earth does not have a comparative degree of flatness.)

Kreeft also says, "...just by looking at the balance of pleasure and suffering in the world, would not seem to justify believing in an absolutely good God. Yet this has been almost universally believed" (35). This is another stab at the argument from popular assent, but beyond that it is just plain wrong. There has never been such an 'absolutely good god' in Chinese, Hindu, Shinto, or Buddhist belief, not to mention the traditional religions in Africa or the Americas, and they have among them always comprised around half the world's population, and still do. Even the God of the Old Testament, while I am assured He is one and the same with that of the New, does not seem to display these absolutely good and loving attributes.

The latter is incorrect, as shown by Miller's item linked above. Beyond that we are presented with yet another uncritical list. I can say that the Chinese at least have indeed held such a belief in the past (the reference is to Shang Ti, the heavenly emperor) and may add that Shinto and Buddhism are in themselves largely indifferent to a god-belief, but are not at all exclusive to it. Traditional religions also often held or hold such a belief. Without critical evaluation, this argument is merely a pep rally and is worthless.

Why are specific counter examples "worthless"? Kreeft cannot blithely ignore 50% of the world's population when making a statement of "universal" application.

Worthless, because as shown, the 50% figure is likely a vast underestimation, and is certainly not the product of serious historio-religious study.

Finally Kreeft attacks atheism by saying, "...it [atheism] robs death of meaning, and if death has no meaning, how can life ultimately have meaning?" (35). I have never understood this argument. It seems fairly obvious that if my life means something to me then it has meaning. Furthermore, if it means something to my family and friends then that meaning is deepened.

If developed further, we would want to distinguish between temporal meaning and ultimate meaning. One can of course create temporal meaning to any extent, but the body will die and decay, and one's memory will vanish. Those who find such limited meaning satisfactory I would say are cheating themselves and putting on a happy-face show for the sake of preserving their rebellion

Just as I would say Christians who search for some sort of meaning beyond death are cheating themselves out of fully enjoying this life for the sake of false hopes.

One may ask how Gerkin knows that Christians are not, or are not capable of, fully enjoying this life. I certainly have no complaints. Is this perhaps a projected dissonance of Gerkin's previous experience?

 -- but that is beyond our scope for more than an elephant hurled back at another, other than this relevant application:

Kreeft also takes an unwarranted shot at atheism by asking us to, "...look at the results of communism, the most powerful form of atheism on earth" (36). As if atheism was why an entire centralized economic-political system didn't work. It should also be noted that communism was not based on atheism; rather a Marxist's atheism is based on communism, being derived from political-historical analysis, not the other way around. Besides, state sponsored atheism is no different than state sponsored religion, and people who are atheists because the state told them so, are the equivalent of people who are religious because their parents told them so.

What was based on what is not really relevant here, nor is reason for belief relevant. The simple fact is that communist atheism consistently and logically applied itself as an atheistic system in which there was no ultimate value or purpose, only temporal values and purposes that could be changed as desired. Atheists who say they would not repeat communist atheism's mistakes have to "cheat" by borrowing a moral base from theism and declaring, arbitrarily, that it will be followed.

Atheism and theism both borrow their respective moral bases from the same source: human experience. But theism proceeds to distort and complicate this base in its own capricious ways, while atheism remains a more parsimonious model. And if people are currently convinced to act morally "because God says so" then I don't think it ought to be terribly difficult to come up with an equally compelling atheistic reason.

Gerkin's reply here is a begged question and reflects the implementation in either case of those who used "human experience" as a shortcut where theism was merely a sidebar. The point remains unanswered: applied consistently, the views of atheism and theism lead down different roads. Once again we also note our "destruction of civilization" example above.

After expressing surprise at Kreeft's use of the "logical impossibility" argument noted above, we have:

Then we jump headfirst into the old free will argument. I'm surprised it took us this long to get here. This is the classic idea that God had to create the potential for evil so that humans could freely choose good. Kreeft says, "It's a self contradiction - a meaningless nothing - to have a world in which there's real choice while at the same time no possibility of choosing evil" (37). I don't know about that. It seems to me that we live in a world where our choice is limited in many ways. No matter how much I may wish to fly in the sky unaided, teleport millions of miles with a blink of my eyes, or blow up someone's head with a thought, these things are beyond my abilities as a human being. Yet, I may choose among the abilities I have. God shorted us with plenty of abilities we could have theoretically had, so why didn't he short us with the ability to do evil?

Once again we are throwing oranges in the apple cart. None of the hypothetical abilities listed would be rooted in the possession of free will; they are physical abilities, not moral or spiritual choices. To short one of the ability to do evil is to short free will; to not grant them an ability to fly, etc., does not compromise free will at all, it compromises freedom, but not free will and the ability to choose. Again Gerkin shows a lamentable lack of ability to make subtle yet simple distinctions.

