The JW writer who goes under the name "Heinz" has offered a response to our material on Jesus as Wisdom and the JW misapprehension of the subject. Here's our response.

JPH: In order to support the traditional Christian view of the relationship of Jesus to the Father, we must understand the background for certain claims about the nature and identity of Jesus in the New Testament.

This is a nice setup by Heinz, who of course begs the question at once of whether the Trinitarian view is or is not under the Jude 3 rubric. It sounds righteous and pious, but it isn't an argument at all.

"Inasmuch as their individual salvation depends on holding faith, which involves receiving and believing Christian dogma, they find it very difficult to ask themselves how doctrine developed. If it developed historically, can it be what it must be in order to be a faith capable of saving us, the 'faith once delivered to the saints'? It is a simple and undeniable fact historical fact that several major doctrines that now seem central to the Christian faith-such as the doctrine of the Trinity and the doctrine of the deity of Christ-were not present in a full and well-defined, generally accepted form until the fourth of fifth centuries. If they are essential today-as all of the orthodox creeds and confessions assert-it must be because they are true. If they are true, then they must always have been true; they cannot have become true in the fourth or fifth century. But if they are both true and essential, how can it be that the early church took centuries to formulate them?" Heresies, p. 20, by Harold O.J. Brown

Another nice "setup" quote by Heinz, but it does not at all address any specifics of the arguments. Like our latest Unitarian opponent Heinz apparently thinks throwing non-specific and irrelevant quotes in the air serves a rebutting purpose. It doesn't. In fact it only tends to make Heinz look like he does not know what the Trinity actually is all about, to wit:

"The Christology of the apologies, like that of the New Testament, is essentially subordinationist. The Son is always subordinate to the Father, who is the one God of the Old Testament. . . .What we find in these early authors, then, is not a doctrine of the Trinity. . . .Before Nicaea, Christian theology was almost universally subordinationist." Grant, Robert McQueen (b.1917-d.?). Gods and the One God. 1st ed. (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, c1986), pp. 109, 156, 160. BL785 .G69 1986 / 85-011443.

And the Christology of Trinitarianism is also subordinationist, in the sense of functionalism. It is not subordinationist in an ontological sense. While not enough is given to tell if Grant recognizes this distinction (he probably does), it is clear that Heinz does not recognize it at all.

Instead of a developed Catholic theology that Holding is clinging to desperately, would not the first realization of Christianity naturally be the best, as opposed to a later one that is tainted and homogenized?

Begged question in context, assuming that the developed theology was not indeed present in the first realization. This is not an answer to anything I have written; it is merely hand-waving and pep-cheering.

"It follows from this premise that any 'development' of Christianity must be seen as a decline." p. 68, The Real Jesus, Luke Timothy Johnson

Starting with an incorrect a priori assumption is never a way one must conduct research.

Continued setup and begged question, and unwarranted accusation (that I started with an a priori assumption). One may as well accuse Heinz of the same thing because he laid out his own case at the beginning of his response. As it is, he has no grounds or knowledge of me enough to claim that I started with an assumption, or that if I did, it resulted in an invalid finding. That must be proven first, not assumed from the get-go. Indeed, isn't this very accusation an a priori assumption?

JPH: Proverbs 8:22-30 "The LORD possessed me in the beginning of his way, before his works of old. I was set up from everlasting, from the beginning, or ever the earth was. When there were no depths, I was brought forth; when there were no fountains abounding with water. Before the mountains were settled, before the hills was I brought forth: While as yet he had not made the earth, nor the fields, nor the highest part of the dust of the world. When he prepared the heavens, I was there: when he set a compass upon the face of the depth: When he established the clouds above: when he strengthened the fountains of the deep: When he gave to the sea his decree, that the waters should not pass his commandment: when he appointed the foundations of the earth: Then I was by him, as one brought up with him: and I was daily his delight, rejoicing always before him..." This passage is one of several in the Old Testament (see Ps. 58:10, 107:42; Job 11:14) in which abstract qualities are personified, following an Ancient Near Eastern tradition of personification. (Derek Kidner, The Wisdom of Proverbs, Job and Ecclesiastes, 44.) Here, and in other parts of Proverbs, Wisdom "makes claims for herself which are elsewhere made only by, or for, God."

