Response to Human Faces of God

HFG1 doesn’t offer a lot in the way of argument in between some stultifying narrative, but the theme summed up is, “The Bible argues with itself a lot.” Unfortunately, it errs on some very basic points which make it a waste of time.

Much is made, first, of how there are so many sentiments in the Bible which would be at odds with Ezra’s decree to send away foreign wives.

Well, we agree.

Say what?

Yes, we agree. But there’s a problem with FHG1’s point: It forgot to prove that Ezra’s decrees were endorsed by the Bible, as opposed to merely being reported by it.

Oops.

Yes, Ezra was going overboard, and it was a time when people went overboard. Misguided zealotry was in the air. That’s the lesson.

It may be objected, “Uh, but the Bible doesn’t SAY this was wrong.”

Oh? Is one’s moral compass so defunct that this is necessary?

Actually, that argument would be the result of a normal error made these days – of reading a high context text like the Bible as though it were a low context document. We moderns need the lesson beaten into us over our heads repeatedly. The ancients did not. Any informed reader (hearer) of Ezra would KNOW his decrees were at odds with prior OT admonitions. They didn’t need it beaten over their heads like we do.

It’s too bad HFG1 forgot this in their headlong rush to prove a problem. Let’s see, what else?

Oh yes. A digression on Jonah. Now personally, I can live with the idea that Jonah might be intended to be understood as fiction. It is correct to say that Jesus’ words on Jonah do not require it to be read as history.

On the other hand, HFG1’s only arguments don’t compel it is to be regarded as fiction either. Why? Because they’re just plain poor, amounting to:

  1. ”It reports a miracle.” (Yes, it would be too hard for a God who created the universe to do something like THAT, wouldn’t it?)
  2. “The Jews wrote fictional stories sometimes.” (They wrote true stories too. So?)
  3. ”It’s satiric and ironic.” (Oh dear. And truth never accomplishes satiric and ironic purposes? Don’t tell Dave Barry that.)

There might be good arguments for Jonah being intended to be read as fiction somewhere, but HFG1 doesn’t provide them any more than anyone else I have seen so far.

Let’s see, what else? Oh yes, a very idiosyncratic exegesis of Deut. 20:19:

When thou shalt besiege a city a long time, in making war against it to take it, thou shalt not destroy the trees thereof by forcing an axe against them: for thou mayest eat of them, and thou shalt not cut them down (for the tree of the field is man's life) to employ them in the siege…

The thing is, HFG1 uses a translation that renders this, “Are trees human beings that they should be destroyed by you?” From this it comes up with this idea that the message is that “trees apparently have more intrinsic value than humans.” Er, no, not quite; this is 1400 BC Canaan, not 1969 AD Woodstock. The actual message is that there’s no need to destroy useful trees, because (sarcasm) they’re not out in the field wielding weapons against you. “Intrinsic value of humans” has nothing to do with this text.

There is one spot where HFG1 rightly finds “argument” inside the Bible with itself – in Job and Ecclesiastes. But it gets the intent there wholly wrong by not recognizing these texts as dialogue literature (see here). This relates to what we said earlier about the nature of teaching in a high context: You are not beat over the head with it, but given tools to figure out and impart the lesson to yourself. Only someone still stuck in fundamentalism would think that the genre here is antithetical to a doctrine of inerrancy.

Relatedly, it is supposed that in Ecclesiastes, verses 1:1 and 12:9-14 were added in later by an editor. There’s no textual evidence for this, and the only argument made for why we should agree is that these comments “ignore the contents of the book, undermining its message by adding a reference to a final judgment in which all that is wrong will be made right – a possibility the Teacher himself had repeatedly denied.” Er, no he didn’t – that’s missing the point of Ecclesiastes as dialogue literature. The final summation is where the Teacher once and for all decides which side of the dialogue he will take.

One final point: A fanciful notion is presented that contradictory views in the OT are in there because the elites of the day could have better control over interpreting and transmitting dissenting messages. But that’s foolish for a couple of reasons. One is that the agonistic tenor of the day made it extremely unlikely that ideologically disagreeable messages would be incorporated. The other is that given the rampant illiteracy of the day, and the restriction of literacy to the very elite, the argument ends up meaning that the elite were incorporating contrary texts into the canon to insure that they themselves, the elite, who already disagreed with these messages, were themselves protected from these messages. And that makes about as much sense as hitting yourself repeatedly on the head with a club now to make sure you’re unconscious so that you don’t hurt yourself later.

That’s a pretty good analogy when it comes to the composition of HFG, however.

In reply to Chapter 2 of HFG, titled “Inerrantists Do Not Exist”, my simplest reply is this title: “Every Theist is an Inerrantist.”

That’s because ultimately, every theist affirms that God is perfect and that any word at all God says is perfect and without error. The real question regarding inerrancy then becomes whether or to what extent any purported revelation (whether the Bible, the Quran, or Aunt Jenny’s prophecy down at the Assembly of God) reflects either God’s own statements – or the actual truth; for of course, a message need not be inspired by God to be without error.

The message of HFG2, though, is a confused one: It argues that there are no real Biblical inerrantists because every person claiming to be one has in some way massaged the Biblical text to change its meaning or application. Unfortunately, in making this critique, HFG2 itself has failed to abandon the fundamentalist hermeneutic it portends to critique.

For example, we are referred to Biblical rules about slavery, and told that no inerrantist would agree that it is morally acceptable to own slaves, much less treat them as described. But I also know of no inerrantist who thinks the rules on slavery (actually, indentured servitude – see material here) were revealed for the purpose of a timeless, universal application, unless it is some strident fundamentalist of the Bob Jones variety.