Let me try it another way. It seems to me that free will, as Christians perceive it, operates in the following fashion:

Oops, there's that "as Christians perceive it" qualification again. :-)

1. A situation is presented to you.

2. You apprehend a number of alternatives as to how you might act in said situation.

3. You choose from the above alternatives.

If this is the case, then God could have simply made people incapable of conceiving of immoral actions. This would in no way impugn their free will according to the above model. It's not as if there are only two, black & white alternatives to any given situation. The person in question would still have a number of alternatives to choose from, however, they would all be morally acceptable choices.

Of course this would impugn their free will. The number of alternatives has nothing to do with it; for there to be free will, all viable choices would have to be accessible, not just a large number of good ones. And note for the record that there is apparently no response to the charge that "free will" has been confused with "freedom".

Kreeft answers this almost immediately with, "Real love...must involve a choice. But with the granting of that choice comes the possibility that people would choose instead to hate" (37). But this is a false dichotomy I think. Why must the spectrum run from love to hate? Why not from love to like? Or even from love to ignore? Would love be less potent without the possibility of hate? I think not.

One wonders what the issue is here. Kreeft is hardly saying that the spectrum must run so; he is saying that it does, which is a reality that can hardly be denied, and that in a world of free will such a spectrum is inevitable.

As stated above, I completely disagree with this alleged inevitability.

Which is a nice personal insight into Gerkin's opinion/mindset, but does nothing to prove the point.

 Gerkin's further comments about a spectrum are therefore of no relevance.

Near the end of this section, Kreeft comes out of nowhere with, "No, the evidence is that God is all powerful" (38). What the hell? I scrambled back through the pages looking for this evidence, but either Kreeft didn't mention it, or (as I really suspect) he thinks the freewill defense proves his point. However, the freewill defense (if valid) may provide an excuse for God's inaction, but this only makes omnipotence compatible with lack of evidence for that omnipotence, it does not demonstrate that omnipotence exists.

Gerkin can't read here -- or else, like Lowder with McDowell, is pretending to read Kreeft's or Strobel's mind. The argument started with the assumption that God was omnipotent and that evil was a possible rebuttal of that. It was not, nor intended to be, a formal and full proof of God's omnipotence.

An assumption is not evidence.

And the point is, he did not say it was. Again, the context of the discussion is what was missed, and apparently Gerkin cannot here dispute that he has made a mistake.

Kreeft returns to his point that God can operate using short term suffering for long term good. He claims the clearest example of this is to be found in the crucifixion of Christ. Concerning the crucifixion, he claims, "...the very worst thing that has ever happened in the history of the world ended up resulting in the very best thing that has ever happened in the history of the world" (39). This is obviously an opinion, and a highly debatable one at that. Crucifying a man is a pretty awful thing to do, but is it worse than the holocaust? Is it worse than Stalin's pogrom that murdered 20 million? Is it worse than the streets of modern day India? I have a hard time buying that. Maybe I'm nitpicking by harping on Kreeft's hyperbole, but it is important to point out these apologists' tendencies for ridiculous exaggeration.

Exaggeration? If Christianity is true, then the crucifixion means that God experienced death, as Kreeft plainly states, but Gerkin ignores. Is the death of God better or worse than a Stalin pogrom? A skeptic would debate this, yes, but a theist would not.

Why not? Sure, God died, but not really. He didn't even suffer on the cross for very long (only his mortal manifestation would've felt pain anyway) and he knew he would be resurrected to live in paradise in a few short days.

This one is answered by Miller's item here.

Of course, none of this seems to have anything to do with God's omniscience, which is what Kreeft is supposed to be addressing. One would think an all knowing being could devise a more coherent path to eternal salvation that didn't involve torturing his son. I guess we should just have faith that God knows what he is doing.

Once again, Gerkin is playing the mind-reading game or is scoring low on comprehension. Kreeft is defending omniscience within the premise of evil as a rebuttal to it, not providing a full-scale defense and analysis of omniscience.

Even so, I fail to see how suffering of any kind redeems God as an omniscient being.

Even so, Gerkin apparently has no recourse but to admit his misunderstanding of the purpose; and we have pursued that redemption in our material and references above.

 Beyond that, for the matter of "coherent", "torturing his son," etc., see Glenn Miller's item here for specific rebuttal.

In the next section we have material that is overall answered by the first Miller item linked above, but we have some added comments:
Once again we return to Kreeft's thesis - that short term suffering can result in long term good, that we sometimes must survive hardships to become better people. But, one can surely dispute that all forms of evil are making people better. Are the former citizens of Hiroshima and Nagasaki better people for being atomized?

Kreeft is not arguing that all evil results in good for all persons. However, to use the example given, one might argue that without Hiroshima and Nagasaki, there would not have been as much restraint in using nuclear devices to the present day, since no one would have personally experienced the horrors of such a device (and tests, for all their display and power, don't hit home as hard as actual use on persons; almost all today can name Hiroshima and Nagasaki, but who remembers or thinks in depth about Bikini Atoll, other than locals and military people?). No Hiroshima and no Nagasaki may have meant New York or Moscow vaporized instead in the 50s. The argument may be better phrased as saying that God can make good out of our evil, or allows it knowing a greater good will come of it in spite of ourselves; but that is not necessarily why all evil is allowed.