In fairness to Heinz, he seems to have quoted this before I made recent additions to the essay about the background of hypostases in the Ancient Near East.

Reply: Here JPH quotes from the KJV. Another alternative rendering that must strongly be considered is from the Revised Standard Version:

Heinz quotes an English version that say "I came to birth" but this is completely irrelevant and no better than a Skeptic quoting dozens of English Bibles to argue a point. Heinz does later consider the Hebrew, but nevertheless, in context quoting English versions is a non-answer.

Are these verses only personified abstract qualities? Let us take a look at JPH's proof-texts, starting with Ps 58:10: "Sooner than your pots can feel the heat of thorns, whether green or ablaze, may he sweep them away!" This verse, and the ones before them give examples of what some are likened to. I don't see personification here.

Heinz does not seem to know what "personification" is. It means applying the qualities of a person (feeling heat) to a non-personal object (pots). And again:

Ps 107:42: "The upright see it and are glad; and all wickedness stops its mouth." Again, no personification here. It simply is another way of saying that "the wicked are stricken silent." NLT

Qualities of a person (stopping a mouth) to a non-person (wickedness). We agree that it does say that the wicked are stricken silent, but it uses a personification (of "wickedness") to make the point. The same applies to Job 11:14, which Heinz similarly cannot see personification in. That wickedness does not "talk" (as Heinz replies) is not at issue. Wisdom's personification is much deeper, but it is still a personification.

Additionally, where does Wisdom make claims only reserved for God, if Wisdom is "created", "born" and given "birth" to? The Commentary Critical and Explanatory on the Whole Bible Jamieson, Fausset, Brown "(1) Though described as with God, wisdom is not asserted to be God."

This relates to the issue of what qanah means, which we will deal with below (and we will draw from material against the Unitarians as well). But once again Heinz seems not to know that Trinitarianism believes that Jesus is with God, and that he would not "be God" in the sense of a one to one correspondence that exhausts God (as Fausset and Brown indicate).

JPH: I found Stafford a very amusing read in ways because although he has some hints about Wisdom, he doesn't see the connection and how it refutes his view of Jesus -- most likely because he has no view at all into the intertestamental literature that founded the "crucial conceptual category" that the NT writers put Jesus into. In this light, I found much of Stafford's material quite irrelevant. The question, "Is Jesus Jehovah?" doesn't require a yes or no answer from our side. Wisdom covers this -- Jesus may have been going around as "Jehovah" (Yahweh) at times in the OT, using that name in his pre-incarnate dealings, but Proverbs 8, as we show in the linked essay, would suggest that there isn't a one-to-one correspondence.

Reply: I find Holding's review of Stafford's book *amusing*, as he absolutely ignores the EVIDENCE, and even misrepresents his findings. Why is the birth imagery in Stafford simply glossed over in JPH's article?

It is not "glossed over" -- it is of no relevance. As I said recently to a Unitarian, and which applies equally to birth imagery:

Therefore, Heinz's further references to birth imagery in Ps. 139, etc. are of no relevance.

Jehovah is "One that is perfect in knowledge" [Job 36:4; 37:16 ASV] there was no need for Him to acquire or possess a special type of knowledge at a later time.

Heinz fails to see that this supports my position that Wisdom was eternal. As I say elsewhere:

Therefore, if God is perfect in knowledge, Wisdom could not be "added" to Him either, but must be eternal.

