Thom Stark Naked

John Loftus has recommended the work of Thom Stark, one whom others might regard as a liberal Christian, but whom we might suggest is simply, as one commentator might put it, a “faithless ax-grinder” whose Jesus is only slightly more divine than Dr. Phil. He is out with a book called The Many Faces of God, and we may examine that in good time. In the interim, we will offer a preview evaluation of Stark’s scholarship by considering his arguments regarding two of the “divine claims” of Jesus – the Son of Man title, and Jesus as hypostatic Wisdom.

To be fair, Stark presents himself as a cut above many average Skeptics. He is aware of many of the informing pre-Christian documents that enable us to interpret these two titles. However, he is ultimately a dilettante in terms of interpretation and understanding of these texts, and raises rather misinformed queries and objections concerning their relevance.

Son of Man

With reference to our article, Stark is quite naturally unaware of the data provided by Herzfeld indicating the highly divine implications of the use of “Son of Man” (bar enash). He introduces the matter by claiming that SoM “just means” a human being, saying that: “The prophet Ezekiel used it to refer to himself all the time, and for Ezekiel, it connoted a sort of humility.” But this obscures something important which Stark has apparently missed, or else is hiding: Ezekiel uses bar adam, not bar enash, as Daniel does. Stark evidently either has not consulted the Hebrew text, or else does not have enough sense to consider whether the difference in vocabulary is important. Indeed the former seems to be the case, inasmuch as he also says:

… the angel Gabriel is “like the appearance of a man” (8:15; 10:18), has the voice of a man (8:16), and is “like the resemblance of the sons of man” (10:16). In 9:21; 10:5; and 12:6-7, angels are simply referred to as “men.” So the language of “one like a son of man” gives the strong impression that the figure in 7:13 is an angel.

Unfortunately, the word used in 8:15 is not enash, and nor, actually, is it adam: It is a word that literally means warrior. 8:16 and 10:18 do say adam, but 9:21, 10:5, and 12:6-7 say ish (meaning “male”). These latter points may be of little relevance for our current purposes of evaluating the use of the SoM title; however, they do make it clear that Stark is treating the text as though the English word “man” is being used, and has little concern for understanding or interpreting their original contexts.

In any event, Stark seems to argue that this application of human terms to angels somehow indicates that the SoM in Daniel 7 is merely an “angelic being” like the others. That’s an exceptionally simplistic linguistic evaluation that shows no concern for the complete context of Daniel 7, in which this SoM is given the very privileges of God. Stark goes on to quote some of these privileges, but declares that these are granted to the SoM figure as the “champion angel” of Israel – a designation that is grossly inadequate with respect to the privileges granted.

Stark further identifies the SoM figure with Michael (!) who is referred to in Dan. 10 and 12. But to achieve this identification, Stark has merely compressed the identities of the SoM figure and Michael based on the loose association of both being defenders of Israel. The obvious logical flaw here is that the argument assumes that being a defender of Israel is the exclusive province of a single person. However, nowhere in Daniel is Michael, when named, granted the unique privileges that are given to the SoM figure (such as sitting at God’s right hand). Stark’s lack of familiarity with the scholarly literature on this subject is what has permitted him to make this identification.

A further loose association is argued in that while the SoM (Dan 7) is given eternal dominion, Michael’s work in Dan 12 ushers in “an era of everlasting peace.” The logical flaws are again apparent: It assumes that eternality is an exclusive property of the SoM figure, and also ascribes the property of “everlastingness” – associated not with Michael, but with the peace he “ushers in” – to Michael himself. This is not to say that Michael (as other angels) will not live eternally, in the same sense that humans also will. However, Stark has performed a semantic sleight of hand in which he plays a shell game with the proper descriptions of the SoM and Michael’s peace. I might add as well that being granted dominion is far from being the same as being a spearheading figure in a drive that will establish peace.

Stark offers two further rationalizations to forge this identification. The first is that “[n]o mention is made in chapter 12 of any other agent…” There is another sort of shell game here, for Stark is surely aware that the chapter divisions are artificialities imposed by later editors. There need not be “any other agent” mentioned in Ch. 12 – that agent has already been mentioned in what we now call Ch. 7, which is part of the same collection of oracles. Second, it is said, “Michael is specifically identified as the agent assigned to the protection of Israel (which is the duty of a king).” Where Stark gets this notion that protection is the exclusive duty of a king I cannot say. It is true that this is ultimately a king’s responsibility, but as David did not himself go out and fight every war by himself, so it is that every king has assigned agents who are charged with enacting that protection. In this case, Michael would obviously be the assigned agent of “King Yahweh”. To say that this duty makes Michael a king is like turning Joab into one as well. Note also that the word used for Michael (sar) is never used of a king, but is used of assigned agents such as the leaders of a military host or the keeper of a prison. That word, in turn, is never used of the SoM figure, who as one enthroned is clearly a cut above a sar.