I don't argue that greater goods can and do come out of some evils. I simply argue that an omnipotent God ought to be able to dispense with the evils entirely while achieving the same (or greater) levels of good.

However, as we have shown in material and reference, this is simply not logically possible. That Gerkin personally thinks God "ought to be able" to do such and such suggests that he believes he possesses omniscience! So then! Has Mr. Turtledove's disciple worked out all the alternate history venues for our inspection? And if he has, how do we know he was right?

 And here is a naive statement by Gerkin: "Compassion, it seems to me, would make me incapable of torturing even one person for any greater good, no matter how great the good was." Indeed? Easy words to say; but we'll put it this way, using a popular analogy: You are a drawbridge operator, and a train is coming. Too late you see that if you open the bridge, the machinery will crush and hideously kill an innocent person crawling in the gears. If you put down the bridge, one person will tortuously die. If you leave it up, 500 will die in just as much agony, if not more -- and there's a darned good chance the guy in the gears will get slathered, too. Is saving the one person "compassion"? Or is it stupidity? Actually it is both. Compassion may not be able to make a wise choice; but that is why we have rational minds.

Maybe I was imprecise, but I think it stands to reason that if I will not torture one person for the sake of many, I will also not torture many for the sake of one. And, of course, given the choice of those two evils, I will select the lesser. However, I had in mind situations where the benefit received by the many was something more than a lack of suffering and torture. And let us remember that none of these points applies to God who should never be hemmed in by a dichotomous situation.

I would like some specifics on these "situations" -- and again, Gerkin is still "hemmed in" to this notion of a God not limited by logic.

Another point of interest: At the end of this section, Kreeft declares that a human trying to devise a utopia might create a precise world adored by engineers but, "...one thing's for sure: you'll lose the kind of world that a Father would want" (42). I find it curious that theologians will claim it is impossible to know the mind of God when it gets them out of a jam, as in the case of short term suffering/long term good, yet in many other instances, like the quote above, they seem to be so sure of God's mind.

I do not know what "theologians" Gerkin refers to, but it is a confidence job to place unnamed theologians with regard to unknown topics against a known person and a known topic.

I am referring to a very specific theologian here, as that theologian is Kreeft. I find him to be typical, in the regard stated above, to other theologians, such as those who are interviewed in Strobel's book.

 Skeptics who pull this kind of confidence game need not wonder why I hold their arguments in contempt. The only theologians I know of who have done this were of the Bultmannian liberal-theology school, and they were trying to bail water from a ship on the bottom of the sea.
The matter of God's delay in judgment is again specifically answered by Miller's first item above. The matter is not one of "refuting" evidence but interpretable evidence. See also here regarding the argument used by Roddenberry, which is the sort of argument we would expect from someone who wrote about Klingons for a living.

Roddenberry's association with science fiction has nothing to do with the veracity of his statement, as Holding well knows.

Indeed, but it does suggest -- tongue firmly planted in cheek -- that one could find a better qualified source. It would indeed be of no use had I not provided refuting connections (which I did).

Kreeft praises God for his willingness to overlook our sins, which are "our fault" (as I stated above, this point is dubious) and instead take all of our suffering upon himself. Once again, I must note that while crucifixion is certainly a terrible and painful way to die, I'm not sure it is commensurate with all the suffering of all time in all the world.

Also, we must question how much Christ really suffered. If indeed he was God, how can the suffering of a being, who is all-wise and all-powerful, who has the greatest willpower and strength and fortitude of any possible being, and who knew perfectly well beyond even a shadow of a doubt that he would not really die anyway, be compared to the suffering of a mortal who shares none of these traits? God is literally incapable of experiencing suffering as humans are capable of knowing it.

On this see specifically here -- Kreeft is not arguing that the suffering is commensurate in the sense of time or pain but in the sense of value.

Sacrificial offering is a savage ritual of barbarous peoples where the value of the sacrifice is determined by how much it will pain the sacrificers to lose the offering in question. Hence virgins, children, and prize livestock were popular sacrifices. Jesus hardly seems to hold value by this standard as the sacrificers (the Romans) were indifferent. One might suggest that Jesus held great value to his Father, who was, ultimately, the sacrificer. But, of course, the Father knew he wasn't actually going to lose his Son so that doesn't hold water.

The descriptions of "savage" and "barbarous" are merely ad hominem, not reply. The remainder is merely a distraction and is answered again by the link we have offered just above.