Heinz next briefly quotes Dake's commentary that merely claims "there is no proof here of the deity of Christ" and no reference to Christ, without any explanation or addressing of any argument I have made. Once again, mere sound bite quotes and labels (i.e., the accusation that Prov. 8 is not being "honestly dealt with") are not an answer. Of the note with Bauckham above, Heinz states:

Is Wisdom used only ONE WAY in the Bible? No (see below)! What does 2 Enoch 33:4 really say? "There is no counselor and no successor, only myself, eternal, not made by hands. My unchanging thought is (my ) counselor, and (my) word is my deed. And my eyes behold all things. If I turn my face away, then all falls into destruction; but if I look at it, then all is stable." There is no mention of Wisdom as advisor here at all! The closest mention of wisdom is the preceding verse where we have God using wisdom to write books.

What this "one way" bit means, we will see below. As for 2 Enoch, what is "unchanging thought" but one's Wisdom? The terms are essentially synonymous (along with "word").

God here is not made by hands, yet Wisdom in Prov 8 is pictured as a handiwork of God.

As noted above, this reflects a fundamental misapprehension of Trinitarianism, which does see Christ as an eternal generation, or product of God. "Handiwork" is not used in Prov. 8 to describe Wisdom.

Though not mentioned in JPH's article, Bauckham then goes on to assert, according to 1 Enoch 84:2, 3, (and Wisdom 9:4, 10) that Wisdom is sitting besides God's throne, and that this is "not parallel to the depictions of exalted angels." Firstly, my copy of Enoch 84 says nothing of the kind, and it is described as difficult, as Bauckham's translation of it is stated as a scribal "emendation." [1 Enoch, A New Translation by E. Isaac]

Heinz's grammar is rather tortured here, and it is hard to get a grip on what his point is, but from here we have 1 Enoch 84:2-3:

2 Blessed be Thou, O Lord, King, Great and mighty in Thy greatness, Lord of the whole creation of the heaven, King of kings and God of the whole world. And Thy power and kingship and greatness abide for ever and ever, And throughout all generations Thy dominion; And all the heavens are Thy throne for ever, And the whole earth Thy footstool for ever and ever. 3 For Thou hast made and Thou rulest all things, And nothing is too hard for Thee, Wisdom departs not from the place of Thy throne, Nor turns away from Thy presence. And Thou knowest and seest and hearest everything, And there is nothing hidden from Thee [for Thou seest everything]

So what does Heinz's copy say, and how specifically does this have an effect? We aren't told.

Secondly, Wisdom 9 is sufficient however as one sitting by God's throne, but Bauckham completely ignores Enoch 3, where we have the "exalted" angel Metatron, "the lesser YHWH", contradicting this professor, as he has special privileges in relation to God's position, for he is the "Prince of the Divine Presence."

3 Enoch is of no relevance, for it is a post-Christian Jewish work of no later than the 9th century, and was supposedly written by Rabbi Ishmael who died in 132 AD. Some traditions may date earlier, but the document as a whole probably comes from the 5th or 6th century. Heinz says, "In line also with the Lamb sharing the throne of God (Rev 22:1, 3, cf. 1 Chron 29:23), Metatron also becomes enthroned (1 Enoch 55:4; 61:8; 62:1-5; 69:29; 3 Enoch 10:1-3; 16:1)." 3 Enoch, as we have noted, is not of relevance; as for the 1 Enoch cites, Metatron is not once mentioned in 1 Enoch, which leads us to wonder what point Heinz is trying to prove, if any.

Heinz next provides a list of 15 ways in which the word "wisdom" is used in the Bible. This is very interesting, but it is like our Unitarian's argument re the word logos, which we refuted thusly:

John uses the word "logos" like he does everywhere else -- to refer to the mundane "word" spoken by God, as spoken by people, not to a metaphysical logos. What this runs down to is:

1. There are obviously two possible uses of logos at issue -- one mundane, the other metaphysical.
2. The rampant "mundane" use of logos (and dabar in the OT) is used to "prove" that the use of logos in John 1:14 is also "mundane" rather than metaphysical.