Rather more dishonest, though, is the appeal to 1 Tim. 2:12-14. It is remarked that no inerrantist treats this text inerrantly, but rather massages it into inoffensiveness to mean what it clearly does not. Perhaps this is what some do, but the exegesis reported here does not. It is properly contextualized, and does not regard Paul as in error in any way. Nor does it rebound to misogyny, or call women credulous, or, as HFG2 complains later, parse between “cultural” and “universal” in an unwarranted fashion. It does not abandon a historical-grammatical reading of the text; it fulfills it. It is not “imaginative and anachronistic” [41]. However, HFG2 seems to think that the best evangelical authority for interpretation of this text is Pastor Mark Driscoll!

To that extent, HFG2’s charges of use of a “hermeneutic of convenience” are ironic. [17] It is fairly clear in this and other examples that far from enough research has been done to justify the complaint. As such our reply will be in the main examples of how HFG2 has itself resorted to “convenience” – if not outright laziness – to arrive at unjust objections.

A rather large section is offered, to start, on Jewish hermeneutics in the NT period. (See the item we often recommended here, plus some relevant material of our own here.) The bulk of the commentary is rooted in two errors.

The first is the claim that biblical writers were “not generally interested in the historical-grammatical meaning of the text.” How “generally” this is supposed to be true is not quantified, but HFG2 sometimes uses this point as though arguing that the biblical writers were never interested in the historical-grammatical meaning, which would be patently untrue.

The second is that biblical writers frequently sought a “double” or “deeper” meaning in texts, one which is at odds with a historical-grammatical reading, and in effect a “misinterpretation” of the text. There are two points to be made in response to this generally before specifics are engaged.

One: In calling these usages “misinterpretations,” HFG2 is merely presuming the very same fundamentalist hermeneutic on the text which they claim is wrongly imposed on it. Writers like Paul would say that the so-called “deeper” meaning was placed there by God, and that they were inspired to find it. Of course, other exegetes like the Qumranites would say the same, but the point is that calling these instances “misinterpretations” in itself begs the question.

Two, and more importantly: In the cases described, what is being offered isn’t actually an “interpretation” of the text at all. Rather, what is being proclaimed is a re-enactment of a text. In such cases, it is not being argued by biblical writers that a text had “two meanings” – they see only one meaning, and one act in modern times that in some way echoes what is in that text.

We’ll get into specifics of that shortly; for the moment, we have an interlude in order on some points made regarding Daniel. A charge is raised here of Daniel 11:45 being in error, and we agree that attempts to apply it to the Antichrist figure are in vain; we prefer an option described here which is unknown to HFG2 and would indeed ruin a contention that Daniel was written in 164 BC (since it predicts events after that date).

The point of more relevance, however, relates to Daniel 9:2 and the fulfillment of Jeremiah 29:10. HFG2 claims that Daniel offers a “real” interpretation of Jer. 29:10 not as a literal seventy years of captivity, but as a reconfiguration of Jeremiah to reflect “seventy weeks of years.” But this argument has two problems.

The first is that it assumes that Daniel thinks Jeremiah was wrong to predict a literal 70-year captivity; rather, it is said, the captivity was only 48 years. But as we have noted elsewhere:

The seventy years begins at 609 BC, the start of the Babylonian Empire, or at 605 BC, the year Babylon defeated Assyria and became the ruling power in the area; and ends in 535, the year that the foundations of the new Temple were laid down, symbolizing the return of the Jewish people from the Babylonian captivity. This "48 years," while a sufficient account of the number of years from the fall of Jerusalem (587) to the fall of Babylon (540), fails to take into account that in 29:10, Jeremiah is communicating with Jews who were taken captive in an earlier incursion by the Babylonians. The Exile started much earlier than 587 for some of them: The OT records at least three separate deportations to Babylon. Also, the number of years is that of a human lifespan and may be programmatic; on the Black Stone of Esarhaddon, 70 years is give as the "period of time during which Marduk shows displeasure toward Babylon." -- Holladay, Jeremiah commentary, 669.

There is thus no reason to think that Daniel supposed Jeremiah to be in error. But the larger point to be made is that there is absolutely nothing in Daniel to suggest that he got his “seventy weeks” prophecy via a reading of Jeremiah’s text. Rather, at Daniel 9:24, Gabriel shows up and presents the “seventy weeks” prophecy, not as a “reconfiguration” of Jeremiah, but as a whole new prophecy.

All that said, we now turn to specific claims of abuse by NT writers, and the first example is reflective of one of the points above – that is, the second one. Taken as an example is Matt. 1:22-23 [27f], where it is said that the virgin birth “fulfilled” Isaiah’s prophecy. HFG2 presents a number of the standard errors dealt with here, but in the main, we would point out per above that when Matthew says that Jesus “fulfilled” Isaiah, he does not mean, “Isaiah predicted this would happen.” Rather, he means that in the birth of Jesus, Isaiah’s report was in some sense re-enacted, that God acted in history in a way that was very like a way He acted before. Isaiah is thus not being “interpreted,” much less “misinterpreted.” Nor is Matthew exegeting Isaiah, so there can be no question of him using (or not using) historical-grammatical exegesis.

The second specific example is a little better. It is noted in 1 Cor. 9 that Paul uses Deut. 25:4 to justify people earning their living from the gospel:

For it is written in the law of Moses, Thou shalt not muzzle the mouth of the ox that treadeth out the corn. Doth God take care for oxen? Or saith he [it] altogether for our sakes? For our sakes, no doubt, [this] is written: that he that ploweth should plow in hope; and that he that thresheth in hope should be partaker of his hope.