Stark then offers analysis of a defining text for the SoM, 1 Enoch. I can only say here that Stark seems to have a problem connecting the dots, as he acknowledges that te SoM figure here “is given preeminence in the heavens…shares a throne with Yahweh, judges the nations” – all the province of a being equal to Yahweh Himself in some way – yet finds it “difficult to determine whether this refers to a human or to an angel.” Stark is clearly not well informed concerning the meaning of such things as sharing a throne -- even without the honor-shame template of the Biblical world, this would clearly suggest an equation and not merely an “exaltation”.

Further “not getting it,” Stark notes that in 1 Enoch, Michael is shown to be an entirely different person than the SoM figure. This does not at all inform him that his equation of the two figures is in error. However, we will not pursue the matter further, for as we note in the article, 1 Enoch is of questionable worth.

Next Stark aims for uses of the term in the Gospels, and we need not detain ourselves overmuch, for his reading of the term as used by Jesus is informed by his incorrect grasp of the phrase as used in the OT. Hence he opts for the “just a human being” reading. Devoid of that proper defining context, it is admittedly possible to get away with such an interpretation for many passages, but it is not so easy with a couple of others. One of these is Mark 8:38 and parallels, in which Jesus says: “Whosoever therefore shall be ashamed of me and of my words in this adulterous and sinful generation; of him also shall the Son of man be ashamed, when he cometh in the glory of his Father with the holy angels.” The other is the scene of Jesus’ trial (Mark 13). Both of these must be admitted to connect to imagery in Daniel 7, and even Maurice Casey, who strained mightily to divest “Son of Man” of any divine connotations, has to resort to dismissing these passages as signifying a late church development coupled with redactive activity.

Stark likewise cannot avoid the connection between these passages and Daniel 7. Unlike Casey, however, he does not resort to the rationalizations of late redaction; rather, he makes the incredible statement that these sayings merely represent “divine agency.” We of course agree that agency is at work here, but the privileges granted to Jesus as “Son of Man” far exceed mere “agency,” as our article explains:


A considerable factor in Jesus' words is his comment that the Son of Man will be seated at the right hand of God. This is far more significant than our phrase, "right-hand man" would suggest. In a study of the matter in Blasphemy and Exaltation in Judaism [203ff], Darrell Bock discusses parallels in Jewish texts and offers these conclusions:

In short, Jesus thereby claims the prerogatives of God with the combination honor of being seated at the right hand of God, and therefore asserts his divine identity.


Does Stark counter any of this? He tries, but the results are inevitably a failure. He first must reckon with the problem of Caiphas having recognized a blasphemy. He supposes that there are “a number of things could be considered blasphemous by the high priest,” but comes up with only two. One is that, “Jesus has threatened [the Temple's] destruction and has now threatened the dynasty of the current high priesthood.” But this won’t qualify in the least, since the same sort of threats were made by Old Testament prophets. Jesus could have been charged with being a false prophet, but not “blasphemy.”

Stark’s second alternative is that “Jesus is falsely attributing to himself the prerogatives that only God’s authentic messianic agent has,” and because he has been shown to be a failure, he is not that agent. But this is yet again not “blasphemy” -- it is being a false prophet, or agent. Claiming to be a false prophet or agent does not insult the majesty of God, as blasphemy requires. Stark is vastly extending the definition of “blasphemy” to accomplish his purpose, and so is left without basis for his argument that there “is nothing like a claim to divinity here.”

Stark further asks: “If the charge against [Jesus] was a blasphemous claim to divinity, why would they tell him to prophesy? Clearly this indicates that his blasphemy was falsely claiming to speak for God: in other words, they executed him as a false prophet.” Not at all; Stark is again failing basic category logic: While not all false prophets might blaspheme by claiming divinity, one who claims divinity ought to be able to competently prophesy. The challenge is entirely apt to a divine Jesus.