Likewise, other uses of "wisdom" in mundane ways does not prove that "wisdom" is used in a mundane way in Prov. 8. Context and later use of Proverbs Wisdom themes by Jesus and the writers of the NT (documented in our original article) is of far more relevance.

Now Heinz gets into the meaning of qanah in Prov. 8. In response to my material on qanah here, it is said:

Reply: We do not create persons called Wisdom, because we are not creators. Jehovah, as being perfect in wisdom, has no need to cultivate it. Proverbs 4:5 parallels "wisdom" with "understanding," clearly the personified Wisdom is not referred to here. Holding's article also completely ignores the LXX translation of this word.

One is hard pressed to understand what point Heinz is trying to make here. He seems to want to argue on one hand that there is no need for God to create his own Wisdom, as he always has it (with which we agree, and which makes Jesus, contrary to the JW view, eternal), but then also seems to want to argue that Jesus is not in view in Prov. 8, which is completely countermanded by the NT use of the Proverbs and later Wisdom tradition, shown in our original article. Heinz goes on to note that the LXX used for Prov. 8:22 the Greek word ektisen used in Mark 13:19, "For in those days shall be affliction, such as was not from the beginning of the creation which God created unto this time, neither shall be." This is fine, but it still fails to overcome our point above about the temporal constraints of verbs.

An extended commentary from bible.org is next provided, which offers some interesting history on the translation of qanah, much of which agrees with our own assessment (i.e., Arius preferred "created", for example), and acknowledges that "the idea [in Proverbs 8] is that wisdom existed before creation," with which we agree. Next Heinz provides a list of places where the word means "buy" or "bought" or "obtained" or "got," which is interesting but also of no relevance since, as I noted in my article, none of us, JW or non-JW, thinks that God bought or got His Wisdom which He did not have before. In short Heinz has provided an extended and irrelevant non-reply.

JPH: Ecclesiasticus 1:1-4 All wisdom cometh from the Lord, and is with him for ever. The sand of the sea, and the drops of the rain, And the days of eternity who shall number? The height of the heaven and the breadth of the earth And the deep and wisdom, who shall search them out? Wisdom hath been created before all things, And the understanding of prudence from everlasting. The book of Ecclesiasticus was written by Jesus the son of Sirach in about 100 B.C. It describes Wisdom as having been "created before all things," as being "from everlasting" and as comparable to "the days of eternity." In this we are in harmony with the Trinitarian view of Jesus as created or generated by the Father eternally, that is, finding his source in the Father and having no existence apart from Him, yet also having existed eternally as God does.

Reply: There are several problems with the above. One, Wisdom is not said to be "from everlasting," in Ecclesiasticus, that statement was reserved for Prudence.

Heinz is clearly not up on the matter of Hebrew parallelism -- in this passage "Wisdom" is synonymous with the "understanding of prudence."

In a note on the Hellenistic Synagogal Prayers, Edited by James H. Charlesworth, he states, "Special attention is given to Wisdom (sophia). Wisdom is personified and represented as the instrument of creation (3:19; 4:7, 38; 12:36). Wisdom is not eternal, however, since God is her father (4:38) and creator (5:3)."

I respect Charlesworth immensely, but if this is all he says, he is merely making the same mistake Heinz is with reference to not understanding the temporal constraints of human language.

The Prayers cross-reference Prov 8:22. Two, even if it was, AIWN(ios)(a)(ion) here does not always mean "everlasting." It actually means "age," or "a long time."