HFG2 claims that in this, Paul totally abandons any actual relevance of this text to oxen and teaches rather that God “does not care” about oxen at all, having just put this text in so that Paul could later use it for its “real” meaning having to do with supplying ministers. But this itself is a reading as forced as it is claimed Paul is making.

First, nothing in Deut. 24:9 reflects God “caring” for oxen. The word used by Paul reflects in other texts some depth of care, of the sort that a single rule like this would hardly indicate. To that extent, then, Paul is either being sarcastic, or using this as a qal wahomer: If God shows this much “care” for oxen, how much more care must he have for his messengers? If this is so, then Deut. 29:4 isn’t being “interpreted” at all, and there is thus no “misinterpretation” either. What emerges then is a principle also offered by Jesus: Are not two sparrows sold for a farthing? and one of them shall not fall on the ground without your Father.

Second, as Witherington notes in his Corinthians commentary [207], Paul isn’t suggesting that God doesn’t care about oxen, but rather is pointing out that the law was meant primarily to benefit humans. God did not make a covenant with the oxen. He made a covenant with humans, and the law was constructed for their sake. Any benefit to oxen was incidental. So once again, it is not a matter of Paul offering a new interpretation; rather, he is logically extrapolating other truths from it.

These two points were apparently HFG2’s best examples of NT misinterpretation of the OT. Unfortunately, they are poignant failures.

We bypass an extended section on patristic exegesis which is of no interest to us, though we may later pass it on to one of our consulting experts. We pick up with one of the standard charges of the Bible teaching that the earth is flat [39], using Is. 11:12, which refers to the “four corners of the earth.” (See answer here. Further comments simply approach the same mistake made by Paul Seely which we address here.

After this, comment is made with reference to the “sons of God” in Genesis 6. HFG2 refuses the reading we offer here on the grounds that Jesus said that “angels are non-sexual beings.” [42] But this is not what Mark 12:25 says. It says that angels do not marry, which is not the same as saying they are “non-sexual”. The point rather is that angels do not engage in marriage covenants (as presumably, they are in covenant with God). See more in the link.

The chapter closes with some remonstrations that it is “pure fantasy” to say that critics of the Bible are “motivated by a need to prove the Bible wrong.” [44] If applied universally, this would be true, but it is equally fantastic to argue as though no critic is ever motivated by this; my own years of experience show otherwise, or else demonstrate that some critics are far denser than I realized.

A final point to be made is a bit nitpicky but needs to be made anyway. It is claimed that the terms “lower criticism” and “higher criticism” are “inventions of fundamentalists.” [44] This may be historically so – it isn’t that important to find out – but if this is the case, it is ironic that one of the leading critical periodicals, a favorite of such as HFG, is titled The Journal of Higher Criticism. Perhaps Robert Price didn’t get that message.

HFG3 is another chapter in the “I’m grown up now” genre, as even the title indicates (“Inerrancy Stunts Your Growth”). I think it is valid to reply, “Well, it may have stunted yours, but not mine – and I don’t think you’ve actually caught up yet, either.” I say this because it is evident that HFG3 reflects a rather childish view of inerrancy, one in which the Bible is immediately turned to on all matters with no further information or discussion. Perhaps this tells us more about the author’s past than it does about inerrancy, though.

Much of the first part of the chapter critiques arguments we would not hold. We certainly do not say, for example, that “inspired” equals “inerrant” [47] (see here), though it stands to reason that if God inspired a text to a certain degree of control, it will come out inerrant. The real question is the same as it is with any document: Is it true? In that sense any document could be inerrant in theory, yet not be inspired at all.

We also would not resort simply to character assassination of Muhammed [57] to invalidate the Quran – or to use an example I know, Joseph Smith. While Smith was a known charlatan in many ways, it is not this that persuades me that Mormon texts contain error; it is, rather, that they fail to correspond to truth. Nor would we argue that dependency on prior ideas of texts disproves inerrancy, especially since it was normal and honorable for Biblical people to borrow (and artfully rework) prior traditions for their purposes. (However, there is no such tradition in Joseph Smith’s time, which means that his own apparent use of the KJV – including its errors – makes it a better argument in his case.) We are also consistent in allowing the same harmonizing techniques to others (see for example here).

We do think that a certain margin needs to be allowed, however, for claims of error not able to be resolved with our current state of knowledge, contrary to HFG3. [58] Certainly the loss of so much knowledge from the ancient world means that at least some understanding will be out of our reach; this applies not just for texts where error is claimed, but where something is not well understood. That said, we may acknowledge that the higher number of texts that are placed in the “difficult” category, the more strained a hypothesis of inerrancy becomes. I daresay however that after so many years of confronting such claims, I find that less than 10% of such claims ought to be regarded as “difficult”, which is surely sufficient to warrant maintaining an inerrancy hypothesis. The examples HFG3 provides are not even in that category, though: The old Egyptian cattle canard and the location of Jesus after his baptism. That HFG3 thinks these are the examples best to highlight points to a bankruptcy in critical thinking skills and belies any claim to have done any serious scrutiny of the texts [62].

Inserted as well is an objection covered here. [65] It appears that HFG3 is unfamiliar with the concept of the “honorable lie” (see more as well here). Also brought up is a standard misreading of Ex. 22:29 as an approval of human sacrifice, of which we have said, “This is not referring to sacrifice, but to service. No one sacrificed fruits and liquors on an altar.” (We will be saying more on this in a later chapter where it is raised again.) And as well, appeal is made to Ezekiel 20:25-6, upon which we commented here.

The largest thematic complaints of HFG3, however, is that inerrancy “taxes the process by which the discernment necessary for moral agency is achieved” because it purports to give easy access to final answers, or a “shortcut”. Actually the same argument could readily be made of, say, one’s state statutes, but let’s take that seriously a moment.