To illustrate his point about God's presence alleviating the Problem of Evil, Kreeft uses the Book of Job. He says, "He (God) could've written the best book on the problem of evil ever written. Instead, he shows himself to Job" (50). I fail to see how this magically whisks away the Problem of Evil. Certainly, the act of God manifesting himself to me would solve the issue of God's existence. But I still wouldn't know much about him. Is he all good? If so...well, you know the rest.

I do no see where it is said that this "magically whisks away" anything; if this is Gerkin's immature, give-me-a-quick-answer attitude, little wonder he is where he is today.

I suppose I would be better off if I found every answer I needed in a book written by long dead desert barbarians.

Once again, all we have here is ad hominem, not a reply. Perhaps if Gerkin could look beyond his bigotry, he would appreciate ANE literature like Job -- regarded by scholars in this field as a classic -- more than he does. What a desert locale has to do with anything I can only wonder. I suppose moving to a forest would make a person more sophisticated. That they have long been dead is also of no moment; those whose works Gerkin admires now will also be in that condition someday.

 However, Kreeft explains his point by noting that evil is answered and ended in God's presence, for it portends the end of evil and the ultimate triumph of good. Perhaps Gerkin has a makeshift answer for this, and of course would dispute it, but he is still selling Kreeft short. For more specifically on Job, see again the first linked piece to Miller.

Indeed, my answer for this is the rather obvious point that an eventual end to evil does not somehow justify the evil that has gone before. Job's blessings at the end of his life do not make his prior suffering any less visceral.

And as we have noted, and as Gerkin has failed to answer, there is no issue of "justifying" evil because it emerges as a possible, logical corollary to the existence of free will. If anyone will have to justify evil, it is we who have done it.

Besides, is the story of Job supposed to demonstrate God's benevolence? By citing this awful biblical tale, Kreeft implies that God is causing people to suffer in order to increase or test their belief in him.  Aren't there far better, kinder ways to gain the same result?  Is increasing belief even a morally acceptable excuse for doing evil?  After all, that was the point of the Inquisition--so were inquisitors acting morally?

No, that wasn't the point of Inquisition, though it may have been an excuse or a cover for the real point, which was power-grabbing. Again Gerkin seems to have a problem making subtle distinctions.

Fair enough, I withdraw the Inquisitor analogy as it stands, but if the goal of the Inquisition had been to increase or test belief, would it then have been morally acceptable? The basic question is still at issue.

Gerkin wants an answer; very well, I shall poke a stick in his trap and spring it. If I answer "no" then we will no doubt be told that certain of God's ways of testing or increasing belief are also morally unacceptable. If I answer "yes" we will be told that there are better alternatives. But there are a few surds to overcome to begin with before we can choose the forked path. To begin, in any case there are indeed better ways, from the beginning, to try to increase and test belief -- but if those fail, then what? If the need to increase and test belief will be known to result in far greater good, then the method is justifiable -- this is where, once again, our analogy of the train and the gears enters in. The Inquisition would have a moral obligation -- as would God, given His moral nature -- to try the simplest means of increasing/testing belief first. The only flaw in the analogy is that humans just don't possess enough knowledge or wherewithal to make such unqualified judgments, whereas God does; and I'll add that humans have this tendency to take the "easy way out" and apply the more serious methods first. That leaves the skeptic to complain that he doesn't think God did the job right, but once again, that's the word from a limited and subjective perspective -- and the argument once again becomes pointless to pursue. (In this light, Miller's item showing that various peoples had ample opportunity to change before being subjected to severe judgment has an application.)

 Are there better, kinder ways to get the result? Only by creating robots.

Since God himself specifically commissions Satan to terrorize Job, I'm not sure how the robot objection applies.

Finally, on Jesus as the answer to suffering:

I think Kreeft is trying to deftly skirt the issue here. First off, we must question the quality of Jesus' friendship. When I say my friends stick with me through thick and thin, I mean they actually do things for me, protect me, talk to me, not that they follow me around and do nothing no matter what happens to me, all the while hiding in the bushes every time I turn around...that would be a dispassionate stalker, not a friend. But ignoring that, it might be great that Jesus will love you and walk with you no matter what happens, however, that is just a way for suffering and evil to be tolerable...

This complaint has the smell of a person with dashed expectations of a God who was a personal genie. Of course it also has merely begged the question that God is indeed "hiding in the bushes" and assumes that arguments above are true, which we have shown they are not. A friend may walk and talk with you, but above all he will die for you. He will also give you the direction you need to avoid trouble -- and that is what the Word is for; those who choose to ignore a friend's advice can hardly wonder why the friend does not intervene when they tell the friend to take a hike because they want to do it their own way.

This might have some validity if only skeptics were ignored by God and left to suffering and misery. But, of course, devout Christians suffer just as much without any help from God. In fact, since skepticism is far more widespread in prosperous societies than the third world, one might argue that the average Christian suffers even more.

All generalized grandstanding about "many atheists" aside, then, it is correct to say that the pragmatic is not tied to the reality. But again, the issue is also not to be decided merely on a sound bite.