One wonders what it is Heinz actually wants to argue here. He has already agreed that God must have had His Wisdom eternally, but now he argues in a way that shoots that argument in the foot! The key here is that Hebrew had no word for "eternity" past or present, so Proverbs 8 emphasizes Wisdom's immense and incalculable age by piling on descriptions (8:23-30) of age. The Hebrews would have no other way of expressing "eternity" at this date -- and since Heinz agrees that God always had His Wisdom, he can hardly throw this out and be consistent! (He appeals to 'olam, but that is not legitimate: the word is used to refer to things like the tenure of a slave, and actually means more along the lines of, "as long as it will be" or in perpetuity.) Heinz also quotes another English version with a reading he prefers, which does not address the matter at all.

Three, it is an oxymoron to say something is created, but has existed from all time. We have no Biblical parallel to compare this phenomenal contradiction with.

As noted above, this is no more than the matter of the temporal constraint of human verbs. There is no parallel to eternally generated Wisdom because nothing else but that which comes from God CAN be eternally generated. If Heinz wants to make a case, he needs to find a verb that adequately expresses, by itself (with no adjectives), the concept of eternal production.

Heinz next offers an extensive quote from one Tom Harpur (who is no scholar, but a clumsy journalist who thinks Acharya S is a scholar!), and a book called For Christ's Sake, which claims that "..it is possible to say that the hypostasized Wisdom of late Jewish writing 'is an anonymous heavenly redeemer figure' very similar to those in both Greco-Roman and Christian thought." Why this is an issue is beyond me. It agrees with Trinitarianism thoroughly: Jesus, the Word of Wisdom and God, as a hypostasis of the true God.

Quoted next is The Dictionary of Demons and Deities which merely describes Wisdom in terms of a "two deity system" without any justification or explanation. It is next said, "Even the suggestion that Wisdom is merely God's attribute does not provide a means of escape," and one Frances Young is quoted:

"Interestingly enough, some of the names of those concretely envisaged beings, the archangels, suggest the personification of divine attributes; Gabriel - might of God, Phanuel - face of God."

This is an astounding piece of work, for "Gabriel" means "valiant man" or "warrior of God" (not "might of God") and "Phanuel" is a name originally applied to a place (Gen. 32:30) and thus any further application to "concretely envisaged beings" (wherever this may be, Heinz offers no cite of a being named "Phanuel") is irrelevant.

Next Heinz throws out more unprocessed quotes, this one from The Myth of God Incarnate:

"Gieschen's conclusions are (1) that angelomorphic traditions "were profoundly employed in earliest extant expressions of Christology," (2) that Angel of the Lord traditions in particular were very important in contributing to the linking of angelomorphic figures intimately identified with YHWH (i.e., the Angel, the Glory, the Name, the Word, Wisdom) to the fleshly Jesus who had ascended and was now enthroned," (3) that early Christians combined various antecedent traditions in formulating their Christology, and (4) that traditions about the invisibility of God were important contributors to the development of angelomorphic traditions and to early Christology. Overall, Gieschen contends that angelomorphic traditions "were some of the oldest and most significant traditions that inspired the Christology which we now find in early Christian literature, including the New Testament." Indeed, Gieschen holds that "the central root" from which various early christological traditions developed (e.g., Wisdom/Spirit/Name/Glory/Son of Man/Image/Anthropos Christologies) is "the angelomorphic tradition in which the Angel of the Lord is God appearing in the form of a man."

Not one word of this rebuts or contradicts anything I have written. One would find it quite agreeable within the Wisdom paradigm for Jesus to have been the "angel" or messenger of the Lord in the OT; the messenger role is functionary and says nothing about the ontological relationship of the messenger to God the Father.

Metzger is then quoted, "The dividing line between Wisdom the woman and God can grow hazy. Without the introductory verses to Proverbs 1:22-33 one might easily assume that the speaker is not Wisdom but God! Theologians have observed that Wisdom functions as a mediator between God and humanity...Wisdom's mediating role may have answered a spiritual need earlier fulfilled by the king (see Ps. 72:1; 1 Kings 8:22-53)." Then it is said, "That Wisdom often looks indistinguishable from God is also echoed in other works that find it hard to tell between God's angel and God Himself. But the language of this use of agency is quite common." And with this we do not disagree in the least for it conforms completely with the Wisdom paradigm we have offered, with Wisdom as God's attribute and ontological equal, and functional subordinate, a mediator between God and man.