The reality is that this is a lazy and shiftless, and thoroughly unwarranted, abuse of inerrancy. In real life, apologists and other commentators also make supplemental arguments apart from the Bible to support their moral views. Those who simply yell, “the Bible says so” are widely regarded by the intelligent believer as misguided and backwards.

Beyond this, it is also assumed by HFG3 that certain questions are worth asking in the first place. The naïve supposition, for example, that Deut. 12-14 might prevent a man from asking why he can’t worship Yahweh in his backyard rather than at a central place is belied by the very fact that people did this very thing in spite of Deuteronomy. Additionally, in reply to the question asked, “Why can’t I worship Yahweh in my own backyard?” it is equally valid to ask, “Why would you want to, aside from some selfish reason like contrariness, pig-headedness, or heresy?” Setting aside the few valid possibilities, such as say injury or other extenuating circumstances (which YHWH does allow for – see the example Namaan), and the fact that such individualism just didn’t exist at the time (there was no reason to validly worship YHWH in your backyard apart from synthesizing with paganism), the assumption is made that no answers have been reached, that we need “freedom to reengage the Argument” as though the argument has not actually been settled.

But this is hypocrisy in any event by HFG3: Because though we are assured that the argument is “perpetual,” HFG3’s very own attitude is that of one who thinks it is settled – that the argument is not settled. Service to the idea of never-settled dialogue is always merely self-contradictory lip service.

Any time some malcontent writes of “polytheism” in the Bible, I have a simple question: Have you overcome the matter discussed in the center here?

Not surprisingly, HFG4 hasn’t. In fact, there’s not a hint of awareness of discussion now held by certain scholars (eg, David Winston, Larry Hurtado) asking whether “monotheism” was ever a good term to use for Biblical religion in the first place. As it is, HFG4 simply falls victim to the same case of illegitimate totality transfer (Hebrew “elohim” = English “gods”) and doesn’t even consider whether the issue rather is one of monolatry, as opposed to monotheism.

That means there’s not a whole lot we need to address here, since it is just the same mistake made repeatedly for most of the chapter. Here’s what we have left.

Deut. 32:8-9 (which is also a popular text for Mormons) is used to argue for “Elyon” and “Yahweh” as two separate beings, with Yahweh as a junior deity:

When Elyon divided the nations, when he separated the sons of Adam, he established the borders of the nations according to the number of the sons of the gods. Yahweh’s portion was his people, Jacob his allotted inheritance.

One interpretation of this passage is that “Elyon” is the Father and Yahweh is Jesus. But this is not our view. Rather, we maintain that “Elyon” (Most High) is a title of Yahweh. HFG4 offers two answers to this relevant to our own assessment (apart from what is said regarding “monotheism,” which as noted is misplaced).

First, it is noted that Yahweh is said to be “given an inheritance” and a father “does not give an inheritance to himself but to his child.” But this is a case of HFG4 illicitly anthropomorphizing, and the word is not exclusive of father-son relationships; it is used in Num. 16:14, for example, of Moses theoretically giving an “inheritance” of land to people of Israel. Here then HFG4 is illegitmiately transferring the totality of modern English usage, once again. What would need to be shown is that one cannot, in their own office (“Most High”) grant an “inheritance” to one’s own self as a person (“Yahweh”). Since it has not been shown correctly that the concept is restricted to two persons, and a father-son at that, HFG4 has not proved its point.

Second, it is said that “the text says that Elyon divided up humankind according to the number of his children, not according to the number of his children plus himself.” But this is reading values illicitly into the text, assuming what needs to be proven: That Yahweh is one of Elyon’s children. If that is not the case, then the reader will naturally assume that the reference mean that Yahweh’s portion was allotted at the time of the broader allotment to all sons of god, without any statement being made regarding Yahweh’s status related to Elyon. The text simply does not provide that sort of information, and HFG4 is simply force-reading the text according to personal preference. Other texts must inform the understanding here, and those texts are such as 2 Samuel 22:14, which indicate they are the same person. (Of course, critics like HFG4 merely beg the question and put down such texts to later development towards monotheism.)

Relatedly, HFG4 denies that the “sons of God” could possibly be angels, as we would indeed hold, for two reasons. The first is that “Hebrew has a perfectly good word for angels”. But that is quite irrelevant: The two terms are hardly mutually exclusive. Second, it is noted – seemingly pointlessly – that divine messengers were also considered divine beings and were also “gods.” But here again we have the same mistake of illegitimate totality transfer.

One other textual abuse of note relates to 1 Kings 3:26-7. Of this we have said before:

Then he took his firstborn son, who was to succeed him as king, and offered him as a sacrifice on the city wall. The fury against Israel was great; they withdrew and returned to their own land.

The "he" here is the king of Moab, who is taking on the Israelites and was losing pretty badly up to this point. Callahan sees this verse as evidence that Yahweh was at one time a mere tribal deity, not the overall Creator, and "the Israelites believed that Yahweh had no power in Moab" against Chemosh, the Moabite god - for otherwise, what is the "wrath" here, and why would they withdraw in the face of victory?

There is one big thing that speaks against this "wrath" being from Chemosh - in this war against Moab, Israel was not alone: They were accompanied by the Edomites and by the armies of Judah, and there is no indication that either of these armies had to take a break from the field.

However, Herzog and Gichon in Battles of the Bible [171] provide the answer: Child sacrifice was often performed in the ANE because of imminent plague. The Israelites would have interpreted the sacrifice as an indication that plague was already in the city, and therefore would have made haste to leave as soon as possible.