Nor are any of the objections tackled by Strobel to be decided by the measly interviews he conducts.

Section 2: Miracles and Such
 

On this chapter we will have much less to say. The objection that Strobel's chapter title is "weakly" phrased is a straw man -- popularly, the objection it embodies is indeed made whether Gerkin knows it or not. Indeed, the fairest scientists (and historians) would not say a miracle "cannot" happen but would say they are unpredictable and beyond their occurrence, in nature unverifiable. But the average person isn't making such a distinction; they are making the objection as indeed Strobel phrases it.

In that case, the popular objectors are wrong, but their misunderstanding of science does not make it acceptable for Strobel to avoid addressing the more potent and reasonable objection that exists.

That said, the specifics engaged by Gerkin beyond this show him to be a poor student of apologetic and scholarly literature. On matters of messianic prophecy and their interpretation, this site and Glenn Miller's have adequately answered all of Gerkin's objections; see our index by Scripture cite as needed.

Wow, talk about a herd of elephants! If Holding is going to list two entire web sites as refutations of my points, then he cannot fairly criticize me for "elephant hurling" without scaling the heights of hypocrisy.

Only if indeed the sites don't contain the exact data, which is why I have an encyclopedia with category entries. No elephant here, just directional signs. Following this I provide links to some points. Gerkin says in reply:

I could provide links to relevant material from a counter perspective, but undoubtedly Holding already knows where to find it, and if he posts this on his site, he will delete the links, so I won't bother. Anyone who is interested in said material may contact me at citizenkyle@hotmail.com.

Matters on evolution, first cause, etc. are again beyond our scope, but it seems unlikely that Gerkin would be any better off. Behe's Darwin's Black Box is said to have been "heavily criticized by the scientific community" along with other Intelligent Design proponents; I can say just as well, and just as accurately, that is has been praised in that same community. One elephant deserves another.

More than simply noting their existence, I actually linked to a number of such criticisms in my essay. I have yet to see a single scientist, who is not promoting a conservative Christian agenda, praise Behe or ID. If Holding is aware of any such people, I would ask that he please produce the documentation.

 For my part, when I see evolutionists making absurd errors in basic logic -- such as Dawkins using his friend losing his vision but still playing racquetball well as he did when we had perfect vision, as an example of how a lesser percent of vision can still be useful in evolution,

Dawkins point was simply that any vision, even if it is blurred or weak, is better than no vision at all. This makes it possible to select better and better vision from successive generations without jumping straight to an eye with the visual acuity of our own.

or using the "evolution" of the automobile (designed by an intelligent mind!) as evidence of naturalistic evolution -- I see no reason to trust them or think that they have interpreted evidence correctly or logically.

Considering that I consistently encounter creationists who demonstrate a complete ignorance of even the most fundamental aspects of evolution (individual organisms don't evolve, the evolutionary model is a tree - not a ladder, natural selection is not random, etc), I see no reason to trust that they have even looked at the evidence for evolution, much less interpreted it correctly.

It is asked how one can know that a supernatural element is involved, and supposed that appeal to the miraculous is "punting to God that which [we] can't explain." One wonders whether it is any different in principle to "punt" to some as yet unknown scientific explanation.

It is a misrepresentation of the position of skeptics to suggest that we place faith in science to answer all unresolved questions. Should empirical evidence be lacking, we simply say that "we don't know". However, it certainly reasonable to suggest that science may provide an answer to some unresolved questions, as there have been a great number of questions which were unresolved in the past, but are now adequately explained by science. On the contrary, God has been used to explain all sorts of "supernatural" questions since the dawn of time such as "why does the sun rise?" to "where does the rain come from?". In each and every case, God was a useless and inadequate explanation.

 Of course the theist may suppose that the punt is made because the punter has spoken and taken responsibility. In any event, once again sound bites and simplistic arguments (such as those from Richard Carrier's material) will not do the job. Desperately suggesting that Joseph of Arimathea gave a false location of the burial "for whatever reasons" isn't going to do the job either beyond upholding skeptical faith-punts.

Okay, here's a specific reason for giving a false burial location: Joseph wanted to prevent the body from being defiled or extracted and tossed in the common criminal graveyard. This could've easily been a legitimate concern as it appears that Jewish Law forbade the burial of executed criminals in family tombs - they had to be buried in one of two special graveyards reserved for criminals (Mishnah, Sanhedrin 6.5e-f).

 On the matter of "looking dead" see here and the portion related to signs of death -- that isn't something easily mistaken, and did not require medical expertise, just a good pair of eyes.

How hard would Roman soldiers really look at the limp, unconscious form of a man who had just been taken down from the crucifix?

Some vague statements Gerkin or other things needs to back up -- I consider every part of these simply false and challenge Gerkin to produce detail, or worthless to argue:

"...John [the Gospel] appears to be written very late, is filled with more exaggeration than the others, and has Jesus take on a more philosophically argumentative stance, suggesting the intent of settling doctrinal disputes in the church."