A.R. Johnson in a monograph entitled The One and the Many in the Israelite Conception of God, states the following regarding this form of speech: "In Hebrew thought a patriarch's personality extended through his entire household to his wives, his sons and their wives, his daughters, servants in his household and even in some sense his property. The "one" personality was present in the "many" who were with him. In a specialized sense when the patriarch's as lord of his household deputized his trusted servant as his malak (i.e. his messenger or angel) the man was endowed with the authority and resources of his lord to represent him fully and transact business in his name. In Semitic thought this messenger-representative was conceived of as being personally-and in his very words-the presence of the sender" (Christology and The Angel of the LORD by John Cunningham).

Hence also this extended quote is irrelevant, for it has no bearing on the ontological relationship of the Angel of the Lord with God. We agree that Wisdom was a messenger-representative (note again, the word "angel" is functional, not a noun of identity as we use it today) of God the Father. Heinz goes on to quote several OT passages and other commentators speaking of agency (a functional aspect), but none of this has any bearing on the ontological relationship of Wisdom to the Father. We agree that Jesus is "God's representative par excellence, and Jesus will speak on behalf of God." That is the functional subordination all Trinitarians recognize. But this does not address at all the issue of ontological relationship. (Further arguments use the same sort of tactic as our Unitarian opponent, re the word "word" in the Bible; see above.)

"So the Logos (Word) became flesh and dwelt among us." (John 1:14) On this passage, Hillar (also used by my Unitarian opponent) is quoted as saying that "Philo describes the Logos as the revealer of God symbolized in the Scripture (Gen. 31:13; 16:8; etc) by an angel of the Lord (Somn. 1.228-239; Cher. 1-3). The Logos is the first-born and the eldest and chief of the angels." With this we have no issue, for it agrees entirely with Trinitarianism and Jesus as God's chief messenger ("angel") -- the Word would be the top message-giver, after all! Then: "The fundamental doctrine propounded by Philo is that of Logos as an intermediary power, a messenger and mediator between God and the world." Once again, we agree to the hilt! All of this is relevant to the functionally subordinate role of Christ the Word. And: "And the father who created the universe has given to his archangel and most ancient Logos a pre-eminent gift, to stand on the confines of both, and separate that which had been created from the Creator. And this same Logos is continually a suppliant to the immortal God on behalf of the mortal race, which is exposed to affliction and misery; and is also the ambassador, sent by the Ruler of all, to the subject race. And the Logos rejoices.... saying 'And I stood in the midst, between the Lord and you' (Num. 16:48); neither being uncreated as God, nor yet created as you, but being in the midst between these two extremities, like a hostage, as it were, to both parties (Her. 205-206)." To all we say, yes, yes, yes! If Heinz wants to refute Trinitarianism he needs to find someone who disagrees with it first!

Next John Henry Newman is quoted: "Philo, as far as I know, ascribed no 'condescension' to his Logos, for he considered him a creature, or, at least, an emanation, as well as his companion Angel. He speaks of him as a second God (vid. Euseb. Præp. Ev. vii. 13, p. 323, ed. 1688); as an Archangel between God and man, neither increate nor a creature, an intercessor with God, a messenger from Him (Quis hæres, p. 509), as the first-born Son, His Viceroy (de Agricult. p. 195), the created idea or plan, the [kosmos noetos] on which the visible world was made (de Opif. mund. p. 5, Quis hæres, p. 512)." Still nothing to disagree with here, though the "emanation" idea fits while "creature" does not (based on Philo's use of apaygasma). Next, Davidson's A Dictionary of Angels:

