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Temptation Ain't Just Chocolate

Does God Tempt People, or Not?
Eric Vestrup and J. P. Holding


C. Dennis McKinsey writes:

An example of a simple, direct contradiction that does not involve figures or numbers occurs in James 1:13, which says that God tempts no man, while Genesis 22:1 says God tempted Abraham. On page 15 of So the Bible is Full of Contradictions Johnson says in this regard, `An understanding of the meaning of the word `tempt' will dispel the seeming contradiction. This word is used in a good sense and in a bad sense. When it's used in a good sense it means to test, to try, to prove. God tested Abraham.... When the word `tempt' is used in a bad sense it means to entice a person to do evil. God never tempts man to sin.' Two major fallacies are immediately evident in this rationale. First, there is nothing in the Bible that would justify such a distinction and there is no compelling reason to make it. Second, if God never tempts man to sin, then why is God entreated to "lead us not into temptation but deliver us from evil" in Matt. 6:13? Moreover, Deut 4:34 says that God does use temptations to further his ends.

Again, we have a case where the assuredness of McKinsey's assertions stretches far beyond the facts. In regards to Johnson's answer (the standard one, by the way) our subject states "...there is nothing in the Bible that would justify such a distinction and there is no compelling reason to make it." The following facts should be presented to see the vapidity of our subject's comments:

  • There is a semantic difference between "test" and "tempt". An examination of a complete English dictionary will verify this. Note that some of the meanings carry positive connotations, while some carry negative connotations. This is a fact and not debatable.
  • In Gen 22:1 the root of the Hebrew verb rendered "tempted" in the KJV (and the more idiomatically-true-to-the-meaning "tested" in the NIV) is nasah . The reader should check the various Hebrew lexicons (such as the Brown, Driver, and Briggs lexicon) to see that both "test" and "tempt" are appropriate renderings of this verb. As with any mode of human communication, context determines the shading being used. And, McKinsey falls into the fallacy of basing an argument for error on an English translation (one close to 400 years old!) instead of referencing the Hebrew.
  • In James 1:13 the verb peirazo is used here. Check the various Greek lexicons to see that there is a wide range of semantical meanings, both positive and negative, attached to this word. Again, context determines the meaning.
  • The reader is urged to examine the usage of peirazo in Matt 4:1,3, 16:1, 19:3, 22:18,35, Mar 1:13, 8:11, 10:2, 12:15, Luke 4:2, 11:16, 20:23, John 6:6, 8:6, Acts 5:9, 15:10, 16:7, 24:6, 1 Cor 7:5, 10:9,13, 2 Cor 13:5, Gal 6:1, 1 Th 3:5, Heb 2:18, 3:9, 4:15, 11:17,37, James 1:14, Rev 2:2,10, and 3:10 to see that there are plenty of different nuances of this verb in the Greek, contrary to our subject's claim.
  • McKinsey claims that there is no compelling reason to make a distinction between the semantical shadings of the words "tempt" in the KJV renderings of Gen and James. Based on the evidence presented immediately above, why not? Where is wrong to let context determine usage and to let the text interpret itself? If there is a natural and contextual exegesis of the passages that avoids problems, why should we press a wooden and literalistic meaning on the texts and create problems? A competent historian wouldn't follow such a procedure dealing with ancient documents! Believers should not let themselves be persuaded into abandoning natural and obvious solutions when skeptical bluster foams in large quantities.

McKinsey's mention of Matt 6:13 as refuting the claim of St. James that God does not tempt men is an interesting one. There is a difference between God tempting men directly and allowing or leading men into situations where they will succumb to sin. What James is stating is that God is not the direct agent in a man's temptations; He will not cause one's favorite vice to appear before one's eyes so as to induce sin in the man. On the other hand, as God is omniscient and ruler over all, everything that happens in the universe is known and seen by him. (I am anthropomorphizing here.) When a man sins, surely God could step in and prevent it, couldn't he? In essence, every sin is "allowed" by God in the fashion just described. I have always understood the petition (in both skeptical and post-skeptical days!) in a passive sense -- in His divine mercy may He not allow us to fall into situations where our weak nature will succumb to sin. To press it against James 1:13 as our subject does is to make various texts clash when we here have a reasonable solution which makes the various texts go together. This is a good opportunity to spell out again the importance of realizing the presuppositions that one brings to a text:

  • If one assumes that the text is not coherent and reliable, then one will have no problem in stating that Matt 6:13 is contrary to James 1:13.
  • If one assumes that the text is coherent, then difficult passages will be attempted to be understood in the light of clearer passages. Scriptura ex Scriptura explicanda est. .
This appears to be one of those passages where skeptics and believers will be talking past each other, due to different presuppositions that each camp brings to the text.

When our subject also cites Deut 4:34 as being problematic, he is relying on the particulars of the KJV translation, which here translates the Hebrew noun root massah as temptation. However, our subject neglects the fact that it is not a particular translation that we analyze problems by, but by the original language. It is a fact that massah has a variety of semantic shadings: testing(s), trial(s), and it is debatable about whether or not temptation(s) is a shading of the word. In fact, the Brown-Driver-Briggs lexicon does not allow "temptation" as a proper shading of the word. The NIV is more idiomatically faithful to the Hebrew by its replacement of the KJV's "temptation" by "testing".

This issue is really a lesson in how not to allege a contradiction in the Biblical texts. It takes but a few minutes to check a lexicon (which one can do even if they are not stars at the language) and look up words. Is it really asking too much for anybody to take the time to do this? McKinsey's readers deserve so much more than what he has provided.