Back it up!

The late date of John's composition is backed up by virtually every piece of modern NT scholarship. I back up the rest of my "vague statement" with the Gospel of John, chapters 1-21.

"I have coaxed the admission out of Christians that nothing could convince them that their core belief about God and the Bible is wrong."

Atheists are little different as a majority. Here is what I will say: Substantial evidence would be required to get such an admission from me; this is because that which weights positive will be hard to overcome. Speculation won't do it. You need a dead body positively identifiable with Jesus to start.

Unfortunately, Jesus' body decomposed long ago, so that will be difficult to produce. In any case,  I find the resurrection to be a curious rallying point for the issues in question. Even if Jesus did rise from the dead, how does that prove the existence of an omnipotent God or the inerrancy of the Bible? Can we say non-sequitur?

Then you need a sound social explanation for a number of factors, recounted here.

The link above is a interesting piece and I would like to tackle it in depth at a later date. For the time being however, I will simply comment that people weren't jumping on the Christian bandwagon like gangbusters to start with. Indeed, if Paul had not possibly been the greatest missionary of all time, I suspect Christianity would have suffered a quiet death and been relegated to a footnote in Jewish history.

Section 3: The Evolution Revolution

The bulk of this chapter is also beyond our scope; for such questions I prefer to refer to my friends at Answers in Genesis. But I do have a few comments.
A large list is offered of supposed "transitional forms". Little or no evidence is given to show how these are qualified as such, and where such description is given it is almost always to say that it is a case of some animal have a small number of parts that resemble A, and others that resemble B, thus showing that it is a transition from A to B. This is far from adequate in context. They are equal to saying that a child's balloon on one end, and an airplane on the other, is proved to have an evolutionary link in a hot-air balloon. I am therefore satisfied to dismiss this as yet more Uncritical Listing Syndrome.

My list of transitional forms was not intended to be an in depth discussion of evolutionary evidence. It was simply a refutation of Strobel's ridiculous contention that evolutionary biologists have not classified any (or very few) transitional forms. Whether biologists are correct in their classification is a broader issue, but one needs to actually look at the scientific literature on the subject to make that kind of decision, not unthinkingly dismiss it as Uncritical Listing Syndrome.

Section 4: Diss God Some More

What does that leave us with? Mostly argument by outrage, "no one is that guilty to deserve punishment" sort of reasoning. In other words, an immensely begged question. A few points otherwise:

Despite the quotation marks, I never actually said  "no one is that guilty to deserve punishment", however I do question the nature and severity of the punishments meted out, not to mention which offenses are denoted as "deserving" of punishment.

Gerkin finds it hard "to believe every ounce" of some culture was "pure evil and rotten to the core." It did not need every ounce; it just had to be sufficiently evil and rotten.

It was Geisler, not me, who first suggested the culture was "totally and utterly depraved". I am just calling him out on his exaggeration. Besides that, what level of evil is justifiably sufficient to wipe out a population in its totality?

 As for the "biased" view of the Israelies, what archaeological evidence we have backs up the Israelite views of these people (see above links) -- and how does one prove that this was biased rather than correct? Isn't this "punting" to an unknown?

Name one culture in all of history whose views of their enemies were not biased.

The old "omnipotence" card is shaken again thusly:

Best yet, Geisler would have us believe that the Israelites needed to be saved because of "the Messiah who was to be born among them" (119). What kind of impotent and unimaginative God is this? Consider: (1.) He is omnipotent, yet he couldn't bring about Jesus except through the Israelites? (2.) He can't think of a better way to save the Israelites than the wholesale genocide of the Amalekites? (3.) The Israelites must be the instrument of God? Why does God need help, or, as Captain James T. Kirk so eloquently phrased it in Star Trek V, "What does God need with a starship?"

Well, when you can't quote scholars, quote James T. Kirk. I like Jim myself, but he didn't have advanced theology on his side. (BTW, one of Shatner's proposed plots for movie V was that Jesus was a space alien, so as much as I like Shatner as an actor, as a theologian, he has a lot of work to do.)

Obviously Shatner's personal theology is irrelevant since I was quoting a scripted character, not the actor. Also, I used the Star Trek quote in an attempt to inject a bit if levity into my piece, however, the basic point (why does God need human help?) is entirely valid and has been explicated by numerous philosophers whom I could have quoted had a chosen a stuffier route.