Thus it is that Stark’s treatment of the SoM title is entirely inadequate. This is not surprising inasmuch as he makes absolutely no use of any relevant scholarly literature in his evaluation. He is merely a dilettante evaluating texts in English without any competent assistance.

Wisdom

Stark’s treatment of the Wisdom template is more in depth in terms of length, but no better in terms of understanding. He rightly notes that pre-existence ascribed to Wisdom does not by itself establish divinity, but fails to make any distinction between actual preexistence (which would be ascribed to Wisdom, and the Torah) and ideal preexistence (as would be ascribed to things like individuals), the way more credible scholars have. As it is, actual preexistence does make a case for divinity, even if it does not seal it; thus we have not argued in our own article that it indicates divinity in and of itself.

Initially, Stark raises the same objection as was raised by one of our JW opponents -- “Wisdom is created.” Unfortunately Stark’s study once again goes no further than thinking that the English word “created” means “created” in the same sense it does in relation to things like the earth being “created.” As we have pointed out in the article, hypostatic Wisdom is indeed “created” in a certain sense; but because it is an attribute of God, that “creation” is eternal. This is not the same sense in which, eg, the earth was “created,” ex nihilo, having not actually existed at some point. God “creates” Wisdom in the same sense as a light bulb “creates” light – but here, the bulb is eternal, so the light is as well. Thus Stark is incorrect to suppose that the use of the word “created” (again, in English!) somehow denies Wisdom its proper divinity.

Stark’s next target is the use of “firstborn,” and here again he imitates the JW line, pointing out that “it refers to a son” and so he concludes it means a created being. He asks, rather inanely, “Where in all the worlds full of Jewish literature is Yahweh ever called firstborn in reference to his authority?” That’s not really the right question – in the works of Philo, divine, eternal, hypostatic Wisdom is called God’s “firstborn son,” making it quite clear that with reference to that entity, it doesn’t entail non-divinity or non-eternality. (Oddly enough, Stark will reference this very quote later, while ignoring the fact that Philo regards this entity as eternal and also only “created” in the same hypostatic sense that orthodoxy would say of Jesus as Wisdom.)

Stark continues by quoting portions of Wisdom of Solomon and Sirach that speak of Wisdom as “created.” Apart from the error in evaluating this word we have already noted, he neglects to quote other passages from those works (as we do in our article) that describe Wisdom in terms of eternal existence. One has to wonder if this means Stark is incompetent or simply being dishonest. Another issue is passages that show that Wisdom is intrinsic to God’s identity (and therefore, eternal as God is). One of the lesser of these, Stark does quote (“I came forth from the mouth of the Most High”), but the more powerful is the very fact that this entity is called Wisdom -- an attribute that is intrinsic, and that we would think Stark might suppose would be something God was never without.

Sections following affirm nothing extraordinary: That Wisdom was a partner in creation; that Wisdom dwelt among humanity (where Stark pedantically informs us that any “impression” we may have had that “Christians invented the idea of divine Wisdom coming down from heaven and taking on a mundane form” is wrong); that the concepts of Wisdom found in the Apocryphal lit are alluded to in the NT; that Wisdom was “rejected by men”. None of this is news to anyone who is the least informed on the scholarship in the matter; Stark has not discovered sliced bread here. Tellingly, and speaking for much in terms of his honesty, Stark quotes 1 Cor. 1:30 (“Christ Jesus, who became for us wisdom from God, and righteousness and sanctification and redemption.”) but ignores the explicit identification of Jesus as Wisdom in 1:24. We get to nothing new until Stark wends his way to an argument that “the language of personification applied to divine wisdom is not meant to be taken literally. Wisdom is not really a being that God created before the foundation of the world….”

It isn’t? Why not? Here is where the rubber meets the road in two respects. The first is that even if Wisdom was merely a “personification” in the relevant passages, it is clear that the way the texts are used in the NT, it is no longer regarded as such, but as a real person. I dealt with this issue when it was argued by Unitarians, and Stark offers nothing that would serve as any sort of response.