The word for "wrath" means indignation or strife, and "against" is a preposition that can mean among, between, concerning, or through.

HFG4 takes the other tack, of course, though using a translation which says that the “coalition” withdrew – which is not a warranted reading of the text. Nor is any answer given to our own, though it is vainly pointed out that the word “wrath” (qetseph) is never used of an army and is mostly used to refer to the wrath of a deity. This is meaningless for several reasons. First, there are no doubt many words never used of an army in the Bible, yet this does not restrict the use of that word to or from any party or person. Second, it is also admitted, humans are said to have qetseph in a handful of passages as well, which is sufficient to show that it is not the exclusive province of deity. Third, it may be noted s that a closely related word, qatsaph, is used frequently of both deity and humanity. Finally, the text does not say anywhere that the qetseph is that of Chemosh, who is not even mentioned anywhere in the passage.

And that is all that needs to be said of HFG4.

Yes, not surprisingly, HFG5 is just a repeat of all the usual canards about human sacrifice in the Bible to which we have an indexed reply here. The only question is – anything new or twisted? Yes, a little. Let’s look at that which is.

Exod. 22:29 --- Rather tellingly, HFG5 leaves out the part about fruits and liquor, thus avoiding having to explain how fruit and liquor are sacrificed on an altar. Noting as well the further rule in Ex. 34:20 which refers to “ransom” of the firstborn, HFG5 tries to read “blood” into the act of ransom. But the simple fact is that there is no blood mentioned in Ex. 34:20. HFG5 merely assumes human sacrifice in order to prove it.

Secondarily, it is noted that other cultures performed child sacrifice, which is very interesting but does not provide any reason to force-read it into Exodus.

Finally, it is noted that Ex. 34:20 also allows redemption of a donkey by subbing in a lamb, and from this it is argued that the ransoming of the firstborn is not because humans are intrinsically more valuable than animals, but for “utilitarian” reasons (a donkey is more valuable than a lamb). But neither “intrinsic value” nor utility is mentioned in the text. This is a case of HFG5 reading values into the text that assume that the case is already proven.

Mesha and his son. We answered this in Ch 4, but wanted to add an amusing note. HFG5 rejects the idea that Israel was reacting to the sacrifice in some personal way by arguing that “the text never indicates that the Israelites knew about the sacrifice of Mesha’s son.”

Oh really?

Then he took his eldest son that should have reigned in his stead, and offered him [for] a burnt offering upon the wall.

Maybe HFG5 thinks that when the text says “upon the wall” it means that Mesha and his son were clinging to the inside surface of the city wall like Spiderman, out of sight of the Israelites outside the wall.

The ban. It is hard to say why this is in a chapter on alleged human sacrifices. It refers to the “ban” or order of destruction of Israel’s enemies. This is hardly different from the orders a modern army takes to destroy the enemy. The enemy is killed because they are an enemy, period. Making this into human sacrifice requires a quite vivid imagination as well as a begged question.

Micah 6:6-8 -- not surprisingly, HFG5 takes a fundamentalist reading of Micah’s query of whether he should sacrifice his son. Apparently “sarcasm” is something HFG5 is not familiar with. If it helps, they may wish to try to picture Micah actually bringing “ten thousand rivers of oil” to the altar.

Jer. 19:5-6. This text has YHWH indicate that he never commanded sacrifice of humans to Baal. One would think this could not be forced into any sort of argument that YHWH commanded sacrifice to Himself, but HFG5 manages enough gyrations to create it by assuming that Yahweh was worshipped as Baal; thus HFG5 finds “beneath the surface of the text” actual sacrifices to YHWH. That makes sense, because ”beneath the surface” is about the only place to find that reading, along with leprechauns, King Kong, and the Loch Ness monster.

Ezekiel 20:26 -- we said of this verse, This is not a case of endorsing human sacrifice, but a case of God giving rebellious peoples what they want and deserve by giving them freedom. HFG5 addresses a similar argument based on linguistics (which is not our own) and admits that the giving over was a punishment – and so unwittingly acknowledges that human sacrifice wasn’t part of the normal program. It is for this reason that HFG5 finds Ezekiel’s logic “difficult to grasp”: It assumes that it was indeed part of the original program. Also in the mix is the standard misuse of Deut. 24:16.

HFG6 is all the usual guffery we get from all quarters about “genocide” in the OT, and there’s not a thing here that isn’t already taken care of by the excellent material we have linked to frequently on the Christian ThinkTank (see links here. Much of the chapter is also devoted to answering arguments we would not choose to use anyway, and there’s also a small portion on archaeology that is beyond our scope. So what is left?

Well, there’s a lot of emotional rhetoric to start, in which it is remotely suggested that people like the Canaanites were just innocently minding their own business when those Visigothic Israelites came rambling down the vale and killed them all. “History is written by the winners,” [101] we are told with all the assurance of a Dan Brown; to which we may reply with as much adequacy, “and complained about by the losers.” We are also assured that HFG6 is “not claiming ‘to know better than God’ “ although there will be at least three stunning examples of claiming exactly that at critical junctures where rational argument and evidence fails. Also, we are told that HFG6 is “not interested in some abstract philosophical discussion about the problem of evil…This is indiscriminate human carnage, and it involves real people, with real lives, real relationships, and real aspirations.”

To which our answer is sufficient: So? In essence, HFG6 simply waves off the epistemic demands of rational argument and admits that emotion is the best they can do.

There’s an amusing error to start as HFG6 fails to notice that Deut. 7:1-6 forbids the Israelites to intermarry specifically with the seven nations of Canaan. On the very next page [103] much ink is spilled being upset over the seeming hypocrisy in God allowing Israelites to intermarry with Midianites. “So what happened to Yahweh’s command?” it is asked. [105] Not a thing. The Midianites are not listed in Deut. 7:1-6 anywhere. That HFG6 misses such an elementary point is rather stunning.