The answers to these:

"He is omnipotent, yet he couldn't bring about Jesus except through the Israelites?" What's the point here? That God could bring Jesus about through someone else? Sure, that's possible, but how does Gerkin know that through Israel wasn't the least amount of trouble? If he had come through the Olmecs, there may have been even more bloodshed. Innumerable factors came into play in this decision for the Israelites: geography, genetics, politics, and so on. I am reminded here of the objection that Abraham was a lousy choice because he was so immoral. Well, my question is, who do the critics think was a better choice when all factors are considered? Do they have a list?
Or perhaps, does Gerkin mean that God could have just had Jesus pop out in midair? Possible of course, but I can just see skeptics pitching a fit about needing more proof on that one! If it had been a stumbling-block for anyone's belief in eternal life, and their free choice for such, it was a necessary trade-off to operate through human agents. The ancients may not have had as much trouble with the concept, given their acceptable paradigms of behavior for divine beings, but most moderns would blow a gasket.

I simply find it hard to believe that an all powerful, all wise being couldn't figure out a better way to present us with "The Prince of Peace" than by decimating whole populations with war.

"He can't think of a better way to save the Israelites than the wholesale genocide of the Amalekites?" As noted in the article link above, that is indeed what it had to come to, and there was no logical alternative -- as well as plenty of chances for the Amalekites to behave themselves. Note as well that Gekrin and other skeptics still fail to put themselves in the place of ancient peoples where matters like life and death are concerned. Their thinking was not as ours, as Miller explains.

I reiterate my point above.

"The Israelites must be the instrument of God? Why does God need help...?" This is later related to the idea that innocent Israelites also died fighting. Sure, God could just take the giant Windex bottle down and wipe out the enemy, but what do you have then? You have Israelites with no sense of earning their way, but rather a sense of entitlement. Doesn't the lesson of welfare reform teach us that letting authority do the job is bad principle? Experience is always key to formation.

The formation of what? A nation that was soon to be conquered? A culture that would consistently break the covenant and eventually choose to slay their own God? Great character building.

Allusion is made to the precedent this all allegedly sets for wackos to claim that "God told them" to kill someone. One wonders why this wasn't able to come along on its own; indeed you already have Hammurabi and others before the Israelites saying that a divine being instructed them to do this or that. It was not much that was bad, but how far is it to stretch it to that?  Blame Hammurabui? No, blame humans for being inventive.

Holding is correct here - blame humans for being inventive. Among their more preposterous inventions. ... God.

 How do we actually know God did not command such people today? If He did, no worries -- you won't be able to keep such a person in a jail cell if they have a genuine mission. Gamaliel was right.
Gerkin naively asks also how realistic it was to suppose these cultures could have repented when they had never heard of Yahvism. See Josh. 9:9 -- it wasn't exactly a secret what was coming and why, and actually, they didn't need to know Yahvism to know they were acting as immorally as they were.

More to the point is the fact that Yahvism was hardly the dominant religion. There were scores of Gods and religions (which the Bible openly refers to). With all these religions, none proving to be particularly stronger than another, is it reasonable to expect everyone to recognize Yahvism as the one true religion and repent? Realize that their own God (in which they most likely believed) was apt to be just as jealous and petty as Yahveh, and just as likely to order death to those who worshipped "false" Gods.

He also naively complains that the women and children driven out "couldn't exactly stay at the Holiday Inn while the war was going on." No, but the men if responsible would have gone with them; as it is they were responsible for the decision to stay behind and essentially pit their gods against Yahweh.

I'm sure that was a comforting thought for the children as they slowly starved to death.

They also had plenty of time to prepare (like the Gibeahites did) and could have survived just as well if they could have anyway -- unlike a modern creampuff like certain skeptical writers today.

Nice barb. I'm sure all Christian writers are hardy he-men ready to live off the desert at the drop of a hat.

Again see the articles linked above for specifics with relation to slavery, life preferences, etc.
Gerkin also pulls up the general spectre of Bible errors, but few specifics are offered. One has to do with the value of pi. A sound bite is offered that Biblical prophecies are "often vague and undefined" -- which sounds like this objection.

Few specifics were offered by me because few specifics were offered by Geisler. And again, if readers wanted more specifics, I provided links to just such resources. As for the value of pi, I mention it only as a direct refutation of total Biblical inerrancy. Yes, I realize that the writers were rounding off. Yes, I realize that exact measurements are not particularly important. But, inerrant means no mistakes - not even minor, inconsequential ones. If the Bible is intended to be the literal word of God then he needs to brush up on his math.

One doesn't actually need to read the prophecies for it to be clear that I was copying. Indeed, I made it clear up front that I had extracted them from another essay. I continue to support that essay as a whole, however, in regards to Amos 7:17 it appears a mistake was made which I did not catch. I will grant you that, and I will also grant you that some of the other "unfulfilled prophecies" may be capable of being adequately defended. But, in order to uphold a claim of biblical inerrancy all prophecies must be fulfilled, all contradictions must be adequately resolved, etc. And this is not possible. Also, as far as prophecies are concerned, they must not only be internally consistent as far as the Bible is concerned - we must also be able to determine whether the prophecies were, in fact, uttered prior to the occurrence which they allegedly predict. It would be all to easy for Bible writers to attribute predictions of current events to prophets of the past.