Second, I am growing less convinced – thanks to a lack of substantive argument to the contrary – that these early writers did regard Wisdom as merely a “personification.” It is true that there are examples of “personified” virtues elsewhere in Proverbs; Folly is one such example, and Wisdom may be such where it is paired with Folly – but there, it may represent wisdom among humans; or, it may be that only Folly is meant to be seen as a personification. The point, however, is that the NT regards Wisdom as a person; and in the OT and the Apocryphal texts, the description of Wisdom is of a richness and detail that it becomes more difficult to maintain that only a personification is in view. Why should we think this is so? Stark provides no serious arguments whatsoever in support. He does say: “it is a metaphor, and most Christians readily admit this when it comes to Proverbs 8. It would be embarrassing, after all, since we all know that Jesus is Wisdom manifest, to have to admit that in Jesus’ preexistent form he was both a created being and a hot babe.” Well, I don’t “admit” any such thing; I have shown that Stark is misinformed about the use of “created,” and in the response to the Unitarians, I likewise addressed the “Wisdom is female” canard – and there is nothing “embarrassing” about it, save that Stark seems to have a certain erotic fantasy engaged on the subject. Other than this, he has nothing but bland assertion.

Logos

In a separate posting, Stark treats the matter of Jesus as Logos in John, as well as other texts in the epistalory literature. He does realize that John is paralleling the Wisdom literature here, so that is not a matter for debate. In this analysis we find much that repeats the same errors as before regarding the meaning and use of “created,” and also much of the same non-controversial identification of the Logos with certain roles such as mediator. An amusing note indicating Stark’s lack of serious study is found here:

As an aside, note first that “Father” here [in Philo] is applied to God without any reference to a “Son.” As argued earlier, the “Father/Son” motif in the New Testament has its home in the royalty tradition in Israelite religion and in the ancient near east more broadly. But it’s important to note that “Father” is an appellation for God that appears regularly outside of the context of a “Father/Son” relationship, and so we should not read occurrences of “God the Father” in the New Testament as implying the divinity of the Son (“God the Son” is a construction which never occurs). God is simply called Father. It should not be read as a crude, proto-trinitarian formula. Digression concluded.

Digression? “Regression” would be better. Had Stark studied the texts carefully, he would know that “Son of God” is used only of the incarnate Jesus, not of Wisdom. While popular usage has clouded this, the NT is quite clear in it; the lack of reference in Philo to a “Son” is of no relevance to the issue.

Stark also makes too much of Philo’s identification of the Logos as an “archangel.” Here again he plays on the English connotation of an “angel” as a non-eternal creature of God. The actual word used indicates a messenger -- a role. The same word used for “angels” in the NT is also used of John the Baptist. It connotes only activity and says nothing about epistemological nature, as Stark is trying to dishonestly imply.

Once again “not getting it,” Stark adds:

Interestingly, the Logos says of himself that he is “not uncreated like God,” but neither is he “created as you.” Instead, he is “somewhere in the midst between these two extremities.” This should not be taken to mean that the Logos is not created. As we have seen above, Philo has clearly stated on numerous occasions that the Logos is created, the first of God’s creatures. “Nor yet created as you” does not mean that the Logos is not created, but that he is not created in the same way as humankind was created.

Stark may be congratulated for coming this close, at least: Yes, eternal Wisdom is “created, yet not as you” – per our analogy of light above. But not wishing to reach for that conclusion, Stark fumbles at the goal line:

In other words, the existence of the Logos is incorporeal, or spiritual, not physical like human beings.

Beg pardon? Stark has shifted the matter from one of the process whereby Wisdom is “created” to the nature of Wisdom’s existence -- and one has nothing to do with the other. Stark is once again dishonestly pulling a bait and switch. The reality: Philo describing the Logos in terms of God’s “image” and “word” tells us that he regards the Logos as something intrinsic to God’s nature. This means in turn that there is a clear referent to what he means when he says that the Logos is “created” but “not as you” – relating that instead to the “incorporeal” existence of the Logos is an effort to pound a square peg into a round hole.

On the side, we hope Stark is being facetious when he says that John stole the idea of the Logos from Philo. As our article shows, both are working within the same broader tradition known throughout their world of ideas. But back to that peg-pounding exercise.

How then does Stark propose to interpret that the Logos is “created but not as you” and show that it has to do with the unrelated theme of corporeality? He attempts a connection based on the premise that “for Philo, the Logos is the ideal human, in a Platonic sense.” How so?

Human beings below are shadows and copies of the Logos, who is in turn a copy of God. For Philo, humankind was made “after God’s image.” Well, “God’s image” is the Logos. The Logos is the image of God.