"In Enoch II, 33, wisdom is hypostasized." Yes! And Jesus Christ is a hypostasis of God, just like Wisdom in Prov. 8! (This is where Heinz could have used that bit on hypostases I recently put up.) The only part we might have a question about is this from a Martin Werner: "The belief that Michael the Archangel was the same as the Word/Wisdom, was carried over by Philo of Judea who, 'identified the Logos with the archangel Michael.'" JWs perhaps would like that part about Michael, but being that Philo's relation to the NT is only as a cousin, not a father, we need a lot more than that, like such an identification in Sirach and the NT as well. (Another quote from Werner is provided saying the same identification was made in the Shepherd of Hermas. Werner's relevance and competence in such matters is quite questionable -- see this review of his work -- and his reading of the shepherd as equating Christ with Michael is quite a stretch: "...and this law is the Son of God preached unto the ends of the earth. But the people that are under the shadow are they that have heard the preaching', and believed on Him; but the great and glorious angel is Michael, who hath the power over this people and is their captain. For this is he that putteth the law into the hearts of the believers; therefore he himself inspecteth them to whom he gave it, to see whether they have observed it. But thou seest the rods of every one; for the rods are the law." (78:7-13) At best this makes Michael a sort of military leader and does not in any way equate Michael with Christ.)

Then we have an extended quote from Crispin H. T. Fletcher-Louis, with which again we overall agree: Philo's logos idea is "an adaptation to a Hellenistic idiom of the peculiarly Jewish language of angels" (noting again that "angel" is a functional category noun in this period, not an identity noun) and that it coheres with the concept of the Angel of the Lord in the OT, which also coheres with the idea of Wisdom. None of this disagrees with the idea of Wisdom as a hypostasis (ontologically equal with!) of God. Werner's evaluation of this issue against Trinitarianism is therefore irrelevant and off the mark.

Finally Heinz works back to our points about Col. 1:15-18. We noted:

Finally, we bring back for our readers a brief note on Col. 1:15. Our friend "Heinz" declared to a reader that Col. 1:15 was in a partitive genitive which made Christ the "firstborn" of creation out to be a part of that creation. This would in no sense eliminate an idea of Christ as an eternal creation of the Father, but even so, as Helyer points out ("Arius Revisited," JETS Mar. 1998) there are actually four possible interpretations of the genitive here: 1) partitive (preferred by the Arians and the JWs); 2) comparitive (which would exclude Christ from the creation; 3) place (defines the sphere of Christ's rule over creation) or 4) objective (relates to the action of the "firstborn" upon the creation). Helyer notes that option 1) is excluded by virtue of a) the hoti clause of v. 16 and the pro panta of v. 17, which clearly exclude Christ from the realm of created things; b) the language of eikon in v. 15 and pleroma in v. 19, which includes Christ in the full deity; c) the parallels to the Wisdom tradition, in which Wisdom is not a creation as the rest of creation, but is eternally begotten; d) that the partitive would emphasize the -tokos aspect of prototokos (firstborn), something paralleled in the NT only in Luke 2:7. Helyer therefore opts for the objective genitive as the intent of the passage.

The logic here is simple. Col. 1:16-17 says, "For by him were all things created (this obviously cannot include God, or Jesus, the "him", himself, for otherwise he has created God and himself, a tautology), that are in heaven, and that are in earth, visible and invisible, whether they be thrones, or dominions, or principalities, or powers: all things were created by him (same restriction), and for him (he cannot create himself for himself!): And he is before all things (including himself as a creation?), and by him all things consist (including himself?)." In short Col. 1:16-17 becomes a meaningless tautology if the genitive in Col. 1:15 is seem as partitive. In reply Heinz pulls up a Barclay rendition of the verse which reads, ""For he is the agent by whom all things were created." -- which fits perfectly with Trinitarianism, as noted above. Then the "21st Century NT" is quoted, "It was he that formed all other things in heaven...all came into existence as a result of him and by means of him." -- again, perfectly in line with Trinitarianism, and with Heyler's thesis.