James 1:13 brings up a secondary issue. It says God cannot be tempted; but what about the Temptation of Jesus? The critics need to read the whole verse: God cannot be tempted with evil. The word behind "evil" means sickness or depravity. Satan made some offers, all right, but none of them were depraved or perverse. And again, the word used here has varying shades of meaning that must be determined by context and subject. (Moreover, this objection fails to differentiate between offering of temptation and receipt of it! Obviously anyone can "tempt" God right now ["Give me this and I'll give you worship!"] but temptation is a two-way street! James' "by evil" comment indicates the two-way version; the Gospels and Hebrews only speak of one way!)


Now for a reply from the crybaby ("Give me a link every page!") Ebon Musings site. Ebon accuses us of "flagrantly" misquoting him, where he says:

The primary meanings of the Hebrew and Greek words used for "tempt", nacah and peirazo respectively in these two verses, are exactly the same - "to test, to prove" - and as well, they also both have the the same secondary meaning of "to tempt" exactly as it is used in English.

I put this down as him saying that the Greek and Hebrew words were "exactly the same" and that is exactly what he said. What does Ebon think that he has been represented as having said? That a Hebrew and Greek word are "exactly the same"? If one is able to read while appreciating context (admittedly this seems a bit difficult for Ebon), then it is clear that Ebon was charged with advocating the view that the Hebrew and Greek words are perfect synonyms in the functional sense, which Ebon seems to stress in his subsequent remarks.

Ebon then commits an elephant-size blunder in saying that " my original point remains and his fails, because the lexicons do agree with me." He then goes on to quote Strong's, which is not a lexicon but a concordance! Ebon doesn't even know the difference between the two! Hint, Ebon: It is like using a dictionary entry versus using an encyclopedia article. Try BAGD or Liddell-Scott, if you do not think these are hardware stores!

Conversely, what was Ebon trying to prove by noting that the definitions were "the same"? The point remains that Ebon has neither established a well-developed case for considering the words sufficiently identical in usage for use in his argument, and simply has not dealt with the contrary argument except to haughtily hand-wave it away. The disputed conclusion is that the alleged similarity of definitions establishes that the terms are intended in the same sense in each passage. If the terms do not mean the same thing, then an instance of equivocation is likely in Ebon's argument. Again, this should be obvious, but Ebon carries on with a wordy smokescreen seemingly intended to obscure the idea that the terms do mean different things as they are used in the respective texts.

Perhaps recognizing that he's been trounced on these grounds, Mr. Vestrup retreats to the always-reliable apologist's defense of quibbling about semantics:
There is a semantic difference between "test" and "tempt". An examination of a complete English dictionary will verify this. Note that some of the meanings carry positive connotations, while some carry negative connotations.... As with any mode of human communication, context determines the shading being used.
In essence, both Mr. Vestrup (and the apologist he quotes through C. Dennis McKinsey) make exactly the same argument: what James says God will not do is "tempt", whereas what God did with Abraham is "test", and that the subtle connotative difference between these two terms is enough to resolve the contradiction.

Ebon's attempt to reason a portion of the issue is instructive in its ineptitude: The reality is, as Vestrup showed in detail and to which Ebon has no answer other than burping, that the words in question do have a wide semantic range, and I have confirmed this from two leading lexicons (Liddell-Scott, BAGD) that note both a "positive" and "negative" meaning for the words at issue.

Ebon pontificates that, "When you start out with the assumption that the Bible is inerrant, who can be surprised when that turns out to be your conclusion as well?" Indeed! When the assumption isn't found in the quoted text, it becomes apparent that Ebon has simply assumed that an a priori assumption has been made, and that this assumption on Ebon's part is the driving force behind his claim that his opponents are guilty of circular reasoning. Ebon refers to an alleged earlier instance of circular reasoning, so for the sake of completeness, I will point out Ebon's error there, also: "Now, apologists such as Mr. Holding would argue that God, the all-knowing, never really was going to destroy the Israelites at all, and had this outcome in mind all along, so this does not genuinely represent him repenting. (Mr. Holding revealingly describes it as God "feigning ignorance".) But this argument is circular. It concludes that God did not repent based purely on the assumption that God cannot repent!" Circular reasoning? On the contrary, the position that the author of Exodus viewed God as completely sovereign is a consideration based on study, and is merely a fact of the cultural context of the work in question. As with any other work of literature, the cultural context is an appropriate consideration for purposes of exegesis. Clueless novices such as Ebon might mistake normal interpretation for a priori assumption, unfortunately.

Though allegedly satisfied that his effort is solid, Ebon continues to add cards to his four-story lean-to house-of-cards. He claims that since God asked Abraham to sacrifice Isaac, it follows that "tempt" should be understood in the negative sense. With his contextual blinders on, Ebon need not consider that Abraham had obtained a promise of a nation through Isaac. Abraham himself was confronted with an apparent contradiction. Would God be true to his promise regarding Isaac? If so, then Abraham could proceed to honor the divine command in confidence that God did not intend that Isaac should die (see here). So much for that extinguished pipe. Ebon triumphantly claims that he has evaluated the meaning of the words with respect to the context, but he conducts no comparison; he merely chooses a meaning and thereafter interprets the passage in light of the meaning that he has chosen ("Bearing in mind our definition of 'to induce or entice to do wrong', was that temptation or not?") He refuses to "get down into the gutter with Mr. Holding and Mr. Vestrup on this one and quibble about translations" (i.e., get down and dirty doing legit research into valid linguistic sources) preferring his sound bite sashay with Strong's and one English definition.


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