Plus see above links on the resurrection narratives -- it is quite naive for Gerkin to allege that it would be reasonable to mention two angels and not just one, since appearing angels were such a spectacular thing. It isn't "reasonable" at all -- the quality of the event remains the same regardless of the number, though a very much larger number (i.e., 8 or 10) suggests significance for other reasons.

I think this is the third time in as many paragraphs that I have been labeled "naive". I guess only a person who - WOW! Look at that angel that just flew past my window! Or wait a minute - was it two angels? Ah well, I guess it doesn't matter...

On the time of Jesus' crucifixion
On Jesus' birthdate
I'll be waiting around for any new ones, and for Gerkin's replies to the above.

Replies may be forthcoming in time. As for any new ones, you know where the Secular Web keeps their Biblical Errancy section.

Section 5: One Way Street

The focus of this section is Christian exclusivism. Gerkin says that he will assume for the sake of argument that Jesus taught this as well, though he first tries to pull this one:

This brings up the point: is this exclusivity something Jesus actually taught -- or is it a doctrine adopted later by his followers? The main support for Christ teaching this idea seems to be passages like John 14:6, "I am the way and the truth and the life, no one comes to the Father except through me." But the context of John 14 does not directly support the concept that one must worship or believe in Christ in order to ascend to heaven. In fact, it seems to me that this scripture could easily be interpreted to mean that one must only live a Christ-like life in order to reach God.

It can only be interpreted thusly via an extremely unprofessional hermenuetic based on a modern lens of poltical correctness and reinterpretation, one that also excludes other passages -- such as those where Jesus portrays himself as the arbiter of final judgment (Matt. 25:31-46).

I greatly question how much of the historical Jesus has survived in the Gospels, especially in John. But, if Jesus was quoted correctly in John 14:6 then you are probably right about the exclusivist interpretation. I withdraw my objection on this point.

Credit where it is due, then.:-)

 But we'll go on and also pass the places (several of them) where Gerkin essentially agrees with Strobel's material or grants the position without argument.There is little substance to much of what follows otherwise.

Again, this is because I was writing a review, and there was so little substance to critique in the original.

 Brief allusions are made to the possibility of arriving at a moral system without a God, but those seeking an expanded defense are referred to the Secular Web Elephant Pen. Gerkin mispprehends Zacharias' point about Buddhism and law: He is not saying what Buddhism is "about" but saying that where it lacks, in theism, opens it to a charge of deficiency. Gerkin of course would still disagree, but the point is, he has yet again not read Strobel correctly.

I understood what Zacharias was getting at. But I still think it's germane to indicate that Zacharias is trying to force an Eastern religion into a Western paradigm and suggesting that because of the ill fit, it is deficient.

As a whole Gerkin does not do justice to Zacharias' arguments in his summary. But we'd like to comment on a few things:
"Is God subject to his own moral law? If so, why can't humans be subject to their own?", etc. As noted, this is not a matter of "subject to" -- moral law is inherent in God's nature; it is not inherent in ours. Let me pose a zinger: We possess more freedom of will than God does. Let's see what our critics think of that one.

I can only then think that freedom of will is a flaw.

"Why should humans follow God's moral law? What if they see some of his laws as evil?" Then they are likely mistaken, and the critic has a burden of proof to bear -- which Gerkin has yet to do, other than the standard and uninformed Amalekite sound bites and SecWeb elephant hurls.

They only way to go about "proving" moral laws are evil is to judge them against a goal. Broadly stated, my own moral goal is to make the world a more enjoyable place for myself, my contemporaries, and future generations to live. Against the achievement of this goal I can "prove" some of God's laws are evil. But naturally, the Christian has a different goal - something like: obedience to the commandments of God. Of course, any pronouncement by God is necessarily good given this standard. Even so, God is perhaps not quite as consistent as he might be and confusion among his servants results betwixt commands such as "You shall not murder." (Ex 20:13) and "If a man lies with a man as one lies with a woman, both of them have done what is detestable. They must be put to death; their blood will be on their own heads." (Lev 20:13)

"Should they still follow them out of fear? Is this moral?" Out of fear, no -- that is essentially non-belief and non-trust. And skeptics like Brooks Trubee ask me how persons rationally choose hell!

In that case, I would conclude that many Christians (likely some who are reading Strobel) are acting immorally in this regard.

Regarding destiny, Zacharias points out that Christ's resurrection, "...opened the door to heaven for everyone who will follow him. Where else do you have anything that comes close to claiming this?" (153). Just off-hand, I would say Mormonism, which claims not only to open the door to heaven but promises the possibility of godhood, at least equals, if not surpasses, stock and trade Christianity for pure destiny-appeal.

That's somewhat of an inadequate answer, since Mormonism, as a derivation of orthodox Christianity, relies on the Resurrection as one of the qualifications for "godhood" -- which may not be as spectacular (nor as far from the orthodox view in some ways) as Gerkin thinks. He'll need more study before he can throw