Yes, frequent readers will see the error at once: And remark as well on the irony that Stark has now managed to combine the errors of two different cults (JWs and Mormons) into one package! Stark here takes image-language to have to do with our nature as humans, which is also a common error of many Christians, but finds its extreme (as here) in Mormonism. On the contrary, as we demonstrated, image-language has to do with authority and administrative representation; in that sense, both the Logos and humanity have been delegated the accessories of image-bearing. In contrast, Stark’s reading of image-language is a grotesque farce barely dissimilar from Mormonism. Indeed, he would be hard-pressed to not also humanify the Father if he were required to keep his exegesis consistent. As it is, he says:

…so God created a copy of himself (the Logos), and from that copy, God made another copy (Adam). The Logos is therefore both the image of God and the model human…The Logos is what humankind hopes to attain to. It is the perfect “man of God.”

But as Mormons reason, for a copy to be a copy of a copy, all three must be human. So how can Stark avoid imitating Mormonism? He cannot, but he is patently unaware of the conundrum he has drawn for himself.

So it is, with Stark continuing to force-interpret Philo to achieve the results he needs, all based on the perception of image-language as having to do with basic nature. Stark takes this further by reaching for commonalities between the Logos and men (eg, the Logos is immortal, and man was intended to be immortal) but nowhere does Philo ever say that this is because the Logos is an “ideal human form.” Humanity and immortality are not inextricably connected attributes; that both men and the Logos might have shared some sort of immortality does not mean that they thereby shared other properties.

Stark returns otherwise to the question of whether John intends for the Logos to be regarded as a person. He runs on about John’s prologue being “poetic” and that is so, but poetry can be written about real persons as well as personifications, so this tells us nothing. The more important point is that John identifies this Logos with the person Jesus, and shows no indication that incarnation alone granted the Logos personhood. Rather John writes with an obvious sense of continuity between the Logos and Jesus. Can Stark contest this? He begins with some victim rhetoric (apparently having himself been called a “theological wimp” for his aberrant views and idiosyncratic notions), then reaches for a reductio ad absurdum:

Can you imagine if Nicaea decided that Proverbs 8 meant that the Holy Spirit was Lady Wisdom, and that she sometimes took human form and called out from street corners? Imagine Nicaea had decided that the Holy Spirit was a female, based on Proverbs 8 and some other texts, and seventeen hundred years later, some arrogant over-educated [deleted] suggested that Proverbs 8 was a metaphor.

We have referenced the non-problem of Wisdom as female previously, and referred to a link with the answer. As for the former point, Stark is referencing Prov. 8:1-4, and offers this as though he thinks it would be a problem. In reality, it isn’t. There is nothing amiss with the idea that the pre-incarnate Jesus, as the Logos, in some sense was calling out from street corners; this as well fits in with the mediatorial role of the Spirit as a sort of conscience, and since Wisdom is regarded as a permeating force that holds all things together (per Paul in Colossians 1), it is patent that Wisdom must be on street corners, in the hallways, even (as children are wont to ask, wondering if God really is omnipresent) “in the toilet”. There would be nothing wrong with Nicea having decided such a thing, though given its irrelevance to the Arian heresy, they would not have done so anyway. Once again, at any rate, Stark is pinioned by his own ironies as he speaks of creeds “blinding” people to the obvious, even as he calls for his guide dog to shepherd him through the texts.

Further on, more is said of parallels between John and Apocryphal literature, in which little new is said. Stark creatively tries to displace a line from Sirach for his purposes, in trying to explain “how John understands that this Wisdom came to be associated with Jesus.” He notes Sirach 1:14:

To fear the Lord is the beginning of wisdom; she is created with the faithful in the womb.

Pairing this with a less specific passages from the Wisdom of Solomon:

Send her forth from the holy heavens, and from the throne of your glory send her, that she may labor at my side, and that I may learn what is pleasing to you. . . . Who has learned your counsel, unless you have given wisdom and sent your holy spirit from on high?

…Stark cobbles together a thesis that Sirach and WoS “answer” the question of when, according to Matthew and Luke, Jesus became identified with Wisdom – this in spite of the fact that Matthew and Luke never ask such a question, nor allude to these texts in any way. Nor indeed can these texts be so applied, unless Stark is engaging a libertarian midrash in which he claims the prophetic authority to apply Sirach in a new and different way than its context (which is how humans in and of themselves acquire wisdom). A similar attempt is made to connect the WoS passage with Gospel passages about Jesus’ baptism and the descent of the Spirit. This is pure midrash, without the authority to pursue it: Stark’s exegetical attempts otherwise are little better than the man who committed suicide because he thought God had led him to cobble together the texts “Judas went and hanged himself” and “go ye and do likewise.”

