A reader recently asked us to look over and comment upon an article titled "Human Suffering and the Acceptance of God" appearing on the Secular Web and authored by Michael Martin, he of the rather embarrassing diatribe The Case Against Christianity. When I earlier examined this work I found it profoundly amusing that it endorsed such fringe ideas as the Christ-myth; if you have wondered whether this was some oddity in Martin's orientation, the following will remove all doubt that it was not.

Martin deigns to briefly reply to an argument by William Lane Craig called the "Suffering Brings About Acceptance Defense "(SBAD). Apparently Craig argued that because "God aims for the maximal number of people as possible to know God and His salvation," there are cases where God will use human suffering to bring people to Him. Thus it is said, "...Craig clams that there have been an increase from 2.3% to 20% in evangelical Christianity in 36 years in El Salvador, a country that has endured great suffering."

We will not presume to speak for Craig here, but it is worthwhile to comment upon some of Martin's rather ridiculous comments in reply. To begin:

• Martin states: "Thus, Craig seems to suppose that the most intense suffering brings about the most acceptance of God and this provides a justification for human suffering." When someone like Martin, who endorses the Christ-myth and in so doing merely re-repeats what G. A. Wells says uncritically, that "seems" is a warning sign. Though it is possible, I rather doubt that Craig has argued that "the most intense suffering brings about the most acceptance of God" in all places, at all times, and for all people, uniformly. In other words, I believe Martin has erected a straw man, a caricature of Craig's argument, based on nothing but assumption. It is far more likely that Craig would say that for each person, within various contexts, there is a certain amount of suffering that will bring about their acceptance of God, and that in certain cases this offers a reason for God to permit suffering. As it is, Martin proceeds upon the assumption that Craig argues that a) suffering is exclusively for the purpose of bringing people to God; b) that the greater the amount of suffering, in all cases, the more likely a turn to God will be.
• A section follows in which Martin speaks of "The Failure of God's Aim" and devises all manner of "why didn't God kiss my boots" requests for spreading God's message. "If God's aim was to have the maximal number of people believe in God," Martin complains, "He has not been successful. Billions of people have not come to believe in the theistic God -- through no fault of their own -- and even today God's message has not reached millions of people." To begin, note well how Martin slips in the premise "through no fault of their own" -- a begged question in context. At the same time, Martin has no idea whether sufficient information has been delivered to the "millions of people" he hypothesizes (note that there is no attempt made to deal with current discussion over what happens to those who do not hear the Gospel message, making this a rude sound bite in context), which will prove rather hypocritical in light of an upcoming demand he makes that Craig needed a larger sample to prove his point!

  At any rate, Martin then offers a series of "armchair" suggestions, "courses of action" which he thinks "would increase belief in God". On many of these, he is aware that the reply would be that free will would be compromised, and for that issue a link is provided to another essay, and thus goes beyond our scope. Other examples deserve little but scorn: "God could have made the Bible more plausible. He could have made it free from contradiction, factual errors, and made it contain clear and unambiguous correct prophecies and no false and ambiguous ones." Given Martin's proven and profound lack of education on this subject, this complaint is hypocritically misplaced. One may as well reply that one who accepts Wells as a primary source and almost completely ignores professional historians is not in a position to speak of lack of ambiguity or errors in the text. Indeed Martin only demonstrates why he does not deserve such deference from God as asking that He have "Bibles appear in every household in the world written in a language that the occupants could read" or take out "commercial" time on prime time television! If we love and desire God, we will earnestly seek Him and not demand that His message be delivered on a silver platter. It is obnoxious to demand, as spoiled children, that we not find it needful to do any work, when in fact that path to discovery is so simple. Instead, Martin and his ilk scatter rocks in the path with their uncritical acceptance of nonsense like Wells' Christ-myth, and show that they will accept any alternative, and have neither love nor desire for God and His message, regardless of where it may be found. Would love demand of a spouse, "I will not love you unless you take out time on prime time television to speak of your love for me?"

• Martin next argues that Craig needs more than anecdotal evidence from one country (El Salvador; see above) to crate a sufficient sample. It is doubtful of course that Craig intended the El Salvador situation to be more than exemplary; in the meantime, as noted, Martin is offering a roaring hypocrisy, as he has NO sample at all showing that persons who have never received a missionary message do not have adequate knowledge of make a salvational decision. In addition, Martin has also presumed to ascribe "no fault" to those who reject the message in certain cases, while providing not so much as a single sample. This is merely an excuse in context. As it happens there is little reason not to extrapolate Craig's example of El Salvador to other persons and situations. A more responsible reply would, for example, have Martin explaining why particular social situations in El Salvador led to more conversions, where it would not elsewhere, or at the very least admitting that perhaps Craig has more data he could offer and that he merely used El Salvador in an exemplary fashion. As it is, Martin rather deceptively argues as though Craig's example were intended to be all that he had to offer, and then offers example in which he "wonders" whether Craig's hypothesis would bear out. Thus for example:
• It is said, "The evidence for Craig's hypothesis is equally uncertain with respect to American Indian suffering. One wonders whether there is any reason to suppose that in those Indian tribes which suffered the most the acceptance of the Christianity was the highest." Here is an example of how Martin falsely assumes that Craig's argument is that suffering is exclusively for the purpose of bringing people to God, and that the greater the amount of suffering, in all cases, the more likely a turn to God will be. Craig has stated this premise nowhere; it is what Martin thinks Craig "seems" to argue, and he proceeds entirely on this basis. A more moderated and complex view is likelier -- Craig would more likely argue (I certainly would) that suffering may have other purposes (i.e., it may stop a person from doing harm they would have done otherwise, etc.) and that the maximum degree of suffering needed to turn a person to God varies by individual (i.e., some may require a certain event -- they may not be moved by personal injury, but would be by the death of a family member; they would not turn with mild suffering, but their neighbor would).
• Martin also complains that it would be hard to gather data showing that suffering was the cause of turns to Christianity. It is true that direct interviews (especially from past history!) would be impractical at best and impossible at worst. But in fact, Craig's hypothesis is validated if only one person -- a valued soul -- turns to God because of suffering; to complain that a certain number need to turn to be validate the hypothesis is to trivialize that one person's soul. Beyond this the complaint only further exposes Martin's hypocrisy noted above, since he has hardly conducted enough sample interviews and done enough in-depth study to be sure that people reject the message through "no fault of their own" or to conclude that those who have not heard the Gospel are in serious danger, not having enough information, and not responsible for their own fates.