At page 107 we get the first instance where HFG6 hypocritcally implies their better knowledge than God, as we are treated to some of the standard rhetorical questions as, “if God knew that the Canaanites were going to become even more depraved, why did he do nothing to intervene in their self-destructive course?” In so asking, HFG6 implies that they know (better than God) that such intervention would have a) worked and b) given a better result than the one we have, which is exactly what HFG6 does NOT know. The naïve suggestion that God could have sent Abraham to preach to the Canaanites as Jonah did to the Ninevites makes the gratuitous assumption that the results of the two missions would have been equitable, as though the Canaanites were exactly the same in every way as the Ninevites, mere carbon copies who will make the same freewill decisions when faced with the same options. (And of course, we would add that despite Jonah, Nineveh eventually had to be judged anyway; in that way, it’s rather like The Terminator said: They didn’t cancel Judgment Day, they just postponed it.)

It is rhetorically asked when eg, children “deserved” the judgment of death [108]; I know of no one who actually argues this, which is not what Miller argues (see particularly the article on the Amalekites). We are told that “[c]oherent answers to questions like these are difficult to come by. In fact I have yet to find anyway.” That only tells me that HFG6 has not looked very far, or else has gratuitously defined “coherent” to mean, “answers that make me smile rather than face harsh realities.”

A second time it is assumed that HFG6 knows better than God, as it is declared merely “convenience” that Israelites were allowed to intermarry with all but the Canaanites. Really? So HFG6 has the omniscience to know that “acquisition of land and consolidation of power” was the real motive?

One note criticizes apologists for making what are called “utilitarian” arguments that the end justifies the means, as opposed to objective moral values. Yet where has it been determined that the two are mutually exclusive? An objective moral value can certainly be justified by way of utilitarian reasoning. To show just how clouded HFG6’s rationality on this point is, consider their scenario [111]:

Imagine the Israelite solider consoling the young Canaanite girl, just before running her through with the sword, “Not to worry, young lady. In the overall scheme of things my people are going to be a blessing to people like you.

Now let’s replace that with a hypothetical scenario from say, the late 1800s in Austria:

Imagine the Austrian policeman consoling the young Adolf Hitler, just before shooting him with a pistol, “Not to worry, young man. In the overall scheme of things this is going to be a blessing to people like you.

This isn’t just a fancy, since I have had more than one critic argue that God should have killed Adolf Hitler as an infant in order to stop his later sins. This example is an extreme one, but it makes a point: The most objective good is achieved by means – in other words, utility. Reasoning is not illicit merely because it is utilitarian; the end can be for the greatest good, or the greatest evil, or somewhere in between. HFG6 obviously has no answer to this, which is why the resort is inevitably to emotional anecdotes like the one above. Perhaps instead of consoling Hitler, HFG6 would prefer to console his eventual 6 million plus victims? (More on this subject here.)

There’s not much left of our concern; at 144 HFG6 force-interprets texts of war in a highly fundamentalist way, a mistake of the sort we discuss here. And that’s really it that’s “new and improved” from HFG6 on this tired subject.

HFG7 is a short chapter that’s little more than a showcase for reiteration of a couple of stale tales about the David-Goliath storyline (hereafter DG). It begins with an account of how the “Washington chopped down the cherry tree” story is a “legendary anecdote.” That much is true, but to determine that this was so, of course, required some justification and research. For example, those who argue that the story was false will point out that the author of the tale, Parson Weems, was a known con artist, and verifiably lied about certain things (eg, he claimed to have once been a pastor in “Mount Vernon Parish,” which did not exist – see one accounting here by an interested amateur). The question of course is what sort of evidence HFG7 brings to bear to argue for the same “legendariness” of the DG. The answer is that it brings forth a lot of already-answered canards.

The first objection is that there is an “anachronism” in that David brought Goliath’s head to Jerusalem, which at the time was under the control of the Jebusites. [153] We’ve heard that one before, and said:

In the political background of the ANE, cities changed hands quite often during military conflicts, and it is not inconceivable that the Israelites possessed Jerusalem, then lost it, then got it back -- many times over. This may also refer to a portion of the city that the Israelites shared with the Jebusites.

Beyond this, it might be noted that even if Israel did not control Jerusalem at this time, the Jebusites would surely be aware of, and following, Israel’s conflict with the Philistines, knowing full well that who won that conflict would closely affect their own future. David’s purpose in bringing the head to Jerusalem would then have been to frighten the Jebusites, who likely shared the confidence (or at least the hope) that the Philistine champion would end the Israeli threat to the city.

There is little doubt that David would have been just as likely to bring the head on tour to other Canaanite cities; but the later author of 1 Samuel would be particularly interested in reporting the trip to Jerusalem, not other cities, seeing this as symbolic of David’s future conquest of Jerusalem. Modern critics like HFG7, having little in the way of a serious understanding of ancient compositional features, make the mistake corrected by oral tradition specialist Albert Lord, to whom we have appealed many times in other contexts:

Traditional narrators tend to tell what happened in terms of already existent patterns of story. Since the already existing patterns allow for many multiforms and are the result of oft repeated human experience, it is not difficult to adjust another special case to the flexibly interpreted story patterns....The fact that the Entry (of Jesus) into Jerusalem, for example, fits an element of mythic pattern does not necessarily mean, however, that the event did not take place. On the contrary, I assume that it did take place, since I do not know otherwise, and that it was an incident that traditional narrators chose to include, partly at least because its essence had a counterpart in other stories and was similar to the essence of an element in an existing story pattern....That its essence was consonant with an elements in a traditional mythic (i.e., sacred) pattern adds a dimension of spiritual weight to the incident, but it does not deny (not does it confirm, for that matter) the historicity of the incident.