Then we are greeted with this:

The verb EKTISQH ("were created") is passive, hence the subject and object are reversed from the active voice. The "him" of AUTWi cannot be the subject because it is part of an adverbial phrase headed by the preposition EN ["by means of']. Thus, the TA PANTA ["all things"] was created by an unnamed EN, the PRWTOTOKOS. Who created all things EN ["by means of"] Christ?

The answer we have given all along: God created all things by means of Christ, who is not himself a creation!

In verses 12 and 13 the Father is the subject, and in v. 13, it is the Father who has delivered us. In v. 14, the Father is still the subject while the Son is the intermediate agent identified by the EN clause (EN hWi). Verse 15 concentrates on the indirect agent of v. 14, that the indirect agent is EIKWN ["image"] and PRWTOTOKOS ["firstborn"], and in verse 16, the Son is indirect agent again because of the EN AUTWi ["for he is the agent by whom" Barclay]. The conclusion is that the Father is creator and he creates "EN", or "by means of" the Son. Passive verbs and prepositions are used in those verses also in Hebrews 1:2 and John 1:3, and describe Jesus as an intermediate agent.

To which we say: We totally agree! Christ IS the intermediate agent in creation; and he is not himself part of that creation. Heinz is refuting his own views with every argument!

The concept of *time* is prominent in Col 1:15 - 18 with temporal words like PRWTOTOKOS ( a temporal word), ARXH (v. 18) and that he is PRO (before) TA PANTA (v.17). It was the Father's purpose (v.18) that the Son be prominent (PRWTEUWN) in all things because of being temporally first, as Paul's use of language shows.

Heinz apparently does not realize that this is not an answer and merely begs the question that prototokos is a "time" word -- as we showed with the Philo parallel, and similar language in Sirach and Wisdom of Solomon, this is not true at all, and as noted above, there is no action verb by itself that can express eternality.

Also ignored is the use of EK, or lack of, in regards to Jesus. E. Lohse, "A Commentary on the Epistles to the Colossians and to Philemon", (The Hermeneia Series) p. 50, note 125 says: "It should be noted that EN (in), DIA (through), and EIS (for) are used, but not EK (from). 'From whom are all things' ( EX hOU TA PANTA) is said of God in 1 Corinthians 8:6. He is and remains the creator, but the pre-existent Christ is the mediator of creation."

Lohse agrees with Trinitarianism here!

The Son is never called "creator", but he is what Robertson calls "the intermediate agent" According to Robertson (Grammar p. 820) the source (direct agent) is most commonly expressed by the Greek preposition hUPO ("by"), and sometimes by APO ("from") and EK ("out of"). The intermediate agent is often identified by DIA ("through").

Several grammatical examples are offered, but they all agree with our view! Christ is the intermediate agent, but NOT a creation of God (in the sense of there being a point when he did not exist) as Arians and JWs would insist. In fact the two concepts are not even related in a refutational pattern. Once again, if Heinz wants to refute our views, he needs to actually find someone who disagrees with us; as it is, he is either shooting his own view in the foot or not addressing the key points at all!

Finally we would like to note a footnote in which Heinz quotes a reviewer of Bauckham's book. which also fails to grasp the difference between ontological equality and functional subordination. The review does close with a comment that another researcher came up with the same ideas as Bauckham, and: "Nevertheless the fact that Johnson and Bauckham, working independently, can arrive at similar conclusions speaks to the strength of their arguments." It should be noted that the points Heinz cites are not a critique of the book, nor an indication that the questions run contrary to his thesis, but that these are things Bauckham would have to deal with in a more comprehensive case. The reviewer as a whole finds Bauckham's work persuasive and compelling.

In closing: Heinz has shown the typical inability to grasp the Trinitarian distinction between ontological equality and functional subordination, and has not even presented a consistent defense of his own view.