Several comments follow on whether John is assuming the virgin birth narrative, but frankly, whether he does or not has no bearing on the question of Wisdom’s eternal personhood. What is clear is that John (and Paul) identity the Risen Jesus with Wisdom, in their present. Thus they assume that Wisdom is, in their present, a person. In light of the fact that there is nothing to suggest that Wisdom merely acquired personhood in the process of Jesus’ incarnation, this completely destroys any notion such as offered by Stark that tagging Jesus as Wisdom just means, eg, his mission enacted God’s Wisdom, or that Wisdom merely “descended” on Jesus at his baptism.

The one thing we will say about the virgin birth is with reference to Stark’s idea that since the virgin birth was such a controversial subject (denied by many Christians), John would have stressed certain issues. The virgin birth was NOT denied by any “Christians,” it was denied by Ebionite heretics who postdate John by nearly a century. Of course, Stark no doubt has many contrived arguments for either dating the Ebionites very early or dating John very late, or both.

As we move on, Stark also makes use of the standard Unitarian arguments and texts that “Jesus himself distinguishes himself from God.” (eg, John 17:3). These we have refuted in the prior linked article, and Stark adds nothing to the mix. Like the Unitarians, Stark fails to understand the distinction between functional and ontological subordination. He then returns to the use of “firstborn” in Col. 1:15, and here, trying to get around the obvious use of this word to mean pre-eminence, in light of the parallel use that is just as clear in 1:18, he writes:

If we are to take the meaning of firstborn in v. 15 as “highest ranking,” what does that do for our understanding of v. 18? “He is the beginning, the highest ranking of the dead.” This would mean that he’s still dead, but as a concession, he gets to pick on all the other dead people.

While Stark calculated to make this sound as silly as possible – since he didn’t have an actual argument against it – it remains correct. Jesus does “get to pick on all the other dead people.” To put it in a less childish way than Stark, he is judge and jury over them (cf. Matt. 25) and rules them.

Or, conversely, if “firstborn of all creation” is not meant to identify Jesus as a member of creation, then “firstborn from the dead” would have to mean that Jesus wasn’t really a member of the dead either.

The argument is not so much that the phrase “is not meant to identify Jesus as a member of creation” for as we have noted, Stark fails to appreciate the point that being a “creation” and being eternal/divine are not mutually exclusive. It is because he cannot grasp this point that he cannot help but read Paul as saying that Jesus was not eternally preexistent.

Like Dunn, whom he quotes (the ONLY source Stark quotes in this entire sorrowful exercise!), Stark also fails (again!) to grasp that God’s Wisdom, as an attribute of God, cannot be anything but eternally preexistent. The alternative is to suppose that God lacked Wisdom at some point in eternity – so was God "stupid" before He created the universe? The further fact that Paul and John identify the Jesus of the present as Wisdom completes the picture. No one could read this and think, as Stark claims, that the whole thing is a mere “metaphor.” (At the same time, Dunn is also working with an outdated understanding of Jewish “monotheism,” which we address as well in the first linked article.)

In the end, Stark (and Dunn) has no argument for denying a literal identification except his own incredulity that such an identification is possible. All of his other arguments – such as Wisdom being female, the relevance of monotheism, and so on – are either badly misinformed or else grossly presumptuous. All tests for designating non-literal meaning fail.

Finally, we might comment on what Stark says of the genitive in Col. 1:15, which we reference at the end of the response to the JWs, linked above. Unfortunately Stark seems to think there are only two ways to read the genitive; Heyler, as we have noted, points out four, and the one Heyler selects is not one of the two in Stark’s options. This magnifies the point that Stark is an inept when it comes to researching these issues, as does his answer, which is to simply say that when you look at every example throughout the Greek OT of the word “firstborn” (prototokos) followed by a genitive, in every single case, it is partitive. As offered that is a thoroughly inadequate argument, and does nothing to contradict the reasons Heyler offered for rejecting the partitive genitive. In grammar, other uses can be good circumstantial evidence, but that cannot be used to contradict the direct evidence drawn from the passage itself.

Stark Naked

Based on the above, it seems fairly clear that in Stark we will have yet another uninspired performer on the stage. We’re not expecting much from his book, but will get it when we can.

Meaning, we’ll buy a used copy.