In the same way, HFG7 assumes that just because 1 Samuel reports what they consider to be a too coincidental trip by David to Jerusalem, that there is some error of fact. In reality, they are reading into the text some purpose which is not even there, and a set of assumed facts that the text does not state (while also neglecting potential contextualizing readings suitable to the situation).

Indeed, the whole critical argument is itself a farce. Let us put it this way. The argument is that the author of this story in 1 Samuel – we’ll call him Sam for convenience – was under the mistaken impression that Jerusalem was under Israeli control at the time of David’s youth. All right: When did Sam live, then? The critic will have to argue that Sam (and if needed, the redactor of 1 Samuel) lived at a time when it was thought Jerusalem was under Israel’s control before David came to power. But if such a belief was prevalent, why is this the only text that reflects it? 2 Samuel 5 reports that David conquered Jerusalem, as HFG7 acknowledges. Why are there not texts saying that Saul did this or that from Jerusalem? And then it must be argued that Sam (or a redactor) inserted this tale into a text that rather clearly reported shortly thereafter (1 and 2 Samuel were one book) this conquest of Jerusalem by David. Is this kind of patent stupidity really the best explanation for the text?

Again: The critic, as HFG7, merely assumes things. The text only says David brought the head to Jerusalem. It does not say WHY he did so, so the modern reader must assess the evidence to see what the best explanation is for David’s actions, in order to decide if the story is a reasonable one. The critic like HFG7 can think of no other reason than that Sam thinks that Jerusalem is under Israeli control. But under that rubric, why again would David bring the head to Jerusalem? Does the critic also think that Sam thinks David was king at this time (in spite of what was in the prior passages, and afterwards) and so was adding the head to a collection of personal trophies in his throne room? The critic can’t come up with a motive apart from positing immense stupidity by the author or redactor. On the other hand, we can provide several viable reasons why David would bring the head: To frighten or intimidate the Jebusites (whether Israel had some or none of the city in their grasp), or as a way to encourage Israeli residents in the strategic city of Jerusalem to open up the city (if some or all of the city was under Israeli control) by showing them that the war against the Philistines was over.

HFG7 apparently cannot think quite this deeply about such matters.

The second objection is the old “did Saul forget David” argument, which we have answered in detail here. HFG2 insists that Saul should have recognized David after being told who he was before (eg, 16:18-19, 22) but between 16:22 and 17:55, a great deal had happened, namely, this little thing called a “war” with an enemy called the “Philistines” that was intent on destroying Israel, which would mean Saul in particular was going to be in for a rough time as a captured monarch (just check how he was eventually treated when he was finally caught). To suggest that Saul should have remembered the name of ONE particular armor bearer under such circumstance is simply nonsensical. It does not help, as HFG7 does, to appeal to 16:22; it is said of that, “Saul developed a strong fondness for David,” but note that in 16:22 it says:

And David came to Saul, and stood before him: and he loved him greatly; and he became his armourbearer.

Saul’s response to David is an immediate one, not the result of any long-term relationship. No doubt Saul just as quickly came to “love” many others he chose as servants; in this, he was not a pedophile or some such, but the word used reflects the sort of desires one might have for any desired thing or person, whether food, or God, or individuals. Chances are that Saul’s “love” here was motivated mostly by the prestige and honor that would be associated with having someone as handsome and skilled as David in his service. His concern would have been for his personal honor, rather than for David as a person (whose name he most likely forgot within ten minutes as he went about other more important affairs, like saving Israel from the Philistines).

HFG7 then makes some rather odd remarks in defense of this notion. The first is that in the ancient world, “a person’s identity was not distinguishable from their lineage,” [154] and so Saul would have made himself familiar with the lineage of David and so have known it later. The basic point of this is true, but does not erase the fact that Saul had larger fish to fry in the time to come, and once the lineage was verified, there was hardly any reason for Saul to have it at the forefront of his mind. The job of verification would be that of his advisors; David would be one of many such persons brought into service who would undergo the same qualifying.

Ironically, it is then also pointed out that David is nowhere referred to by name by Saul – which if anything precisely proves our point. HFG7 no doubt sees this, and so appeals once again to the alleged “favor” David found with Saul, which as we have noted above, is an inadequate argument.

The last issue raised is one we have noted in a response to Callahan here, regarding 2 Sam. 21:19 versus 1 Chr. 20:5. Once again, of course, the question is what explanation is the best one.

HFG7 offers the explanation that Elhanan did originally kill Goliath (per 2 Samuel). It is then offered, without the least hint of embarrassment, that, “One would think someone would have noticed” the conflict with the earlier story of David killing Goliath. Precisely. It is impossible that it was NOT noticed. As with the above situation, HFG7 is content to posit rampant stupidity by an author, a redactor, and hundreds of upper-class literate readers over several centuries who had every opportunity to excise this story with no one the wiser (save their own people, who would be inclined to favor David in the first place). There is simply no possibility that a story like this, which stole honor from David, would be permitted to enter into in the text as it now reads. HFG7’s solution is that the Chronicler added a few qualifying phrases so that it was Goliath’s brother that Elhanan killed. This is rather odd as a thesis inasmuch as HFG7 acknowledges that the Chronicler’s usual tactic when David was not a good person was to simply not report what happened (eg, the story of Bathsheba is not used at all). So why didn’t the Chronicler just not report Elhanan killing Goliath if that is what 2 Samuel actually said?