  In addition, Martin offers the consolation to Skeptical readers that maybe suffering was coincidental with other factors such as missionary work. That may indeed be so, but beyond this again we are required to hypothesize states of mind and the means of private decision-making processes which neither Craig nor Martin has access to. And as noted, only one such conversion is needed to validate Craig's hypothesis "to any extent" as Martin requests -- though given the inaccessibility of mind, it would be of no moment for Martin to contrive a hypothesis in reply such as that the person was lying, or misled as to their own motives. Indeed contrivance, not investigation, is his primary recourse in any event: "Suppose there has been an increase in countries such as El Salvador of evangelical Christianity given the great suffering in those countries. It does not follow that there has been increase of acceptance of God: In El Salvador there may simply be fewer traditional Catholics and more evangelicals. The total number of believers may be the same or even less than before." Not that Martin lifts a finger to seek out such statistics himself!

• In a section "Why Is There Not More Suffering?" Martin exerts further the straw man of Craig's position that suffering is universally for the purpose of causing conversions and that maximal suffering is always required for conversion. Thus: "Surely God could have indirectly brought about more suffering and increased acceptance." Martin has again here put upon Craig's argument a black and white, all or nothing proposition that simply is not there, leading to such asinine comments as this one: "Instead of an increase from 2.3% to 20% in evangelical Christianity in 36 years with more suffering and pain God could have increased his spiritual 'harvest' to 80% or 90%. Why there is not more suffering is hard to explain if Craig is right." Remember that this is all based on what Martin says Craig "seems" to argue, not what Craig has actually argued. Martin has moreover assumed that the 20% figure is NOT the maximal possible and/or necessary harvest. Note again the hypocrisy of arguing this even as he demands more details from Craig!
• Martin then complains that he thinks that there would be better ways for God to bring about acceptance of His message, in part re-iterating some of the points alluded to above. Hypocritically again, one of his responses to the idea that "suffering is a more efficient way of getting people to accept God" is a childish, "there is no reason to suppose that this is so." This kind of argumentation simply runs against the very basic principle that suffering is a motivator, and a very efficient one at that. The American Revolution would not have happened had there not been grievances against suffering (of whatever degree) imposed by the British. Political revolution worldwide and throughout history has been promoted by suffering and by dissatisfaction. Suffering ranging from inconvenience to intense pain has motivated people to improve their lives, change their pursuit of health, seek cures for diseases, and contribute to charity. In this light it is far more absurd for Martin to blandly state that "there is no reason to suppose" that suffering is an efficient way to turn people to God.

  Martin then states, "Moreover, even if this is so, it would be a contingent fact, something that could be changed by an all powerful God," and argues that there may be more efficient ways. The latter point of course begs the question, and merely exploits the factor of personal sympathy and dislike for suffering to assume that "there had to be a way" even if there was not. If Martin thinks God's power allows Him to find more efficient ways, he is merely begging the question as to whether suffering in any particular case IS the most efficient and effective way, not indeed just for conversion but for broader purposes as a whole. A person converted by suffering for example may be motivated as well to pursue a lifetime in medicine, rather than playing ice hockey as they once planned to. Martin's vision is rather narrow in this respect! Martin speaks of a teacher "who believed that the most efficient means to teach math was to beat his students although he knew merciful means were available that would be successful but that would take more time." But that begs the question of whether indeed the more merciful means would be successful (and also trivializes eternal life by comparing it to passing a math exam!).

• Finally, Martin objects that he thinks suffering is a poor epistemic reason for people to believe in God, which is rather hoidy-toidy in outlook. Martin "seems" to glare down from his ivory tower at the peasants who accept God on such poor epistemic terms; let him be reminded that if eternal fate is at issue, matters of epistemology will hardly be at the fore of the typical "peasant's" mind. The "good reason" for people to believe in God by this view is that He offers eternal life and escape from eternal condemnation. As long as others have good epistemic ground for believing in God and His message (i.e., like Craig arguing for the resurrection) how persons come about that saving belief is of no concern to an armchair technician like Martin.

In conclusion: Martin overstates Craig's argument without justification, criticizes it hypocritically, and argues as though his subjective feelings and experiences were universals. As such, his reply to Craig, while pointing out the need (obvious for any argument) to provide an expanded database and become more developed, is primarily useless.