Gleason Archer offered a rather complex textual distortion thesis, which HFG7 addresses, and also offers their own less complex case for the 1 Samuel story being miscopied by the Chronicler (though why this can’t have been a copyist of Chronicles making the mistake is not explained). HFG7’s answer to Archer is that there is no textual evidence of corruption to the depth Archer requires, and this is a fair charge; any case of conjectural emendation must be reasonably argued.

Archer does provide explanations, HFG7 offers some contrary arguments under the premise that 1) Lahmi is not a Philistine name; 2) Biblical men are introduced with their place of origin, so that the “Bethlehemite” reading is likely original. The first point is less persuasive; “Lahmi” could perhaps be a punning distortion of a Philistine name (eg, “my bread” – as if to say, Elhanan had this warrior for lunch!). The second point is more persuasive, as it is also noted that elsewhere Elhanan’s father is said to be from Bethlehem. However, since we do not know when the “Lahmi” reading emerged, nor what efforts were made to harmonize this and the Chronicles text with one another, “Lahmi” doesn’t even need to be the original reading for the thesis to stand.

In the end, however, I am not particular about Archer’s explanation being the correct one; I think it sufficient to say that 1 Samuel’s text was first corrupted (see more below), and that the Chronicler’s text underwent more than one permutation in an attempt to resolve it. The real issue is whether it is believable that any account originally had Elhanan killing Goliath, and while HFG7 is content to simply gloss over the amount of stupidity this would requires by numerous authors, redactors, and readers/hearers of the text, it is in fact their largest problem.

Put another way: Let us say that we had two texts, one which claimed that Andrew Jackson led the Battle of New Orleans, and another which credited it to an otherwise unknown person named Rudolf Snort. According to HFG7, the solution to this would be that in reality, Snort did lead the Battle of New Orleans, but that it was ascribed to Jackson to give him honor he didn’t deserve. But this would require the exceptionally insane conclusion that a collective amnesia of the whole reading population managed to falsely ascribe the deed to Jackson. Note that there is no comparison here to Weems, because he referred to an isolated incident with only two possible witnesses (Washington and his father) that occurred in a remote place at a remote time. David is more like Jackson in this regard than he is like Washington as a child. Moreover, as HFG7 admits, as it sounds the text indicates Elhanan made this kill as if in the line of duty, not as though he were (like David) about to save the while of Israel by defeating the man. Here Goliath is not that big a kill. He may have a huge spear, but so what? Israel is not in any danger from the Philistines at this time; they are downgraded to local nuisance rather than potential conqueror, and the kill itself took place in a Philistine town. What sense does it make for anyone to have borrowed the name of this relative nobody, and then created the rest of the story whole cloth? Why not also give the man an invented name, if the story is made up?

We’d like to raise one more point. Please note the whole text from 16 to 22, points highlighted:

Moreover the Philistines had yet war again with Israel; and David went down, and his servants with him, and fought against the Philistines: and David waxed faint. And Ish'bi–be'nob, which was of the sons of the giant, the weight of whose spear weighed three hundred shekels of brass in weight, he being girded with a new sword, thought to have slain David. But Ab'ishai the son of Zeru-i'ah succored him, and smote the Philistine, and killed him. Then the men of David sware unto him, saying, Thou shalt go no more out with us to battle, that thou quench not the light of Israel. And it came to pass after this, that there was again a battle with the Philistines at Gob: then Sib'bechai the Hu'shathite slew Saph, which was of the sons of the giant. And there was again a battle in Gob with the Philistines, where Elha'nan the son of Ja'are–o'regim, a Beth'lehemite, slew the brother of Goliath the Gittite, the staff of whose spear was like a weaver's beam. And there was yet a battle in Gath, where was a man of great stature, that had on every hand six fingers, and on every foot six toes, four and twenty in number; and he also was born to the giant And when he defied Israel, Jonathan the son of Shim'e-ah the brother of David slew him. These four were born to the giant in Gath, and fell by the hand of David, and by the hand of his servants.

It should be seen as odd that three of these four named are said to be “born to the giant” – the exception being our problem person. In an oral composition, we would have expected this to say something like: “ And there was again a battle in Gob with the Philistines, where Elha'nan the son of Ja'are–o'regim, a Beth'lehemite, slew so and so who was born to the giant, the staff of whose spear was like a weaver's beam. “ “Born to the giant” is the repeated theme of this story; the fact that it is missing in the portion in question is a fair indication of pretty serious textual corruption. And it needs to be asked: What “giant” were these fellows born to? There was a certain giant named Goliath, not long ago, actually, who might just have had sons, no? And so perhaps we can guess how it is that it was “Goliath” whose name got mistakenly put in here: He was being referred to all right, but originally, not by name.

The bottom line, in the end: There is too much obvious corruption in transmission here for critics like HFG7 to be putting this one on their front burner as evidence of error in an original account. Neither side can make use of this one for their purposes.

For the chapter of HFG on eschatology, the regular reader will rightly anticipate that we will decline an answer on much of it as irrelevant to our preterist eschatology. The chapter consists of 40 pages, only 13 of which address a position close to preterism: That is, the views of N. T. Wright, who is not a preterist, but who offers some interpretations amenable with preterism. And of those 13 pages, some critique positions of Wright that I do not hold myself. (I am assuming, by the way, that HFG represents Wright correctly, which may be doubtful. But we will assume that it does.)

HFG8 begins with a fair chunk of preachiness and implied declarations of the author’s spiritual maturity for having come to the conclusions he has. Then it embarks on some critiques of dispensational ideas, which occupy several pages, of which we need to say little. Here is the substance we need to address. For background of our stance the reader may consult our material here.